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Migration in Asia Pacific through Hubs and Hinterlands

Binod Khadria

The New Dalit Diaspora

Vivek Kumar

**Widening Income Gap and Economic Disparity among South Asians in
Canada**


Sandeep Agrawal

International Migration and Diaspora Studies Project

Zakir Husain Centre for Educational Studies

School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University

New Delhi-110 067, India



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Zakir Husain Centre for Educational Studies
School of Social Sciences
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi 110067, India
Tel: +91 11 26704417
Email: imds.jnu@gmail.com

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Understanding Migration in the Asia-Pacific Region through a Model of ‘Hubs and Hinterlands’¹

Binod Khadria

Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi

Abstract

The Asia-Pacific region has a distinction of sending large number of highly-skilled professionals to Western countries, and unskilled and/or semi-skilled labour to the Middle East. Besides, the region is also experiencing significant amount of intra-regional migration ranging from movement of high skilled workers and students, to low-skilled labourers, maids, brides, refugees, and even trafficked migrants involving violation of human rights. Almost all countries in the Asia-Pacific region experience some amount of emigration as well as immigration, but some are specifically labeled as source countries, a few as destination countries, and some others as transit countries. In addition, migrants’ profiles also vary from one country to the other ranging from the low-skill manual workers to high-skill knowledge workers and students. Even reasons for migration vary for different countries and different kinds of people ranging from economic motivations to family reunification, marriage and socio-political compulsions. In understanding the pattern of all this, one constraint is common. It is not easy to trace the pattern of outmigration from any country, but it is possible to monitor in-migration. On the basis of this dichotomy, eight countries in the Asia-Pacific, top two in each sub-region, viz., Australia and New Zealand in the Oceania; Japan and South Korea in East-Asia; Singapore and Malaysia in South-east Asia; and two most populous countries of the world – China (Hong Kong) and India could be said to have emerged as the “hubs” for in-migration from some specific countries that would define their respective “hinterlands”. Some of the hubs themselves also belong to the hinterlands of other hubs in the region. For example, whereas India is an attractive destination, a hub, for unskilled migrants, whether legal or illegal, from the neighboring countries in the subcontinent - primarily Bangladesh and Nepal, it is also a hinterland for the developed countries like Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore (and the fast developing Malaysia too) because of its emergence as a country of origin for the migration of so-called “knowledge workers,” mainly IT professionals, and large number of students in the twenty-first century. Hence it is suggested in this paper that the pattern of migration in the Asia-Pacific region can be better understood by creating a model of “hubs and hinterlands” of migration. The paper looks at the changing stocks of migrants in the Asia-Pacific countries, and attempts to understand the emerging patterns of in-migration through this model of “hubs and hinterlands”. It does not talk about out-migration per se, which would be the counterpart of in-migration, on the plea that outmigration data are practically non-existent for most countries, except for Australia which is outside the scope of this paper for in-depth analysis.

Keywords: Asia Pacific, Student Migration, Knowledge workers, Hubs and hinterlands, Refugees.

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1. Introduction

The Asia-Pacific region comprises almost 60 percent of the world population. Population movements in the Asia-Pacific region have become one of the defining features of today's increasingly globalised world. Many countries in the Asia-Pacific region, especially the developing countries such as China, India, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and several others have emerged as major source of labour to many developed countries of the world. They are predominantly known for large scale emigration of their population to Western countries of the developed world, viz., the USA, Canada, the UK, the mainland EU countries of Western Europe and so on. Besides, they also send significant number of migrants to other countries of the Asia-Pacific region, like the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries in the Middle-east, and Australia and New Zealand in the Oceania. The region sends as well as receives migrants belonging to all skill levels – ranging from unskilled and semi-skilled workers to highly skilled professionals and knowledge workers. Migrants vary from those moving for economic reasons such as domestic workers, masons, construction workers, drivers, care-givers who are considered to be in low- skilled occupations; to engineers, doctors, legal advisors, teachers, IT professionals, etc., who require at least some college education or professional degrees and are highly paid. Besides, there are significant number of people who migrate for various other reasons such as to rejoin their families, for marriage, under persecution as refugees, for higher studies and some trapped in illegal channels of trafficking.

The Asia-Pacific region, which is so vast and diverse, sends as well as receives migrants falling into each of these categories. The countries involved in these flows are highly diverse in their geography, history, societies, language, and political structures. There is significant migration across countries of the Asia-Pacific and other global regions, wherein the Asia-Pacific region as a whole sends more people than it receives (Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific, 2009: 19). Still, most Asia-Pacific migrants stay within the region, moving in many cases just to a neighbouring country. Overall, although inter- and intra-regional migration flows have given migration in Asia-Pacific region its distinct character as Asia is now emerging as a world power in the 21st century, the scope of this paper is focused upon analyzing the patterns of intra-regional in-migration in the Asia-Pacific. It is limited to in-migration because outmigration data are practically non-existent for most countries. Australia may be an exception in this regard, but outside the primary focus of this paper for any in-depth analysis. The Middle-east and the former USSR belonging to Asia are parts of the Asia-Pacific. However, for the purpose of this paper, both these regions have also been kept outside the discourse – the USSR, because historically and politically it has been more European than Asian, and the data are too complex because of the definition of migrants arising from movements within the former USSR region after 1991, when it broke into many smaller independent nations; Middle-east because it has a distinct dynamics of migration of its own, which has already been analysed in a large body of literature. Thus, the Asia-Pacific region that has been considered in this paper is the collection of all other countries in Asia and the Oceania listed in Tables 11 and 12. In other words, the emphasis is on the hyphenated region of Asia-Pacific, the joint-set part of the Asia *and* the Pacific, so to say, and not the whole set!

The region has a long history of intra-regional migration, but the patterns of its diversity and significance have not been analysed through any well-known definitive framework of

analysis so far. Our thinking about Asia-Pacific intra-regional migration is often characterized by different typologies based on different dimensions like developed versus developing (Australia, New Zealand, Japan vs. India, China, Malaysia, Pakistan), source versus destination (India, China vs. Singapore, Australia), low-skilled versus high-skilled flows (mainly low-skilled flows toward the Middle East vs. high-skilled migration toward Australia, Singapore), adjacent versus long distance moves (from Nepal to India vs. Bangladesh to Singapore) and so on. The dimensions included in these typologies are very specific and they tend to shed light on distinct aspects of migratory flows. However, since we do not have the required data set to unpack all these dimensions together, this paper proposes a generic model of “hubs and hinterlands” of migration in the Asia-Pacific, emphasizing the simple distinction between immigration and emigration: Some countries in the region have emerged as hubs for migrants from within the region to go to while some others serve as part of a hinterland from where they originate.

On the basis of this proposed dichotomy, eight countries in the Asia-Pacific, top two with highest stocks of migrants in each sub-region, viz., Australia and New Zealand in the Oceania; Japan and South Korea in East-Asia; Singapore and Malaysia in South-east Asia; and two most populous countries of the world or parts thereof – China (the Hong Kong part) and India have been identified to have emerged as the hubs for in-migration from some specific countries that would define their respective hinterlands.² Some of the hubs themselves also belong to the hinterlands of some other hubs in the region. For example, whereas India is an attractive destination, a hub for unskilled migrants, whether legal or illegal, from the neighboring countries in the subcontinent - primarily Bangladesh and Nepal, it is also a hinterland for the developed countries like Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore (and the fast developing Malaysia too) because of its emergence as a country of origin for the migration of so-called “knowledge workers,” mainly IT professionals, and large number of students in the twenty-first century.

2. Intra-Regional Migration in Asia-Pacific Region

(i) International Migrant Stocks in the Asia-Pacific Region

Over the last fifty years there has been a steady rise in international migration in Asia and the Pacific. Researching the United Nations projection data revealed that in 2010, the region (inclusive of the Middle-east, but exclusive of the former USSR) was likely to have around 29 percent of all the world’s migrants, consisting of almost 62 million international migrants (Table 1). These migrants would account for 1.4 percent of the people in overpopulated Asia, but 16.8 percent in under-populated Oceania (Table 2). Table 2 shows the trend in the international migration as a share of population for different sub-regions of the world. The share of migrants as the percentage of total population has remained highest in the Oceania (comprising the two hubs of Australia and New Zealand, and a large number of small Pacific-island hinterland countries being located in the region) during the last fifty years. While the other regions have significant proportion of their residents as migrants, Asia seems to be at the lower end in terms of this percentage, primarily because of overpopulation. Nonetheless, in terms of absolute number of migrants Asia has been hosting the highest number of them and was also projected to continue doing so with 56 million migrants (as compared to 6 million in the Oceania) in 2010 as could be seen from Table 1.

² Thailand and Taiwan are also included as hubs in this paper.

Table 1: World Migrant Stocks in Different Continents and the Asia-Pacific, 1960-2010

Regions	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010
World	77,114,679	80,796,968	84,460,125	90,368,010	101,983,149	113,206,691	155,518,065	165,968,778	178,498,563	195,245,404	213,943,812
Africa	9,177,148	9,479,091	9,961,113	10,668,640	13,831,872	14,076,809	15,972,502	17,921,345	17,062,143	17,735,600	19,263,183
Europe	14,603,457	17,074,574	19,154,448	21,592,590	23,068,860	24,180,990	27,778,054	34,072,964	37,730,382	44,634,741	50,146,329
Latin America and the Caribbean	6,151,367	6,002,175	5,834,502	5,835,456	6,110,542	6,344,910	7,130,326	6,233,506	6,470,622	6,869,399	7,480,267
Northern America	13,603,509	14,390,788	15,247,200	17,532,810	20,198,787	23,417,418	27,773,888	33,595,046	40,395,432	45,597,061	50,042,408
Asia	28,494,923	28,258,258	28,135,639	28,228,079	31,957,123	37,995,413	42,890,293	41,496,656	45,592,977	49,130,555	55,598,438
Oceania	2,142,555	2,575,891	3,034,676	3,339,599	3,564,858	3,857,741	4,365,023	4,732,999	5,015,868	5,516,274	6,014,693
USSR (former)	2,941,720	3,016,191	3,092,547	3,170,836	3,251,107	3,333,410	29,607,979	27,916,262	26,231,139	25,761,774	25,398,494
Total Asia-Pacific (Asia+Oceania)	30,637,478	30,834,149	31,170,315	31,567,678	35,521,981	41,853,154	47,255,316	46,229,655	50,608,845	54,646,829	61,613,131
Asia-Pacific migrants as percentage of world migrants	39.7	38.2	36.9	34.9	34.8	37.0	30.4	27.9	28.4	28.0	28.8

Source: Trend in International Migrants Stock: The 2008 Revision, United Nations Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs

Table 2: International migrant stocks in the World and Different Continents, percentage of respective total population, 1960-2010

Regions	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010
World	2.6	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.3	2.3	2.9	2.9	2.9	3.0	3.1
Africa	3.2	2.9	2.7	2.5	2.9	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.1	1.9	1.9
Asia	1.7	1.5	1.4	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.4
Europe	3.4	3.8	4.2	4.6	4.8	4.9	5.6	6.7	7.4	8.6	9.5
Latin America and the Caribbean	2.8	2.4	2.0	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.3
Northern America	6.7	6.6	6.6	7.2	7.9	8.8	9.8	11.2	12.7	13.6	14.2
Oceania	13.5	14.5	15.5	15.7	15.5	15.5	16.2	16.3	16.1	16.4	16.8
USSR (former)	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.2	10.3	9.6	9.1	9.0	9.0

Source: Trend in International Migrants Stock: The 2008 Revision, United Nations Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs

(ii) Trajectories of Intra-regional Migration in Asia-Pacific Region

Intra-regional migration prevailing in the Asia-Pacific region could be classified into different categories on various grounds. For example, international migration could be classified on the basis of (1) Motive (e.g., economic, family reunion, education, marriage), (2) Skill (e.g., high skilled or low-skilled migration), (3) Distance (e.g., cross-border or overseas), (4) Legality (e.g., regular/authorized or irregular/unauthorized), (5) Trigger (e.g., induced by political instability, environmental reasons) etc. There are overlaps in these categories, with some characteristics dominating some of the migration streams taking place during the last couple of decades, and some others dominating the others from those narrated below:

(a) Labour Migration

A significant amount of migration in Asia-Pacific occurs due to the economic reasons. The demand for labour in the newly industrialised economies of East and South-east Asian countries during the 1980s was responsible for a growing volume of labour migration from the developing countries like Bangladesh, Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, etc. These migrants were mostly low-skilled and used to work in the poorly paid jobs. Another group, which is much smaller in number but still significant, involves highly skilled professionals drawn mainly from India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and the Philippines. These high skilled migrants were attracted not only to fast developing labour-short Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs) and near-NICs but also to labour surplus nations like Indonesia where a mismatch between the products of the education and training system and the skilled labour demands of a rapidly restructuring and growing economy was visible (Hugo 2005). Singapore had about 150,000 workers entering every year since 2007, constituting about one-third of the nation's workforce, (*Hindustan Times*, July 15, 2010).

During the last 30 years, the flow of migrant labour towards the Middle East (often preferably called the West Asia) went through some important changes. Declining opportunities in the Middle-east coinciding with the Persian Gulf War in 1991, and increasing opportunities in East and South-east Asia led migrant labour flows to take new routes within the Asia-Pacific. Originally limited to workers from Malaysia, employers in Singapore were allowed in 1978 to hire migrants from Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Thailand; and in 1984 from what are now parts of China (Hong Kong, and Macao); the Republic of Korea; and Taiwan. Expansion led to the situation of approximately 560,000 workers being employed in Singapore in 2010. Facing the need to control the influx of the Chinese from the mainland (an average flow of 150 a day), Hong Kong looked for migrant workers from other countries, mostly for specific projects. At the same time, it allowed the hiring of foreign workers in the domestic house-help sector, opportunities that were seized mostly by the Philippines (136,000) and later by Indonesia (54,000) and Thailand (27,000). Proximity to countries of origin with a large supply of labour, lax implementation of border control and an active middlemen system resulted in two countries – Singapore and China – hosting the largest number of migrants from Asian countries (Tables 3 and 4).

Table 3: Stocks of authorized migrants, by select Hubs and Hinterlands in the Asia-Pacific, various years.

Origin countries (The Hinterlands)	Destination countries (The Hubs)						
	Japan (1997)	Republic of Korea (1996)	Taiwan Province of China (2000 end)	Hong Kong, China (Mid-1997)	Thailand (2001)	Malaysia (2002)	Singapore (2000)
Indonesia	11,936	9,600	77,830	34,300		5,67,000	1,65,600
Philippines	93,265	10,800	98,161	1,46,400		6,500	99,300
Thailand	20,669		1,42,665	25,000		2,400	99,300
China	2,52,164	26,700					76,200
Bangladesh	5,900	6,300				1,05,000	
Myanmar					4,47,100		
Other	10,98,773	95,300	7,589		1,12,500	89,100	3,04,600
Total	14,82,707	1,48,700	3,26,245	2,05,700	5,59,600	7,70,000	7,45,000

Note: Reference years are mentioned in the parentheses.

Source: Adapted from Battistella (2003), Table-1 and Asis (2004), Table 7.2 (A)

Table 4: Estimate of unauthorized migrants, by select Hubs and Hinterlands in the Asia-Pacific, various years.

Origin countries (The Hinterlands)	Destination countries (The Hubs)					
	Japan (End 1997)	Republic of Korea (2000)	Taiwan Province of China (1996)	Malaysia (1996)	Singapore (End 1998)	Thailand (2001)
Bangladesh	5,864	13,774		2,46,400		
Myanmar	5,957			25,600		4,21,719
Cambodia						42,119
China	38,957	85,429				
Indonesia			2,700	4,75,200		
Republic of Korea	52,854					
Malaysia	10,926		400			
Mongolia		12,155				
Pakistan	4,766	5,589		12,000		
Philippines	42,627	11,850	5,150	9,600		
Taiwan Province of China	9,403					
Thailand	38,191	11,309	6,000	8,000		
Viet Nam		6,991				
Others	72,242	25,404	5,750	23,200		56,159
Total	2,81,787	1,72,501	20,000	8,00,000		5,20,000
Recent total (see Note 2)	2,51,697	2,20,000		6,00,000	3,50,000	

Note: 1. Reference years are mentioned in the parentheses.

2. Cited by Battistella from an article published in 2001 in Asia Times.

Source: Battistella (2003), Table-2 and Asis (2004), Table 7.2 (B)

Authorized flows originating from South Asia and Indonesia were directed mostly towards the Middle-east and this pattern has not changed significantly for the last 20 years, except for the increasing number of Bangladeshis going to Malaysia; and the Thais to other Asian destinations, while those from the Philippines being more or less evenly distributed. The stock of authorized migrants in the major migration-receiving countries of Asia comprised approximately 4.2 million persons (Table 3), while the number of unauthorized migrants in the same countries was 2.4 million (Table 4 – recent total). However, the estimate of unauthorized migrants in South Asia has not been included.

Table 5 summarizes some estimated stocks of Asia-Pacific migrant workers in countries other than their own, mostly in the Asia-Pacific itself at the onset of 21st century. Around 2010, there may have been over 45 million Asian workers in these countries. Prominent hinterlands in South-east Asia have been the Philippines and Indonesia, and to some extent Vietnam.

Table 5: Matrix of Hubs and Hinterlands: Estimated Stocks of Intra-Asia-Pacific Migrant Workers (given years)

Hinterland	Number of workers out-migrating (in thousands)	Main Hubs	Year
Southeast Asia			
Burma/Myanmar	514.2	Thailand, India, Malaysia, Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea	2010
Thailand	810.8	Saudi Arabia, Cambodia, Malaysia, Japan, Australia, The Republic of Korea	2010
Laos	366.6	Thailand, Australia, Japan, Cambodia, New Zealand	2010
Cambodia	350.4	Australia, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Japan, Thailand	2010
Vietnam	2,226.4	Australia, Cambodia, the Republic of Korea, Japan, Thailand	2010
Philippines	4,275.2	Malaysia, Japan, Australia, United Arab Emirates	2010
Malaysia	1,481.2	Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, India Japan	2010
Singapore	297.2	Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, Japan	2010
Indonesia	2,502.3	Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Australia, Japan, Singapore, the Republic Korea,	2010
Total	12,824.30		
South Asia			
India	11,357.5	Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka	2010
Pakistan	4,667	India, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman	2010
Bangladesh	5,380.2	Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, India, United Arab Emirates	2010
Sri Lanka	1,847.5	India, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman	2010
Nepal	982.1	Thailand, India, Japan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Australia	2010
Total	24,234.30		
North East Asia			
China	8,343.6	Japan, Singapore, Thailand, Australia, Republic of Korea, Hong Kong SAR China, Macao SAR China	2010
North Korea	2,078.7	Australia, New Zealand	2010
South Korea	300.8	Japan, Australia, Cambodia	2010
Japan	771.4	Australia, Thailand, Malaysia, the Republic of Korea	2010
Total	11,494.50		

Source: Compiled from World Bank (2011), Migration and Remittance Fact book, Washington D C

(b) Student Migration

In the last four decades or so, transnational mobility for education has increased substantially. Asia-Pacific countries, particularly those with colonial links, have become the major hinterland of the developed countries for the so-called “recruitment” (implying enrolment!) of overseas students from. In 2005, out of the total students enrolled in tertiary institutions as foreign (non-resident) students, more than 2 million students comprising 52.4 percent of these were from Asian countries. China and India, two most populous countries of the region, have sent about one-fifth of all international students. However, the destinations of international students have become increasingly diverse in the last decade. Some countries in the Asia-Pacific region have emerged as major hosts to international students also. Australia

has fast emerged as one of the most popular destinations for international students just after the traditional hosts like the US and the UK. In particular for students from India it had even surpassed the UK in 2007 although there has been a decline in 2008 and 2009 (Table 7) in the wake of xenophobic attacks directed towards them - drawing the attention of international media and damage-control engagement of diplomatic circles in both countries (Baas 2010). Australia has also received large and increasing proportions of students from the other Asia-Pacific countries in 21st century. China, Japan, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore too have emerged as major hubs of foreign students in the last one decade.

Table 6 shows the stocks of international students in 'East Asia and the Pacific' region being more than one-fifth of the world total. In 2009, the number of tertiary students from all regions of the world studying in East Asia and the Pacific region was 679,055, while 401,570 were from other countries within the region. Table 7 shows that intra-regional mobility is quite prominent among countries of the Asia-Pacific region. Australia has emerged as the most important destination for tertiary students from New Zealand, Singapore and Malaysia, and third most favoured destination for those from China, India, South Korea and Japan.

Table 6: Internationally Mobile Tertiary Students by Regions of Destination (The Hubs) and Origin (The Hinterland), 2009

Regions of Destination (The Hubs)	Total No. of Foreign Students studying in the Region	Mobile Students by Regions of Origin (The Hinterlands)								
		East Asia and the Pacific	Central Asia	South and West Asia	Arab States	Sub- Saharan Africa	Latin America and the Caribbean	North America and Western Europe	Central and Eastern Europe	Unspecifie d
World	3,369,242	945,637	120,983	321,549	232,463	234,886	195,951	522,531	374,801	420,443
East Asia and the Pacific	679,055	401,570	4,422	66,399	16,532	14,212	5,496	31,642	4,676	134,106
Central Asia	47,168	3,440	25,944	4,318	1,047	31	<5	136	11,107	1,141
South and West Asia	15,358	1,801	187	4,665	4,069	1,996	42	925	91	1,582
Arab States	187,008	1,985	445	3,749	45,427	6,709	530	4,257	668	123,238
Sub-Saharan Africa	77,825	113	-	20	216	52,965	<5	68	53	24,389
Latin America and the Caribbean	80,271	4,138	33	1,337	381	6,682	44,634	8,358	220	14,488
North America and Western Europe	1,973,680	504,208	18,499	226,208	149,350	145,003	143,540	454,009	228,069	104,796
Central and Eastern Europe	308,877	28,382	71,453	14,853	15,441	7,288	1,704	23,136	129,917	16,703

Source: UIS (2011)

Table 7: Hubs and Hinterlands of Overseas Tertiary Students From and In the Asia-Pacific Countries (2009)

Country	Students Studying Abroad, from the country (As part of a Hinterland)	Main destination countries in		Students from Abroad, studying in the country (As a Hub)
		Asia-Pacific Region	Non-Asia Pacific Region	
Australia	9,968	New Zealand (2,943); Japan (326)	USA (3,150); UK (1,647); Germany (347)	257,637
New Zealand	4,530	Australia (2,393); Japan (84)	USA (1,056); UK (481); Canada (76)	38,351
China	510,314	Japan (79,394); Australia (70,357)	USA (124,225); UK (47,033); Rep. of Korea (39,309)	61,211
India	195,107	Australia (26,573); New Zealand (5,710)	USA (101,563); UK (34,065); Russian Fed. (4,314)	-
Japan	44,768	Australia (2,701)	USA (28,783); UK (3,871); France (1,847); Germany (1,778)	131,599
Republic of Korea	125,165	Australia (6,796); Japan (24,850)	USA (73,834); UK (4,277); Germany (4,105)	50,030
Singapore	19,633	Australia (10,394); Malaysia (606)	USA (3,923); UK (3,188); Canada (355)	40,401
Malaysia	53,121	Australia (19,970); Japan (2,147)	UK (12,697); USA (5,844); Russian Fed. (2,516)	41,310

Source: Compiled from UIS (2011)

(c) Women Migration

Women constitute almost half of all the immigrants in Asia (IOM 2005). There are three main routes of female migration – women migrate as independent individuals to participate in the economic activities (nurses, house-maids, entertainers, care givers); under the family reunion clause of the receiving countries mostly by marrying a person in the destination country; and trafficking (related to prostitution). Asia is one of the world's largest suppliers of female domestic workers, with Indonesia, Sri Lanka and the Philippines being the largest hinterlands of two hubs in the Asia-Pacific, i.e., Singapore and Hong Kong (China). The large majority of women in the Asia-Pacific region work in the domestic house-maid services or entertainment, and even in the flesh trade.

Intra-regional migration for family reunification through marriage is increasing in the Asia-Pacific region. In many East and South-east Asian countries, the increase in women's participation in the workforce – coupled with a trend towards delaying or forgoing marriage and childbearing altogether – is leading to a demand for more 'traditional' brides from the surrounding regions in order to maintain the household.³ In Taiwan, for example, brides now represent about half of the total migrant population.⁴ Since the 1990s, nearly 100,000 Vietnamese women have married Taiwanese men.⁵ There is also a surge in the number of women migrating to South Korea to marry local men.⁶ Significant numbers of Filipino women are married to men in Japan, Australia, (and North America and Europe).⁷ In South Korea, 47 percent of the foreign brides came from Vietnam, 26 percent from China and 10 percent from Cambodia. (www.asiaone.com July 7, 2010). 'Mail order brides', the term generally used for women who intend to marry across the border or overseas through matrimonial negotiations involving transnational commercial agencies, has gained currency in the practice of international migration in the region.

(d) Human Trafficking

Human trafficking is a major human rights violation issue faced by countries the world over. It is also referred to as modern day slavery where the victims experience various forms of exploitation. Around 4 million people are reportedly trafficked annually, the majority of whom are women and children, although increasing numbers of men and boys are also targeted by traffickers for forced labour exploitation and other practices. The major forms of human trafficking are forced labour, sex trafficking, bonded labour, debt bondage among migrant labourers, involuntary domestic servitude, forced child labour, child soldiers, and child sex trafficking.

³ G. W. Jones and K. Ramdas (Eds). 2004. *(Un)tying the Knot: Ideal and Reality in Asian Marriage*. Singapore: Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore. Cited in: "Transnational Migration, Marriage and Trafficking at the China-Vietnam Border," p. 4 by Duong, L. B., D. Bélanger, and K. T. Hong. 2005. Paper prepared for the Seminar on Female Deficit in Asia: Trends and Perspectives, Singapore, 5-7 December 2005. Paris: Committee for International Cooperation in National Research in Demography. SWOP.

⁴ Tsay, C.-L. 2004. "Marriage Migration of Women from China and South-East Asia to Taiwan." Pp. 173-191 in: *(Un)tying the Knot: Ideal and Reality in Asian Marriage*, edited by G. W. Jones and K. Ramdas. 2004. Singapore: Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore. Cited in: "Recent Trends in International Migration in the Asia Pacific" (ESID/SIIM/13), p. 12, by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, UNFPA, International Organization for Migration, Asian Forum of Parliamentarians on Population and Development. 2005. Regional Seminar on the Social Implications of International Migration, 24-26 August 2005, Bangkok. Bangkok: United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, UNFPA, International Organization for Migration, Asian Forum of Parliamentarians on Population and Development. SWOP.

⁵ Wang, H., and S. Chang. 2002. "The Commodification of International Marriages: Cross-border Marriage Business in Taiwan and Viet Nam." *International Migration* 40(6): 93-114. SWOP.

⁶ Lee, H.-K. 2003. "Gender, Migration and Civil Activism in South Korea." *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal* 12(1-2): 127-154. Cited in: "Recent Trends in International Migration in Asia and the Pacific," p. 34, by M. M. B. Asis. 2005. *Asia-Pacific Population Journal* 20(3): 15-38. SWOP.

⁷ Hugo, Graeme. 2005. Migration in the Asia-Pacific region: A paper prepared for the Policy Analysis and Research Programme of the Global Commission on International Migration. Global Commission on International Migration. p.20.

Some countries have been identified as origin countries, some are destination countries and some play the role of transit countries in trafficking. A basic constraint in assessing the changing patterns of trafficking in the Asia-Pacific is the lack of data. The reasons for the scarcity of such data are the underground and illegal nature of trafficking, lack of anti-trafficking legislation in many countries, reluctance of victims to report their experiences to the authorities, and the lack of governmental priority given to data collection and research. The IOM global human trafficking database is the world's largest database of primary information on registered victims of trafficking (VoTs), containing only primary data on 13,809 registered victims of more than 85 different nationalities trafficked to more than 100 destination countries at the end of 2009. However, it is only available to IOM personnel. Sex tourism in South and South-east Asia is highly prevalent and is a major problem that the governments of different countries in the region have to deal with.

The US Department of State publishes Annual Reports on Trafficking in Persons and this report is not merely US-specific but has a global perspective covering 177 nations. The report gives country narratives and also differentiates the countries into different tiers. According to the 10th annual Trafficking in Persons Report published in 2010, the Tier Ranking of countries in the Asia-Pacific region is as follows (Table 8). The report defines the different 'Tiers' as given in the Box 1. The tiers are based more on the extent of government action to combat trafficking than on the size of the problem, although the latter is also an important factor (see Box 1).

Table 8: Human Trafficking Tier Classification of Asia-Pacific Countries

Tier 1
Australia
New Zealand
Taiwan
Tier 2
Cambodia
Hong Kong
Indonesia
Japan
South Korea
Macau
Nepal
Pakistan
Timor-Leste
Tier 2 Watch List
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Brunei
China (PRC)
Fiji
India
Laos
Malaysia
Maldives
Philippines
Singapore
Sri Lanka
Thailand
Vietnam
Tier 3
Burma
North Korea
Papua New Guinea

Source: Trafficking in Persons Report 2010

Box 1**TIER 1**

Countries whose governments fully comply with the Trafficking Victims Protection Act's (TVPA) minimum standards

TIER 2

Countries whose governments do not fully comply with the TVPA's minimum standards, but are making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with those standards

TIER 2 WATCH LIST

Countries whose governments do not fully comply with the TVPA's minimum standards, but are making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with those standards, AND: a) the absolute number of victims of severe forms of trafficking is very significant or is significantly increasing; b) there is a failure to provide evidence of increasing efforts to combat severe forms of trafficking in persons from the previous year; or, c) the determination that a country is making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with minimum standards was based on commitments by the country to take additional future steps over the next year

TIER 3

Countries whose governments do not fully comply with the minimum standards and are not making significant efforts to do so

Source: Trafficking in Persons Report 2010

e) Refugee Migration

Among the five regions⁸ defined by UNHCR, the Asia and Pacific records the highest number of refugees and people in refugee like situations. Table 9 shows the refugee population in the Asia and Pacific region for 2007-2009. The data shows increase in refugees and people in refugee-like situations in the region as a percentage of the global total. The global total for refugees has declined but total refugees in the Asia Pacific region has increased. Out of the ten major refugee hosting countries in the world, three are in the Asia Pacific Region, viz., Pakistan, Iran, and China. Pakistan is host to the largest number of refugees worldwide. Afghanistan is a major source country for refugees in the region. Almost the whole refugee populations in Pakistan as well as in Iran are from Afghanistan. Around 2.9 million Afghans were refugees at the end of 2009. Another major source country for refugees in the region is Myanmar.

Table 9: Refugee population in Asia-Pacific (2007-2009)

Region	Refugees			People in Refugee-like situations			Total Refugees		
	2007	2008	2009	2007	2008	2009	2007	2008	2009
Asia Pacific	2,675,900	2,577,800	2,666,600	1,149,100	1,018,300	1,189,400	3,825,000	3,596,100	3,856,000
Global total	9,681,200	9,050,500	8,806,800	1,709,400	1,428,100	1,589,700	11,390,600	10,478,600	10,396,500
Percentage of Asia Pacific	27.6	28.5	30.3	67.2	71.3	74.8	33.6	34.3	37.1

Source: Compiled from UNHCR, various years

Table 10 presents select Asia-Pacific countries as origin and destination of refugees as of January 2010. The table highlights the fact that the some of the hubs for international migrants in the region are not hubs for refugees. For example, hubs like Australia, New

⁸ Africa, Americas, Asia and Pacific, Europe, Middle East and North Africa

Zealand, Japan and Korea are destination and origin countries for very few refugees, whereas Pakistan, Iran and China are their major destinations.

Table 10: Refugees in Select Asia-Pacific countries, by Hubs and Hinterlands (As on January 2010)

Countries ¹	Refugees from the Hinterland ²	Refugees in the Hub ²
Australia	28	22,548
China ³	180,558	300,989
Japan	150	2,332
Korea, Republic of	573	268
New Zealand	10	3,289
India	19,514	185,323
Sri Lanka	145,721	251
Bangladesh	10,432	228,586
Myanmar	406,669	0
Thailand	502	105,297
Viet Nam ³	339,289	2,357
Afghanistan ⁴	2,887,123	37
Iran, Islamic Republic of	72,774	1,070,488
Pakistan ⁴	35,132	1,740,711
Total	4,098,475	3,662,476

Source: UNHCR/Governments.

Notes: ¹The data are generally provided by Governments, based on their own definitions and methods of data collection. Country or territory of asylum or residence. In the absence of Government estimates, UNHCR has estimated the refugee population in most industrialized countries based on 10 years of asylum-seekers recognition.

²Persons recognized as refugees under the 1951 UN Convention/1967 Protocol, the 1969 OAU Convention, in accordance with the UNHCR Statute, persons granted a complementary form of protection and those granted temporary protection. It also includes persons in a refugee-like situation whose status has not yet been verified.

³The 300,000 Vietnamese refugees in China are well integrated and in practice receive protection from the Government of China.

⁴Afghan refugee figure for Pakistan includes individually recognized Afghan refugees (2,800), registered Afghans in refugee villages who are assisted by UNHCR (756,000), and registered Afghans outside refugee villages who are living in a 'refugee-like' situation (981,000). Individuals in all categories have been issued a Proof of Registration Card by the Government of Pakistan. Following the completion of the registration exercise in 2007, those living outside refugee villages are now in the 'refugee-like' category. They do not receive direct UNHCR material assistance but they benefit from advocacy and reintegration support upon return.




Figure 1: Stock of Foreign Population, in select 'Hubs' of the Asia-Pacific, 1990 and 2010

Source: ESCAP (2010)

3. Hubs of International Migration in the Asia-Pacific

As mentioned earlier, countries of Asia-Pacific region could be classified into two broad categories – some are mainly immigration countries and some emigration countries. Immigration countries that serve as the shelter to many immigrants and are the favourite destination for migrants in the region have been identified as the “hubs” in this paper. Countries sending migrants to each of the hubs make what I have called its “hinterland”. Each hub attracts migrants from many a country, mostly from the neighbourhood and some from distant ones as well. I have identified eight countries as these hubs of in-migration in the Asia-Pacific Region. Tables 11 and 12 provide the detailed time series of in-migration to these eight hubs (from countries worldwide and not only from those in the Asia-Pacific region) and their comparison with the smaller in-migration in their hinterlands, for 1960-1985 and 1990-2010 respectively. Figure 1 shows the change in the stock of in-migrants in six of the eight hubs (i.e., excepting Korea and New Zealand) over twenty years between 1990 and 2010, which can be interpreted as the transition in the pattern of in-migration between the twentieth and the twenty-first century.⁹

Table 11: International Migrant Stocks in the Hubs and Non-Hub Countries of the Asia-Pacific, 1960-85

Major area, region, country or area	International migrant stock at mid-year (both sexes)					
	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985
USSR (former)	2,941,720	3,016,191	3,092,547	3,170,836	3,251,107	3,333,410
ASIA	28,494,923	28,258,258	28,135,639	28,228,079	31,957,123	37,995,413
Eastern Asia	2,809,961	2,945,203	3,031,465	3,401,664	3,899,157	4,112,421
China	245,684	260,479	280,404	298,474	311,194	323,937
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	25,072	26,596	28,568	30,345	31,588	32,859
Hong Kong, SAR China	1,627,488	1,696,828	1,715,474	1,884,492	2,100,549	2,184,333
Japan	692,651	712,854	725,139	770,342	802,422	850,775
Macao, SAR China	79,831	88,227	97,506	107,761	119,095	154,518
Mongolia	3,684	4,072	4,501	4,975	5,499	6,078
Republic of Korea	135,551	156,147	179,873	305,275	528,810	559,921
Southern Asia	17,871,416	17,221,957	16,599,172	15,770,855	16,209,949	19,004,143
Afghanistan	46,468	49,535	53,051	57,043	59,021	56,118
Bangladesh	661,411	685,166	726,989	768,579	804,526	842,155
Bhutan	9,676	11,243	13,063	15,178	17,635	20,490
India	9,410,535	9,350,557	9,181,520	9,011,238	8,845,466	8,131,017
Iran (Islamic Republic)	48,374	53,761	86,165	157,166	555,455	2,855,231
Maldives	1,703	1,802	1,916	2,055	2,225	2,422
Nepal	337,636	344,550	345,489	299,373	251,180	313,922
Pakistan	6,350,296	5,698,452	5,105,556	4,574,348	5,012,524	6,288,210
Sri Lanka	1,005,317	1,026,891	1,085,423	885,875	661,917	494,578
South-Eastern Asia	3,859,318	3,545,601	3,683,481	3,038,305	3,004,053	2,939,424
Brunei Darussalam	20,562	26,038	32,903	41,032	50,977	61,374
Cambodia	381,271	373,625	342,322	14,551	4,168	12,647
Indonesia	1,859,466	1,475,121	1,170,220	928,340	756,851	593,098
Lao People's Democratic Republic	19,646	20,177	20,688	21,247	26,990	22,901
Malaysia	56,895	204,679	736,323	717,901	789,130	908,395
Myanmar	286,559	279,484	272,584	265,854	188,051	133,053
Philippines	219,676	219,555	217,435	162,045	134,439	145,508
Singapore	519,246	525,047	530,873	529,006	527,453	619,330
Thailand	484,839	409,954	347,394	344,715	479,387	406,658
Timor-Leste	7,148	7,705	8,306	8,953	7,706	8,307
Viet Nam	4,010	4,216	4,433	4,661	38,901	28,153
Western Asia	3,954,228	4,545,497	4,821,521	6,017,255	8,843,964	11,939,425
Bahrain	26,733	38,357	37,946	60,092	103,466	137,052
Cyprus	29,589	32,483	34,485	36,610	38,866	41,262
Iraq	87,752	78,709	74,870	71,219	68,826	111,660
Israel	1,185,573	1,291,182	1,408,744	1,446,242	1,430,985	1,522,681
Jordan	385,789	453,521	531,617	675,638	810,326	942,798

⁹ Various snapshots of migration in each of the eight hubs are available on the weblink.

Understanding Migration in the Asia-Pacific Region through a Model of 'Hubs and Hinterlands'

Kuwait	90,629	240,583	463,366	664,156	966,341	1,240,806
Lebanon	151,443	174,368	190,842	208,567	241,367	347,773
Occupied Palestinian Territory	490,250	544,665	584,506	625,953	692,030	785,596
Oman	43,656	52,362	62,804	75,328	146,043	282,251
Qatar	14,400	34,091	68,339	119,182	165,426	281,907
Saudi Arabia	63,389	155,823	356,996	928,827	1,920,478	3,401,020
Syrian Arab Republic	276,050	319,431	367,760	429,290	497,764	627,729
Turkey	947,635	926,865	376,394	144,529	784,193	933,014
United Arab Emirates	2,194	25,981	65,827	312,400	718,479	1,007,837
Yemen	159,146	177,076	197,025	219,222	259,374	276,039
OCEANIA	2,142,555	2,575,891	3,034,676	3,339,599	3,564,858	3,857,741
Australia and New Zealand	2,031,944	2,440,872	2,865,968	3,152,310	3,366,838	3,623,523
Australia	1,698,085	2,054,727	2,456,522	2,659,453	2,896,444	3,143,480
New Zealand	333,859	386,145	409,446	492,857	470,394	480,043
Melanesia	57,793	74,231	96,929	98,720	89,724	95,146
Fiji	20,078	17,953	16,394	15,071	14,025	13,103
New Caledonia	10,979	17,630	23,392	32,108	33,811	34,648
Papua New Guinea	20,189	31,694	49,755	43,690	34,088	40,373
Solomon Islands	3,715	3,895	4,084	4,282	4,289	4,270
Vanuatu	2,832	3,059	3,304	3,569	3,511	2,752
Micronesia	41,681	45,689	50,322	58,135	67,069	88,213
Guam	31,001	34,190	37,806	43,897	50,997	59,836
Kiribati	610	602	587	771	1,639	2,055
Marshall Islands	846	936	1,035	1,144	1,265	1,399
Micronesia (Federated States of)	5,848	5,563	5,292	5,034	4,542	4,098
Nauru	410	951	1,596	2,634	3,217	3,645
Northern Mariana Islands	2,648	3,077	3,576	4,155	4,828	15,870
Palau	318	370	430	500	581	1,310
Polynesia	11,137	15,099	21,457	30,434	41,227	50,859
American Samoa	2,384	4,170	7,248	10,843	13,594	17,073
Cook Islands	778	928	1,181	1,532	2,128	2,448
French Polynesia	3,665	5,480	8,194	12,252	18,015	23,734
Niue	235	285	377	433	457	476
Pitcairn	10	8	8	7	5	6
Samoa	3,430	3,442	3,373	3,742	4,347	2,422
Tokelau	107	123	143	167	205	258
Tonga	121	236	460	895	1,741	3,386
Tuvalu	372	363	355	347	339	331
Wallis and Futuna Islands	35	64	118	216	396	725

Source: Trend in International Migrants Stock: The 2008 Revision, United Nations Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs

Table 12: International Migrant Stocks in the Hubs and Non-Hub Countries of Asia-Pacific, 1990-2010


Major area, region, country or area	International migrant stock at mid-year				
	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010
ASIA	50,875,665	48,768,018	51,915,384	55,128,485	61,323,979
Central Asia	6,627,683	5,815,387	5,182,032	5,059,631	4,970,148
Kazakhstan	3,619,200	3,295,400	2,871,300	2,973,574	3,079,491
Kyrgyzstan	623,083	481,787	372,532	288,053	222,731
Tajikistan	425,900	304,900	330,300	306,433	284,291
Turkmenistan	306,500	259,600	241,000	223,732	207,700
Uzbekistan	1,653,000	1,473,700	1,366,900	1,267,839	1,175,935
Eastern Asia	4,483,812	5,082,820	5,716,496	6,185,340	6,485,446
China	376,361	437,269	508,034	590,252	685,775
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	34,103	35,291	36,183	36,765	37,121
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China	2,218,473	2,431,422	2,669,122	2,721,139	2,741,800
Japan	1,075,626	1,362,512	1,686,567	1,998,884	2,176,219
Macao Special Administrative Region of China	200,478	224,453	240,313	278,038	299,692
Mongolia	6,718	7,425	8,206	9,069	10,022
Republic of Korea	572,053	584,448	568,071	551,193	534,817
South-Eastern Asia	3,060,304	3,551,917	4,838,013	5,623,545	6,714,768
Brunei Darussalam	73,200	87,305	104,128	124,193	148,123
Cambodia	38,375	116,441	236,655	303,871	335,829
Indonesia	465,612	219,140	292,307	135,623	122,908
Lao People's Democratic Republic	22,866	23,445	21,734	20,276	18,916
Malaysia	1,014,156	1,192,734	1,553,777	2,029,208	2,357,603

Myanmar	133,538	113,659	98,024	93,243	88,695
Philippines	159,430	210,286	322,667	374,786	435,423
Singapore	727,301	991,549	1,351,806	1,493,976	1,966,865
Thailand	387,454	548,824	791,560	981,960	1,157,263
Timor-Leste	8,954	9,652	9,274	11,909	13,836
Viet Nam	29,418	38,882	56,081	54,500	69,307
Southern Asia	20,195,841	16,272,052	15,669,377	13,847,015	14,303,823
Afghanistan	57,686	70,205	75,917	86,451	90,883
Bangladesh	881,617	1,006,448	987,853	1,031,886	1,085,345
Bhutan	23,807	27,660	32,137	37,338	40,246
India	7,493,204	7,022,165	6,411,272	5,886,870	5,436,012
Iran (Islamic Republic)	4,291,601	3,015,539	2,803,805	2,062,218	2,128,685
Maldives	2,652	2,870	3,026	3,151	3,280
Nepal	430,651	624,880	717,751	818,702	945,865
Pakistan	6,555,782	4,076,599	4,242,689	3,554,009	4,233,592
Sri Lanka	458,841	425,686	394,927	366,390	339,915
Western Asia	16,508,025	18,045,842	20,509,466	24,412,954	28,849,794
Armenia	658,789	681,557	574,235	492,570	324,184
Azerbaijan	360,600	524,518	347,540	254,509	263,940
Bahrain	173,200	205,977	239,366	278,166	315,403
Cyprus	43,805	55,203	80,076	116,157	154,253
Georgia	338,300	249,900	218,600	191,220	167,269
Iraq	83,638	133,733	146,910	128,115	83,380
Israel	1,632,704	1,919,314	2,256,237	2,661,261	2,940,494
Jordan	1,146,349	1,607,661	1,927,845	2,345,235	2,972,983
Kuwait	1,585,280	1,089,545	1,500,442	1,869,665	2,097,527
Lebanon	523,693	655,832	692,913	721,191	758,167
Occupied Palestinian Territory	910,637	1,200,972	1,407,631	1,660,576	1,923,808
Oman	423,572	582,463	623,608	666,263	826,074
Qatar	369,816	405,915	470,731	712,861	1,305,428
Saudi Arabia	4,742,997	4,610,694	5,136,402	6,336,666	7,288,900
Syrian Arab Republic	690,349	816,799	924,086	1,326,359	2,205,847
Turkey	1,150,463	1,211,865	1,263,140	1,333,883	1,410,947
United Arab Emirates	1,330,324	1,715,980	2,286,174	2,863,027	3,293,264
Yemen	343,509	377,914	413,530	455,230	517,926
OCEANIA	4,365,023	4,732,999	5,015,868	5,516,274	6,014,693
Australia and New Zealand	4,104,553	4,447,964	4,712,579	5,193,405	5,673,562
Australia	3,581,363	3,853,736	4,027,478	4,335,846	4,711,490
New Zealand	523,190	594,228	685,101	857,559	962,072
Melanesia	91,222	97,679	98,410	104,650	110,631
Fiji	13,671	14,752	15,918	17,176	18,533
New Caledonia	37,673	44,697	49,651	54,475	59,767
Papua New Guinea	33,053	31,247	25,515	25,493	24,546
Solomon Islands	4,668	5,293	6,001	6,468	6,971
Vanuatu	2,157	1,690	1,325	1,038	814
Micronesia	110,946	124,006	136,647	144,827	151,124
Guam	69,755	71,934	74,181	76,498	78,887
Kiribati	2,162	2,025	2,009	1,993	1,978
Marshall Islands	1,547	1,586	1,626	1,667	1,709
Micronesia (Federated States of)	3,697	3,349	3,105	2,878	2,668
Nauru	3,928	4,233	4,562	4,921	5,308
Northern Mariana Islands	26,988	36,217	44,866	50,839	54,798
Palau	2,869	4,662	6,298	6,031	5,776
Polynesia	58,302	63,350	68,232	73,392	79,376
American Samoa	21,283	23,026	24,912	26,585	28,370
Cook Islands	2,587	2,734	2,785	2,795	2,805
French Polynesia	25,830	28,189	30,329	32,489	34,803
Niue	461	436	412	389	368
Pitcairn	6	6	6	6	6
Samoa	3,200	4,551	5,708	7,158	8,976
Tokelau	269	264	259	258	259
Tonga	3,015	2,192	1,594	1,163	848
Tuvalu	323	267	221	183	151
Wallis and Futuna Islands	1,328	1,685	2,006	2,366	2,790

Source: Trend in International Migrants Stock: The 2008 Revision, United Nations Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs

4. Conclusion:

One thing remains to be stated though. By and large the presence and significance of many small islands in the Pacific like Fiji, Samoa, PNG, Nauru, and Guam etc. has continued to remain outside the discourse of migration in the Asia-Pacific region. Figure 2 shows that not only Singapore and Macao (China), but other small islands have also experienced high proportion of foreign migrants in their population beyond 25 percent.



(having more than 25% foreign population in 2010)

Figure 2: Foreign Population as a Share of the Total Population, select Hub and non-Hub small Asia-Pacific Island Countries, 1990 and 2010

Source: ESCAP (2010)

However, these islands have remained neglected both in academic discussions and policy analysis (Khadria 2004), whether of global migration or that in Asia-Pacific. I had made a distinction elsewhere between a 'telescopic perspective' and 'microscopic perspective' in tracing and analysing the patterns of migration in the Asia-Pacific, and stressed the point that it is the latter which is essential while looking at the small island economies of Asia-Pacific region (Khadria 2007). There have been some attempts in doing so by some dedicated and committed individual researchers (Bedford 2006); but traces of institutional efforts have so far not been reflected in global dialogues or discussions about migration and development. The consequent lack of data sets on these small island economies have worsened the data problem which is pervasive across most countries of the Asia-Pacific, whether large or small, and stands in the way of drawing the past and/or the emerging patterns of migration in the region – a task not accomplished adequately or satisfactorily as yet, not to speak of completely.

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The New Dalit Diaspora: A Sociological Analysis¹

Vivek Kumar

Jawaharlal Nehru University

Abstract

Although there is a tendency among the social scientists of India to project Indian Diaspora as a monolithic whole, it is a fact that Indian Diaspora is internally differentiated on regional, religious, linguistic and caste lines. The intensity with which Diaspora responds to any happening within their respective community or region of origin amply proves this differentiation. The responses of Punjabi, Gujarati, Malayali, Tamil and even Bihari Diaspora to the crises faced by their respective community and regions of origin should be seen in the same light. In the same vein Dalit Diaspora has been highlighting the issues of violation of Dalit Human Rights in India at the international forums and is involved in philanthropic activities back home. However, except a few exceptions (Schawartz, 1967) Indian Diaspora has not been analyzed through caste perspective. Therefore there is a genuine need for the study of Dalit Diaspora which will help us to understand Indian Diaspora through caste perspective also. This article will begin by analyzing the processes of crystallization of Dalit Diaspora and its types. We know that Dalit Diaspora can be divided into 'Old' and 'New' (Kumar, 2009). However, we will restrict ourselves to the analyses of 'New Dalit Diaspora'. The article will analyze the nature, composition and structures prevalent in the 'New Dalit Diaspora'. The article also records the mechanism through which Dalits are asserting their independent identity in Diaspora; outside the unified identity of Indian Diaspora. Further, the article also tries to understand the dynamics of usage of symbols- both religious and secular, by Dalits, for establishing unity and solidarity among themselves in Diaspora. The causes and methods of formation of independent religious and social organizations have also been explored in this paper. By analyzing and exploring these issues we can really understand-one, the presence of caste, second caste discrimination, third, the assertion of independent identity by the Dalits and thereby existing differentiation within the Indian Diaspora.

Keywords: Migration, Heterogeneity of diaspora, Indian Diaspora, Caste Discrimination, New Dalit Diaspora

1. Migration and formation of Dalit Diaspora

At the outset it is true that Indian Diaspora crystallized because of migration of Indians during Colonial period when the Indians migrated as indentured laborers or under the Kangani system to different parts of the world. Same is true for the Dalit Diaspora as well. Migration of Indian Dalits as indentured laborers to different countries is also a fact. For instance, the table below depicts the migration the Dalit castes as indentured laborers to Mauritius. Migration for Mauritius had started in 1834 after the abolition of slavery in the British colonies and the colonies required farm laborers. Indian farmers were most suited for

¹ Because of publication delay, this Working Paper, although dealing with 2012 data, appears in a 2011 issue.

the job and were preferred over the Africans. These figures are for the period between 1843 and 1873 when the Dalits were taken as indentured laborers.

Table 1: Dalit Castes' Migrants to Mauritius

S.No.	Name of the Castes	Men	Women	
1	Chamars	338	96	
2	Doshad	186	46	
3	Dhangar	68	19	
4	Bhuiya	40	21	
5	Pasi	26	6	
6	Dhobi	25	--	
7	Moochi	23	--	
Total		706	188	894

Source: Carter Marina, 1995, *Servants, Sirdars, and Settlers: Indians in Mauritius 1834-1874*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, pp. 202-203.

Further, Carter (1995, p. 98) also suggests that, "...out of 1659 individuals traveling from Calcutta to Mauritius between April-July 1872, 38 percent were respectable agriculture castes, 27 percent low castes and artisan castes 13 percent." In the same vein, according to an estimate of 60,965 Indian Indentured labors who migrated to Fiji between 1879, when the migration began until 1916 when it finally ceased, about 11,907 or 26.2 percent belonged to low menial castes like Chamars, Koris, Pasis, etc. (Lal 1984, pp. 126-130). Similarly, Brereton (1974, p. 26) writes, "To give some figures, between 1876 and 1885 the caste derivation of Hindu arrivals in Trinidad was: Brahman and other high castes 18 percent; artisan castes 8.5 percent; agricultural castes 32 percent; low castes 41.5 percent". The percent of low castes was really very high. The members of Dalit International Organization (DIO) Malaysia revealed that the Dalits especially from the then Madras presidency were brought here as indentured laborers some hundred years back by the colonial rulers. According to their information that Dalits here constitute sixty five percent of the ten percent of the total Indian population settled in Malaysia. In this context (Jain 1984, p. 175) makes an interesting point. Although he accepts that many untouchable castes (Adi- Dravidas) migrated to Malay (as Malaysia was known at that point in time) but he argues that it is difficult to substantiate it statistically. These are few examples of Dalits migrating in Colonial period. We have come across data that proves their presence in countries like-South Africa and Surinam as well. However, the irony is that nothing has been written exclusively about the existence, culture or organization, etc. of Dalits in this Old Indian Diaspora. Their identity has been submerged in the larger Indian Diaspora identity.

Apart from migration of Dalits as indentured laborers the Dalits have also migrated as free laborers and professionals to European Countries, United States of America, Canada, Middle East etc. For instance, Dalits in Canada celebrated centennial ceremony of their arrival in Canada in August 2006. The souvenir published by Shri Guru Ravidas Sabha (Vancouver) acknowledges that the first group of Dalits came to Canada in the year 1906 and settled on the west coast of Canada. Similarly, Dalit activists from Punjab narrated that their migration to United Kingdom dates back to before independence. However, according to Juergensmeyer (1982, pp. 245-246), "Between 1950 and 1968 before rigorous immigration policies were imposed, hundreds of thousands of Indians emigrated to Britain, a remarkably large percentage of them Punjabis. More remarkable still, there was a heavy representation from Scheduled Castes (Dalits), especially from *Chamar* subcastes. There are no exact figures, but Indian consular officials estimated that the percentage of Scheduled Castes immigrants within the total Punjabi community was as high as 10 percent "(According to him about

300,000 Indians emigrated to England during the first twenty years after independence, when Indians automatically received commonwealth status and were allowed into the country). A Dalit respondent from Punjab who in one of his Articles wrote, "I came to Britain in the late 1960s from a remote village in India" (Muman, 2000, p. 71).

During this epoch mostly illiterate Dalits migrated as industrial and domestic laborers and got settled there. But after 1960s various professionals like doctors and engineers and businessmen also migrated establishing a vibrant Dalit Diaspora in UK. In the same vein although Dalits Diaspora in US crystallized only in 1960s and 1970s, Dalits have a long history of to and fro migration between US and India. The respondents during my fieldwork from January 2012 to mid-May 2012 told that this relationship began when few individuals came to US for some specific job and then returned back, but some did not go. For instance, they told that, Mangoo Ram a Dalit Sikh became towering leader of Ad Dharma movement in Punjab in 1920s came to US in the year 1909 as a farm laborer in California. He went back to India in the year 1915. B. R. Ambedkar came to US in 1913 for his graduate studies at the age of 23 and remained here till 1916. After that he came again in 1952 to receive his Ph.D. degree. In between Dalit Sikhs immigrated, specifically, to California during 1920s and 1930s from Fiji. After this a bunch of Dalit students started coming to US universities in 1950s for their higher studies. Some students returned to India after completing their studies to come back to US, while others could not finish their education and got some job to settle down in US. Apart from these after 1960s some engineers and doctors came on green card to settle down in US. Together, the illiterate Ravidasis, students for higher education and professionals gradually crystallized in US Dalit Diaspora. Mention may be made here of the President of the Indian chapter of *Apravasi Dhobi Mahasangh* (Confederation Non resident Indian *Dhobi* [washer man]) who informed the author that, "the *Dhobi* community has been migrating and living in Middle-East countries since Second World War when the British forces took them there as manual laborers and some of them as soldiers. Since then they are maintaining a regular flow of the community members in the four countries namely- Iraq, Iran, Bahrain, and Kuwait. In these countries they are concentrated in number of cities like- Baghdad, Albasra, Abudahabi, Dohaquatar, Dubai, Muscat, Sarjaha, Salal, etc. However, because of the law of the aforesaid countries they have not been able to settle down there permanently and hence an Indian Diaspora could not evolve.

2. Two Types of Dalit Diaspora

From the above, based on the nature of emigration and temporal history of migration of Dalits we can locate two strands of Dalit Diaspora- the 'Old' and the 'New' (Kumar, 2004; 2009). The 'Old' comprises of indentured laborers and assisted laborers who were taken to different parts of Africa like- Mauritius, South Africa, to parts of Asia like-Malaysia, Burma, to parts of Caribbean Latin America like- Trinidad, Guyana, Surinam and to Pacific like Fiji during Colonial period. The contractors and British government facilitated the emigration of Dalits along with other Indians, when slavery was abolished in 1834. This type of Dalit Diaspora had lost touch with their country of origin and remained aloof till recently when the 'New' Dalit Diaspora renewed their links after the emergence of process of globalization. We have now started reading about them on electronic medium.

The other stream of 'New' Dalit Diaspora includes semi-literate, literate and professionally trained Dalits who have immigrated especially to Europe, United States of

America, Canada, Australia and other developed countries of the world. The members of this Diaspora migrated to the aforesaid countries as industrial and farm laborers, technicians, mechanics, drivers, students and professionals like- engineers, doctors, management experts, software engineers, etc. There were more opportunities for software engineers after the era of information revolution in 1990s. The 'New' Dalit Diaspora particularly the professionals and students have used the modern electronic technology of internet, e-magazines, blogs, Facebook, Twitter, e-mails and websites stated by the Dalit themselves to unite the 'Old' and 'New' Diasporas and make them aware of each other. Further, they have helped each other to assert the separate Dalit identity in Diaspora with their own icons, religious and secular symbols. This Diaspora remains in constant touch with the home land renewing its link with the home land regularly.

3. Caste in Indian Diaspora

The moot question is how did caste travelled in Indian Diaspora? This is not difficult to answer. It can be argued sociologically that when people migrate they do not migrate merely as biological entities. Rather when human beings migrate they carry along with them their socio-cultural baggage as well. These may include beside others their family and caste values in which they have been socialized for so many years. Caste being the core structure in which Indians are born and which is also embedded because of kinship ties gets easily transferred in Diaspora. Once transferred, it is invoked whenever people find themselves alone in Diaspora. The caste identity facilitates their identification with the people of their own castes. Caste also plays role of cushion in period crisis-the crisis of identity being the most dominant one. That does not mean that caste gets replicated as the system of stratification. But, it surely, influences the interactional pattern of Indians in Diaspora. Most glaring of all is members of same caste helping their own caste persons in finding jobs, giving loans or finding spouse for their wards. Different matrimonial sites and last pages of Indian Newspapers published in Indian Diaspora further endorse the point that caste has really established itself in the different parts of the world and has come to stay in Indian Diaspora. Today in this era of globalization and information revolution caste and caste based ties are being revived and strengthened further because of increased communication links-websites, internet, and mobile telephone and cheap international conveyance. This has further helped the Indian Diaspora to marry their wards in India within their caste and sub castes by flying back to India or having a match with the help of www.shaadi.com, www.matrimony.com etc. and other internet sites. This Diaspora now days travel to their native place to marry of their wards because of cheap air fares and low budget, which further revitalizes and strengthens caste ties in Diaspora.

Having discussed the process of crystallization of Dalit Diaspora, caste among Diaspora, and its type let us now understand and analyze the nature and characteristics of the 'New Dalit Diaspora'. In this context we will like to analyze the process and mechanism of different types of organizations and associations they established. We will also analyze the process of assertion of identity and its formation among Dalit Diaspora in UK, US and Canada. We will also see if there exist any networks or not. To begin with we will analyze the Dalit Diaspora in UK first.

4. Dalit Diaspora in UK

Today the website www.ambedkar.org estimates about one *lakh* fifty thousand Dalits living in UK. This Dalit population in UK is quite near to the Dalit population estimates given by Harpal and Tatla (2008, pp. 59-60). They argue that although according to 2001 census Sikhs were 336,179, which for few community leaders are substantial under representation of the Sikhs in Britain, and exact figure is around 500,000. Out of which one-third of Sikhs belonged to the Dalit category (Harpal and Tatla, 2008, p. 60). We have already discussed the nature and history of their migration above. The first generation migrants were of course semi-literate predominantly male and found jobs in industries and settled in the industrial areas of England: London, Birmingham, and Midlands. One of the respondents told me that, "Many of us started to work in transport industry as drivers and conductors, while some others got the job in foundries as laborers". They came and shared the rooms and houses and availed the facilities of newly constructed Gurudwaras. After 1960s literate and professional Dalits started to migrate to UK. After establishing themselves they called the members of their immediate family giving mostly birth to nuclear family. But Dalit families like any other family were male dominated and hierarchical where the eldest male took every decision. One peculiar element which most of the emigrants told me was that, "we used to work very hard; some worked for 18 hours a day and send whatever money they could save back home. They also nursed the idea that when they have earned enough they will return home. But the day never came as we realized that life is much better in England than in India".

However, some of the respondents did feel otherwise. They were of the opinion that caste prejudice against them and caste stigma also prevails in UK same as it used to be in India. Juergensmeyer (1982) endorsed the same in his study of Ravidasis of Wolverhampton way back in 1970s. He wrote, "on the whole, life is better for the Scheduled Castes in England, but in some ways it is disturbingly the same...the Jat Sikhs do not hesitate to remind the Chamars that they are still Chamars, even in England. Most of the Chamars prefer to be called Ad Dharmi or Ramdasia, but many Jat Sikhs insist on calling them Chamar even as a form of personal address. A pub on west End Road, South hall, in the suburb of London has come to be known pejoratively as the Chamar-wali pub because of its clientele, and fights between Jat Sikhs and Chamars have broken out in factories and pubs all over industrial England. Some say there even have been killings." (Juergensmeyer, 1982, p. 246). In the same vein, Guhman (2011) has argued that Dalit immigrants to UK faced double prejudice, at one level they were looked down as Asians by the whites and on the other hand the so-called upper castes also treated them with contempt.

4.1 Social Solidarity, Identity and formation of Organizations

To fight these prejudices and stigma against them the Dalits in England started organizing themselves. According to Juergensmeyer, "In 1956 the Ad Dharma Chamars made the first move towards proving to the British Sikhs that they were a Quam of equal status and heritage by organizing association of Ravi Das Sabhas in Birmingham and adjoining Wolverhampton. These associations were intended not only to counteract the Sikhs, but to provide support and assistance for the masses of new immigrants, many of whom had only passing familiarity with English language. Eventually an attempt was made to establish a central organization with secular name, the Indian Welfare Association but it was hard to reach an agreement on what its nature should be" (Juergensmeyer, 1982, p. 248). However, a secular organization did

emerge when the UK branch of the Delhi Scheduled Castes Welfare Association was opened in Birmingham in 1957, although it did not function for long (Rattu, 1999, in Introduction). Further, 'Bhaartiya Buddhist Cultural Association' with its headquarters at Birmingham was established in 1961. This organization tried to organize the Dalit Buddhists in UK. In this chain of events in 1969, another organization called, 'Dr. Ambedkar Memorial Committee of Great Britain' with its headquarters at Wolverhampton sowed seeds of Ambedkarite movement in UK (Paul, 2006, pp. 48-49). The Committee has done some remarkable work for furthering the interests of Dalits in UK and in India both. For instance it helped in the assertion when it got installed the life size portrait of Babasaheb Ambedkar in London School of Economics and Gray's Inn in England. We are also aware that, followers of Babasaheb from Maharashtra established 'Buddhist Society of United Kingdom' in the year 1970. This organization was successful in getting installed Babasaheb's portrait in Indian House, London. Before that they had taken up the issues of human right violation of Buddhist and Scheduled castes with United Nation's Human Right Commission. The organization was also successful in leading a conversion ceremony to Buddhism in Britain.

In 1985 a number of organizations working in the name of Dr. Ambedkar and Buddha for the uplift of the masses came together and formed the Federation of Ambedkariate and Buddhist Organizations, UK (FABO, UK). This federation of Dalit organizations played a very vibrant role for quite some time in organizing Dalits not only in UK but back home as well. The organizations set up Ambedkar Centenary Celebrations Committee and launched it at the House of Commons in April 1989. Ambedkar's century celebration in UK was very successful because the then Prime minister of India inaugurated the celebrations which went on for years. FABO, UK helped Late Kenneth Griffith to make a documentary film on Dr. Ambedkar which was released on BBC 2 Channel. This was not a mean achievement as the documentary highlighted Ambedkar's movement at the international level. Further, FABO, UK also played a dominant role in getting a bronze bust of Babasaheb Ambedkar installed at London School of Economics, where Ambedkar had completed his D.Sc., on 14th April, 1996. Another bust of Ambedkar was installed in the Indian High Commission. A commemorative plaque was installed at 10, King Henry Road, Hampstead, where Babasaheb Ambedkar lived during his period of education in London from 1891-1922. On 24th October, 1995, another bust of Dr. Babasaheb was presented to Columbia University, New York where Ambedkar had done is Masters and then Ph.D. The bust was of course installed with the help of the US local Dalits Diaspora. In this way we can see that Dalit Diaspora had transnational relationship with each other even in mid-1990s.

4.2 Ambedkar Memorial Lecture in University

Apart from, social, religious and welfare organizations Dalits in Diaspora also established relationship with UK universities to sensitize the western masses about life and struggle of Babasaheb Ambedkar on the one hand and secondly about the plight of the Dalits in India. With the hard work of Late Shekhar Bagul and Dr. P.L. Ganvir, the Department of History and Economic History has set up an annual Ambedkar Memorial Lecture at the Manchester Metropolitan University. To make necessary arrangements for this lecture, Ambedkar Memorial Committee was also established. The first lecture was held in the year 2001 and the 9th was held in 2012. Every year an eminent person is invited to give lecture. The arrangement is like this –one year an Indian academician is invited and another year a person from any another part of the world is invited. On this day, an exhibition of the works of Baba Saheb

Dr. Ambedkar is also displayed. The preamble of the Ambedkar Memorial Fund says the following:

“Our Committee has also established a three-year PhD studentship at Manchester Metropolitan University to support research into aspects of the history of the poor and disadvantaged. We recently instituted an under-graduate essay prize also designed to highlight the work of Dr. Ambedkar among students in the Manchester region.”

In this manner we can observe that Dalits in UK have successfully organized themselves socially and on the basis of religion. They have created number of social organizations and also established Ravidasi Temples, Buddha Viharas and Ambedkar Bhawan for themselves. These associations and places have given them much needed social solidarity in an alien place and also an independent identity. However, the social stigma and discrimination still survives even after more than half a century of their migration from mother country and that too to an alien land.

4.3 Caste Discrimination in British Indian Diaspora

If caste exists in Indian Diaspora and Dalits also exist in Diaspora then it is natural that caste based discrimination would also exist within Indian Diaspora. This discrimination existed in both ‘Old’ and New Dalit Diaspora. To begin with let us explain the discrimination in Old Diaspora. According to Jain, “There is evidence that some of the traditional methods of showing differences between status still exists. Thus in Trinidad the residence of lower castes is restricted. In South Africa there is some idea about unclean occupations. There is also some restricted commensality, for example that of the Trinidadian Brahmin priests as rituals, or the Guyanese who told Singer that he would not eat in the home of a low-caste, and restricted feeding of Valmiki in East Africa” (Jain, 1993, pp. 15-16). Similarly we will take examples of caste discrimination from new Diaspora, “...in Wolverhampton the customer refused to take the change from the vendor lest he found their touch polluting and instead that the change be placed on the counter to avoid contact. On the factory floor, again in Wolverhampton, we know of women of so called upper castes Jats not taking water from the same tap from where the so called lower caste person drink... (in another incident of practice of untouchability) the Sikh temples hold annual inter-temple sports tournaments. One such tournament was held in Birmingham where the *Langar* (sanctified food) will be served by one of the participating temples who happened to be belonging to the Ravidasia community. Whilst their teams participated in the tournament but the *Langar* was not eaten by the Jats because it came from the Chamars” (VODI Report, 2000, p. 73). Caste Watch UK, an organization highlights the existence and spread of ‘Caste based discrimination –especially among the Asian Communities’ in UK. Besides it provides a platform to the sufferers of the aforesaid menace to come forward and share their painful experiences to sensitize the larger UK society about the issue.

In an interview with the author in London Organization’s head argues that, “In Britain, caste operates at a much more subtle and sophisticated level. This is the reason why caste discrimination has escaped the attention of the authorities in Britain so far, who are obsessed with countering racial discrimination”. Other organizations working for the same issue like-Voice of Dalit International (VODI), International Dalit Solidarity Network (IDSN) etc. endorse the view. They all emphasize the prevalence of multiple forms of caste based discrimination. One of most common form is prevalence of ridiculing Dalits by their caste

names from schools to factory. Secondly, restriction on inter-caste marriages between Dalits and castes located higher up in so-called caste hierarchy by the parents of the latter. Caste Watch UK has number of testimonies to prove caste based discrimination in Britain. In one such testimony an African from Jamaica told that his co-brother-in-law has not been accepted by an upper caste family after he married their daughter even though he is an Indian and financially much better than him just because he belongs to Dalit community.

However the menace is on the rise with number of cases of caste based discrimination increasing in contemporary Britain. That is why the organizations like Caste Watch have also sprung up. In fact since 2004 this organization has been organizing annual conferences to bring people from different walks of life to take active part in the prevention of the growing menace of caste. Its latest conference was in Aston University, Birmingham on 30th August, 2008 on the topic, 'Caste and Cohesion: Engaging with communities' in which author also participated; delegates belonging to academics, NGO, Human Right Organizations, Religious Organization, etc. in the conference accepted the presence of caste based discrimination in different spheres of life. Five categories of caste based discriminations, which exist in Britain, were identified by the participants. One, caste discrimination has crept in schools where Dalit children are bullied by their caste names by their teachers and classmates. Two, when Dalit enters in inter-caste marriage with a girl of a so-called higher caste, he or the couple face isolation, ostracisation, violence and threats by bride's family. In number of inter caste marriage cases the Dalit boys were beaten. Today the young Dalits feel that caste has curtailed their choice of spouse in an otherwise egalitarian society like UK. Three, factories and pubs have seen ugly violence against Dalits and ridiculing of Dalits by their caste names. Fourth, Dalits have been denied equal opportunity and equal status and respect by the so-called upper castes in different organizations based on Indian religions in UK. That has forced Dalits to establish their own organizations and worship places all over Britain. Fifth, and last but not the least there are songs asserting one's caste identity and pride by the so-called upper castes while being insensitive to the hidden stigmatization and insult of Dalits in the same songs. In this regard it is interesting to note that, "Dalit organizations...have mounted a sustained campaign to include caste discrimination in the Single Equality Bill in the British Parliament. Their argument is that caste discrimination is to be found amongst the Indian Diaspora and it is likely to get worse as some Indian-based companies start to operate in the UK. It is argued that it is as pernicious as racism and we need a framework of law to address it. However, the evidence presented to the House of Lords Committee to support their case was considered not robust and comprehensive, therefore the...Labour government has commissioned large-scale research to find out the extent and scale of caste discrimination in employment and delivery services" (Ghuman, 2011, p. 103).

Going by the above discussion and description of Dalit Diaspora in UK one can conclude that, Dalits have really made a mark for themselves in UK. They have developed an independent identity for themselves and can be recognized independently through their symbols and icons like-Buddha, Ravidas and Ambedkar. According to Tatla and Singh, Ravidasis have 13 places of worship while Valmikis have 9 in England (2008, p. 79). Through their cultural associations and celebrations the Dalits have developed a vibrant culture of their own. Buddha *Jayanti*, Ravidas *Jayanti*, Ambedkar *Jayanti*, Ambedkar Memorial Lecture etc. to name just a few are examples of the same which will also be observed in Canadian and Us Diaspora. This Diaspora has also started developing their own music and dramas to counter the negative effects of caste prejudice (Ghuman, 2011, p. 104). Further, caste did exist earlier

but in contemporary times caste has got new lease of life in UK, the New Indian Diaspora remains in constant touch with mother country unlike the 'Old Indian Diaspora' who have lost touch with the mother country.

5 Dalit Diaspora in Canada

Dalits in Canada celebrated centennial ceremony of their arrival in Canada in August 2006. The souvenir published by Shri Guru Ravidas Sabha (Vancouver) acknowledges that the first group of Dalits came to Canada in the year 1906 and settled on the west coast of Canada. A group of four persons namely Shei Mahia Ram (of Matida), Shri Essar (of Lagiri), Shri Basanta Ram (of Mahilpur, and Shri Gurditta Ram Dhanda (of village Uppalan) hailing from different parts of Punjab are considered to be the 'Dalit Pioneers'. The first group of Dalits did travel via ship as the other Indians traveled with harrowing experiences. The Dalits share experiences of their grand parents with anguish. For instance Darshan Singh Khera, the third generation Dalit from Punjab in Canada argues, "My grandfather would tell us about many hardships he faced. I recall that my grandfather would tell us how they spent the first night in Canada in a horse barn and how difficult was their first day at the potato farm". Bill Basra the president of the Guru Ravidas Sabha, Vancouver writes, "Many of the pioneers worked tirelessly and they lived in isolation from their families and loved ones for many years. Some of them even faced discrimination because of their race as well as of their caste" (Souvenir of Sri Guru Ravidas Mahasabha, 2007).

5.1 Regions of Origin and Occupation of Dalit Diaspora in Canada

Most of the Dalits in Canada have migrated from Punjab. Some of them have also come from UK or can be called as members of double Diaspora. Some Dalits have also been sponsored by their relatives. The Dalits more often than not sponsor their old parents once they get settled in the country. Canada also have Dalits are from Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Bihar as well. The Punjabi Dalits mostly belong to Ravidasi community while some of them belong to Valmiki community also. As far as their occupations are concerned the Dalits from Punjab have mixed baggage. Their range is from factory worker to contract builder to doctors and engineers. There are taxi drivers, mechanics, builders, financiers, having chain of hotels and restaurants, real estate business, fast food outlets and even government servants. The Dalits from other parts of India are mostly the second-generation learners and possess a professional degree either an engineer-mechanical, Chemical and software engineers. Not even one Dalit is in conservancy job, which used to be their hereditary occupation while they were in India. When probed why no Dalit is in these jobs, most of the respondents argued that the Canadian government has preference for the Whites. Also workers in the conservancy jobs are lucratively paid. For instance a semi-skilled factory worker gets 70 Canadian Dollars for eight hours. However, a conservancy laborer gets 140 Dollars for as many hours. The Dalits suspect that there is some discrimination against Indians because native Canadians do not want that Indians be employed in such a lucrative job.

5.2 Dalits in Canada and their Family Structure

Most of the Dalits live in nuclear families but few have maintained joint families living under one roof but cooking separately. The Dalits are of the opinion that it is economical to live in a joint family in Canada. The theory is simple. More hands are needed to carry out a business as

most of the Dalits manage their business on their own. To hire a person for work is a costly affair. On the other hand the care of young ones also becomes easier in the joint family. Further, most of the Dalits in Canada, especially Punjabis have strong ties with their relatives back home either through visiting them annually or through telephone. As hard workers, most of the Dalits in Canada work till late in the night. It is a routine. It is interesting to note that most of the Dalit males, females, young boys and girls (law permissible age) know driving. Though it is very tough to get a driving license in Canada and traffic rules are very stringent and therefore one has to be very careful in driving. Because in the event of any accident or violation of signals stringent penalties are imposed and after a certain point the traffic police can confiscate the driving license of the erring person. The members of the community argued that without a driving license it is difficult to survive in Canada or for that matter in any western country. Most of the Dalits who have spent few years in Canada have their own houses, which are centrally heated or cooled, this can be called as luxury but Dalits argue that it is the compulsion of the Canadian weather.

5.3 Organization of Dalits in Canada

5.3.1 Guru Ravidas Sabhas

We are aware that that Dalits started migrating to Canada since 1906; however they could begin their organization only in 1962. That means it took more than half a century, for them, to realize that they needed separate and independent status. Guru Ravidas's birth anniversary brought the Dalits in Canada together. They celebrated this anniversary for the first time in Port Alberni in British Columbia under the banner of Khalsa Diwan Society in the year 1962. In 1979 Dr. Ambedkar Memorial Association was formed in Vancouver while Guru Ravidas Sabha (Vancouver) was registered in British Columbia in the year 1981. Finally in 1986 Sri Guru Ravidas Community was established at Edmonds Street in Burnaby, British Columbia. The formation of Guru Ravidas Sabha in Canada did not have an independent and isolate origin. Rather it has historical roots in Punjab's Ad Dharm Movement. Ad Dharm movement emerged in 1920s in Punjab. The leadership was provided by an American return Dalit youth called Mangoo Ram. He helped to establish Sri Guru Ravidas, a 14th century saint poet from Uttar Pradesh in Punjab in 1920s although Ravi Das was already associated with Sikh tradition in Punjab. Verses written by Ravi Das appear in Sikh scripture. According to Juergensmeyer (1982, p. 89), "The Ad Dharm took the integrative myths and Ravi Das symbol and appropriated them for a separatist identity. His picture, his name, and his stories were slated throughout the literature and movements". Few Ravidasis who were part of this movement had migrated to Canada; they wanted to revive the organization in Canada. But there was an immediate reason for the establishment of Guru Ravidas Sabha. This was realization of discrimination meted out to them by Jat Sikhs in Canada. Dalits argued that they wanted initially to get assimilated in the Sikh Gurudwaras and celebrate Guru Ravidas birth anniversary. But they felt that they and their Guru were not accorded equal status at par with other Sikhs and Sikh Gurus. It happened so, "Some Dalit Sikhs approached Panjabi media in Canada for an advertisement on the occasion of Guru Ravidas anniversary. But to their utter dismay they were told that the advertisement could not be published if they used the title of Guru for Ravidas. The Panjabi media owners told the Ravidasia community that Ravidas cannot be revered as Guru and he is only a Bhagat (a devotee). The Dalits contested - how Ravidas can be only a Bhagat because his verses are included in the holy book Guru Granth

Saheb". Hence the whole Dalit community in Canada got annoyed. They discussed among themselves that they are being treated in the same way in Canada as they were treated in India. And hence they got dissociated from them and established independent organization Sri Guru Ravidas Sabha (Vancouver) in 1981. When I visited Canada in April 2007 there were five Guru Ravidas Sabhas throughout Canada. Those are in Vancouver, Calgary, Montreal and two in Toronto (Ontario).

Establishing independent Guru Ravidas Sabhas and temples in different cities of Canada by Dalits of Punjab has not been an easy task, argued few Dalits in Canada. The whole community has selflessly donated from their hard earned money in the foreign land. Some of them were forced to mortgage their residence to buy independent building for the Guru Ravidas Temple and facilities their in. The Guru Ravidas Temples have now become hub of social gathering of Dalits. From literary functions to ideological functions to social gathering, the temples have also become information centers for community services and resources. Different Guru Ravidas Sabhas at different places in Canada are involved in multiple activities. For instance in 1998, Dalits of Vancouver Sabha presented Dr. Ambedkar's portrait and collected works to the University of British Columbia, Simon Fraser University, and University of Victoria. On 14th October, 2004, Dr. Ambedkar's bust was installed at the Simon Fraser University in Vancouver. All the organizations, without fail, celebrate Babasaheb Ambedkar's birthday on 14th April and commemorate 6th December as his death anniversary.

5.3.2 Maharishi Valmiki Sabha of Canada

There is also a small but vibrant Maharishi *Valmiki Sabha* in Toronto. According to one account the members of *Valmiki* community in India were considered to be part of *Chubra* Community among whom Arya Samaj introduced the Balmiki cult (Webster, 2002, p. 76). *Valmiki* the legendary low caste author of the Hindu epic the Ramayana, was depicted variously as their ancestor, their teacher and their deity. The *Sabha* (organization) though works in tandem with other Dalit organizations in Canada, yet the members of Valmiki community have kept their separate identity alive. Members of the community have close links with each other but they meet every Sunday in the Valmiki Temple run by the Valmiki Sabha. *Langar*, prepared by the ladies of the family is served in the temple, after the prayer, on every Sunday. The exchange of food cooked in different families can be taken as a mark of solidarity of the community in the foreign land. But it is a fact that usually families which are joint or have more hands in the family bring these food items. The unique characteristic of Valmiki Sabha is that its members have profound respect for Dr. Ambedkar. They recognize his contribution for helping their community in getting their human rights. This was evident from the fact that his photograph is kept along with *Guru Valmiki*, Ravidas and others. His name is recited during the *Ardas* (prayers) offered at the temple on every Sunday. Along with this, *Valmiki Sabah* celebrates the birth anniversary of *Guru Vammiki* at a larger scale. It is also worth mentioning that members of the community are conscious that back home their community is socially and politically most backward community and therefore they have to do something at any cost. The members have transnational networks, as well, especially in UK and USA. There is a close link with the *Valmiki* community in UK, and members of UK *Valmiki* Sabha are helping, financially and through human resource in building a bigger *Valmiki* Temple in Toronto.

5.3.3 Other Organizations in Canada

There are other organizations too in Canada among the Dalits. The Ambedkar International Mission (AIM), Indian Buddhist Society, Bahujan International - all these organizations are perpetually trying to organize people through social, religious and political programmes. For instance Ambedkar International Mission (Canada) has instituted an annual “Dr. Ambedkar Memorial Symposium” in the University of Calgary. Every year an Indian scholar hailing from Dalit community and a foreign scholar, who is working on the Dalits and related issues, from different parts of the world is called to deliver a lecture on Babasaheb’s thoughts and other related issues to Dalits. The organization pays air fare to the speaker from India. International Bahujan Organization is working on the ideology of Bahujan Samaj Party. The members keep in touch with recent development taking place in the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP). In fact they celebrated recent 2007 victory of BSP in Uttar Pradesh elections with great fanfare. Many members of have donated money to the members contesting elections from BSP The Buddhist Society has just established a Buddh Vihara in Toronto after purchasing their independent land. They also collaborate with the Buddhist organizations of different countries of the word where Buddhism is practiced.

6. Dalits in US: Towards Diaspora

We have already explained the process of crystallization of Dalit Diaspora in US. However for clarity I will repeat here that it gradually crystallized in 1960s and 1970s with illiterate farm laborers who came from Punjab and also from Fiji, small pool of Dalits students, professionals like engineers, doctors and other. Dalits during discussion told that it was not easy to migrate to US leaving a permanent job for the first or second generation educated member of Dalit community with no network in foreign destination. It was also difficult to convince their parents who had pinned their hopes from their educated sons. This was the general trend all through 1960s till 1980s. New Dalit Diaspora in US further developed during 1990s after the information revolution as Information technology industry got a boom. Dalit second generation literates from urban centers who were qualified software computer engineers and had enough (five to eight years of experience) work experience started migrating to US. No doubt their Visas were facilitated by their respective IT companies. The third wave of Dalit emigrants in US, which the author found, was of researchers and scientists who have migrated after 2000. Most of them have their doctorates in bio-technology and other biological sciences and were either working in research institutes or teaching in colleges back home. A fourth strand of Dalits in US is of dependents and relatives of the professionals who got the US citizenship. It happens more often than not that once a professional gets settled he gradually starts calling his blood and wife’s relatives. Apart from these four groups in Dalit Diaspora a fifth group of Dalits which exists here is of the students who came to do their higher studies but did not go back and gradually were absorbed in the job market.

6.1 Dalit Diaspora in US: Their legal and professional Status

Like any other Indian group there are different categories of Dalit Diaspora. There is diversity in terms of their legal and professional statuses. As for their legal status is concerned I met NRIs, Green Card Holders, and Dalits as US Citizens (you need at least five years of continuous residence in US to apply for becoming citizen). Now more and more Dalits are

applying for Citizenship. They also want to take PIO (People of Indian Origin) card to save their time and energy in obtaining an Indian Visa every time when they come to India.

The profession of Dalits in US is so diverse that it is difficult to find out how many professions they are in. One can imagine their range from the fact that some of them are working in NASA and some are Taxi drivers. I have interacted with Dalit teachers in Universities and electrical, mechanical and software engineers. Many successful Dalit doctors are also living in US. Scientists, doing research in biotechnology in different universities and research institutes, producing number of research papers with first, second or third authors also form the part of Dalit Diaspora in US. I met a researcher who has at least hundred research papers published in reputed Science Journals. One scientist showed that a diagram of his research papers appeared as cover page of a Journal. I also found young minds working in advertisement industry and also TV program producer. Clinical Psychologists, Businessmen, Taxi Drivers, Mechanics, Motel Owners, Gas- Station owners, Car Garage Owners, DELI owners and what not, you name a profession and they are there. That shows their versatility and availability of opportunities existing in US society.

6.2 Regional Diversity in Dalit Diaspora

In terms of their regional origin Dalits in Diaspora cut across linguistic boundaries. During my field work I met people from Hindi Heartland (UP, Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, MP, Rajasthan, Uttarakhand, and Chhattisgarh), Bihar, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, etc. No doubt people from Maharashtra, UP and Punjab dominate this Diaspora. However, it is really astonishing to note that Dalits from Bengal and Gujarat did not identify with the community at all and therefore I could not meet even one of them in the number of celebrations. Gujarati Dalits although have substantial presence in US but they remain within their own sub- castes and seldom take part in any celebrations in the name of Ambedkar or Ravidas. That means they rely much more on their Gujarati identity rather than Dalit identity.

6.3 Reasons of migration

Why did they all come here? Reaction is mixed. Many have the dream that they will do well. The software engineers told that they came to US because they knew that there is boom in industry and therefore they are in demand and hence will get good money for their education. However, it is astonishing that most of them left their permanent government jobs. However, many of them have horrendous story of discrimination, back home, to tell which forced them to leave the job and look for something different. Worst sufferers are the researchers who pursued their Ph.D. from some university in science or bio-technology. Each of them underwent extreme form of harassment. They had to wait years together for their degrees to be awarded. Their Supervisors took lots of time for sending their thesis for evaluation to the external examiners. Some students had to wait more than five years before they were awarded Ph.D. After these types of discrimination, they told, it was so difficult to work with those teachers further and also there was no hope to get a teaching position the same department, and hence it was better for them to leave the country. The government doctors felt that there was no respect for the profession especially in the government hospitals as any VIP can insult you any moment and therefore they migrated.

6.4 Dalit Organizations in US

What was the need to form an organization in US? The Dalits in US explained that during early days there were very few Indians in US what to say about Dalits. Before the 1960s, untouchables in the US were extremely rare, according to Owen Lynch, Professor emeritus of anthropology at New York University. But their numbers have grown steadily, "and they are showing the world that they can succeed when given equal opportunities," said Lynch. It was difficult to meet each other. Therefore, "we used to give advertisements to call people for any program of ours. There was no community life and we were two to three people meeting regularly. Therefore to mobilize the people and form a community of our own we formed our first organization" told Virendra Chowdhry one of the founding members of VISION (Volunteers in Service of India's Poor and Neglected), which was formed in mid 1970s in New Jersey where most of the Dalits lived. Most of the members of these organizations are in mid or late seventies and have fond memories to tell. How they have faced this world with their grit and determination. They remember protesting against few cases of discrimination against them within US. But mostly demonstrations were held against Dalit killings and human right violation in India. United Nation's office used to be their main centre. 1977 was the year when the atrocities on the Dalits were on the rise and they all protested in front of UN office. In 1997, P. P. Laxman wrote a letter to editor to EPW highlighting the demonstration led by VISION. According to him,

Dalits from eleven different organizations staged demonstration on July 21 ... in front of the United Nations in New York. It was in protest against the desecration of the Ambedkar statue and police firing on Dalits in Mumbai on July 11. The slogans raised at the demonstration were loud and clear : 'Stop Killing Dalits', 'Dalits rights are human rights', 'No more caste wars', 'Caste System, India's shame'... a memorandum...was submitted to Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of UN. The memorandum requests the UN to investigate the atrocities against untouchables through its Human Rights High Commissioner, Special Rapporteur on Racism and Racial Discrimination and Xenophobia, and Special Rapporteur on Child labor and Child Prostitution (Laxman, 1997; 2078).

These protests did not go waste because it is with these experiences that Dalits approached United Nations and participated in the Durban 'World Conference against Racism and Xenophobia' in 2001 and highlighted the Dalit human right violation at the international level. Gradually VISION reseeded in background with other organizations taking over.

Ambedkar Literary Vision was one of the organization which emerged out of VISION tells its founder Rambabu Gautam. It was established in the year 1991 which coincided with the century year of Ambedkar's birth. Although he is still active but his organization has become defunct because of lack of second generation leadership. During his active days he got established two Buddha Viharas and 7 libraries in India. The two Buddha Viharas are at district Sharanpur (Village Chhutmal Pur, Kalsia Road) and district Mainpuri UP, respectively. He had more than hundred members who actively made financial contributions to the organization. It is interesting to note that that the donors were mostly Americans, Europeans and Indian Dalits. Culture and education were the main areas in which this organization concentrated. Rambabu Gautam told that his organization gave financial aid for the needy students for more than 12 years. Every year twenty to twenty five students were selected from 200-250 applications from different states of India. After careful scrutiny he used to send 50

to 100 dollars cheques directly to students. But now he has grown old and cannot handle the work load alone.

Ambedkar International Mission (AIM) started in the year 2003 in New York and New Jersey, is the most visible and organized organization of Dalits in US today. It was started in 1994-1997 in Malaysia and has chapters in Brunei, Canada, Japan, etc. But it started making a serious effort from 2005 when it began celebrating both Ambedkar's Birth Anniversary and Conversion ceremony to Buddhism in New Jersey. We will analyze the role of AIM in detail a little later. Further, Ambedkar Association of North America was founded by Dalits living in Detroit in 2008. Different Dalit organizations have begun to participate in Indian Independence Day Parade, held in New York every year, with their own float. It has begun in 2007 and since then they have been participating regularly in the parade which happens on the first Sunday after 15th of August. In this parade a vehicle usually a big Bus is decorated with the pictures of Dalit social reformers. Dalit men, women and children keep on waving the Indian tricolor on the bus and on the road while walking in procession. B.R. Ambedkar's contribution in the making of Indian Constitution is also highlighted with slogans shouting Long live Babasaheb. Few organizations are publishing different newspapers in Punjabi, Hindi and English. Ambedkar Times is a famous among all.

Although it is religious yet New York *Ravidasi Gurudwara* acts more like a socio-political organization. It is unique because it has *Ravidas's* portrait in the centre. It has also a portrait of Ambedkar on one side of the wall. On the first floor there is small library which has portraits of Phuley, Shauji Maharaj, Ambedkar, Kanshi Ram among others. Numbers of books related to Dalit movements are lying in the library. Secondly a pile of Ambedkar's famous essay 'Caste in India: Genesis, Mechanism and Spread' is lying which is distributed free of cost to different groups of people. One of the members told to me that he distributes these books only to Americans and Europeans so that he can make them conscious about the plight of Dalits in India. Above all this, New York Gurudwara also celebrated birth anniversary of Kanshi Ram during my stay in New York. .

6.5 Dalits and Celebrations in US

There are number of celebrations in which Dalits participate, cutting across caste and regional boundaries. It is here that caste among Indian Dalits takes the shape of a community in Diaspora. The biggest and most elaborate of all celebrations in US among Dalits is *Ravidas Jayanti* (Birth Anniversary of 14th century Saint Poet), in different *Ravidasi Gurudwaras* in different states of US. Author participated in three such functions in New York, Rio-Linda-Sacramento in California and Huston in Texas as they were celebrated on different dates. As we know that *Ravidasi* community tries to establish a separate religious place for themselves wherever they are in substantial number and economically well off. In this religious place which is called '*Ravidasi Gurudwaras*' or '*Ravidas Temple*' along with *Guru Granth Sahib*, *Guru Nanak*, *Guru Ravidas* is also revered as the Dalit Sikhs have declared him as a *Guru* because, they say, that his couplets are also enshrined in *Guru Granth Sahib*. There is chanting of slogan '*Jo Bole So Nirbhay; Ravidas Maharaj Ki Jia*' (He who says hial *Ravidas Maharaj* is fearless). On the specific day of *Jayanti* Dalits throng in big numbers whole day. It is great feast on that day which begins with breakfast and ends with lunch which is served free of cost at different stalls. One such celebration in Rio Linda needs special mention here because of its unique nature. *Ravidasi Gurudwara* here has a big premise in which a fair is organized every year on

this occasion. On the one side of the premise different types of articles are sold –which include from clothes, to cosmetics to posters of social reformers. On the other side you have different types of food items served free of cost- *Choole Bhature*, Bread, *Ghobi*, *Pyaj* and other types of *Pakora*, *Puri-Subji*, Mango *Lassi*, *Bhutta* (Roasted Corn) and what not. You can have unlimited quantity. The attraction of this celebration is ‘*JHANKP*’ (Road Show) - a parade of men, women and children on the road. This parade can stretch to one kilometer in length. Members of the community use different vehicles, cars, mini trucks, decorated with pictures of most of the Dalit social reformers. Even horse carts driven by white men are used in the march as a status symbol. All through the procession Punjabi and Hindi Music is played. ‘*Bhangra*’ dance is also performed. Number of slogans are chanted during the two or three hour long march. This all gives total Indian ambience. Celebration cannot be without political mobilization because every *Ravidasi Gurudwara* is run by annually or bi-annually elected committee. After the prayer, the leaders discuss the future plans to expand the activity of Gurudwara in which donations are also sought.

6.6 Ambedkar Birth Anniversary in US

Ambedkar Birth Anniversary was celebrated in Consulate General of India Office in New York since 1978-79 by group of VISION as some respondents told. It was celebrated for ten to twelve years. In this they were helped by some of the officers of the Consulate who belonged to Indian Foreign Service. The respondents were sure of their identity because there titles resembled with some of the Dalit castes of North India. Then why did VISION stop celebrating Ambedkar’s birth Anniversary in the Consulate? V.K. Chaudhary, explained it was so because we wanted to give it more visibility and hence decided to celebrate in more open place so that common people should also know. Therefore they took it to Columbia University in 1991 which was Ambedkar’s birth Century. From 1990s till 1998 another group of *Ravidasis* (Punjabi Dalits) led by Sita Ram and others started celebrating Ambedkar’s birth anniversary outside the *Ravidasi Gurudwara*. The event became so popular that more than two hundred people used to participate in the event. After 1991 Ambedkar’s bust was installed in Lehman Library in Columbia University campus which later became centre point for celebrating the anniversary. Since 2003 Ambedkar International Mission (AIM) a group of young Dalits professionals started organizing anniversary programme in New Jersey and New York. However along with this they added Ambedkar’s conversion to Buddhism anniversary as well. From 2011 it is AIM which now-a-days leads Babasaheb Ambedkar’s birth Anniversary program in the Consulate General of India Office, New York. AIM was again helped by a Dalit IFS officer who helped them to organize this program. In 2012, it was to the surprise of participants that the Ambassador of India to US also participated in the program and made a small speech on the occasion, although she was not officially supposed to take part in the program. Dalits felt that this was greater legitimacy to their program.

6.7 Ambedkar at Columbia

Ambedkar’s bust was installed at Columbia University in his birth century year 1991. It is kept in the ground floor of Lehman Library. The university authorities agreed for installation of the bust because B. R. Ambedkar is considered distinguished alumni of the University as has been done in MMU and Calgary University, Canada. Apart from this, for long Dalits in US, especially Ambedkar International Mission has been trying to get going a regular lecture series in the name of Ambedkar in the University. They could succeed only in 2009 when Nicholas

Dirk the Vice President of Columbia University gave first lecture. Later, during October 16-17th, 2009, a two day conference, 'Caste and Contemporary India' was organized by the Southern Asian Institute with the help of other nine organizations, which included the US Department of Education, Centre of Human Rights Documentation and Research, and Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Race. A galaxy of Indian, European and Americans academicians working on caste participated along with number of Dalit activists from India. In 2010 government of India setup Dr. B. R. Ambedkar Chair in 'Indian Constitutional Law' with four million dollars endowment funds.² Along with the chair there is provision of a Dr. B. R. Ambedkar memorial lecture also. Although the Chair is still lying vacant till this article was written; in March 2012 Columbia Law School, where the Chair has been instituted, organized first Ambedkar Memorial lecture. The lecture was delivered by Ram Chandra Guha who spoke on 'Reconciling Gandhi with Ambedkar' which attracted lots of criticism in the audience. Some Dalit members in the audience went on to argue that this lecture was disrespect to Ambedkar because speaker did not give adequate time in delineating Ambedkar's thought on caste but kept on elaborating and discussing Gandhi. In fact, some of the faculty members of Columbia university during informal chat aired out their dissatisfaction about the chair being located in the Law school instead in social sciences.

6.8 Buddhism via Virtual Buddha Vihara

Dalits in US Diaspora who believe in Buddhism have kept themselves involved in the religious ceremonies and celebrations. Year after year they celebrate *Buddha Jayanti* (Buddha birth and death anniversaries) and anniversary of Ambedkar's Conversion to Buddhism by bringing Dalits together cutting across the caste, regional and linguistic boundaries together. Although unlike Dalits in UK and Canada, Dalits in US do not have a Buddha *Vihara* of their own but they regularly visit Buddha *Viharas* which are in their own areas. But Dalits do not look satisfied with this because it was difficult for Dalits to find their own community in the different *Viharas*. Therefore for past one year Vijay Shankar a software engineer has started what he has termed as 'Virtual Buddha Vihara' (VBV). This is a unique experiment by Dalits for uniting a community through cyber world. Let us see for ourselves what is this Virtual Buddha *Vihara*? There is a central link which has been created so that other members can 'log' on to it and remain connected throughout the session through their computers. There have been at least thirty to forty members congregate each week through Virtual Buddha Vihara. The congregation meets every week on Sunday morning 10 AM to 12 noon approximately. A *Bhikku* (a Buddhist monk) joins the congregation on the web and initiates the participants into Buddhist prayer (*tri saran and panchseela*) and gives sermon in English. After sermon participants are allowed to ask their queries about religious tenets which Bhikku replies. This goes for a while and after that the religious congregation is transformed into social-interaction of community where members air their views about some immediate issue or discuss about some upcoming event (program). Some new comers to US, temporary or permanent, from India may also be introduced in such gathering. The new comer becomes center of attraction as curious residents ask him about the contemporary situation back home. In number of meetings which I attended I found people were asking mostly questions about existing situation of Dalits in particular. In such types of gatherings people sitting at distant places in US have free and intense interaction within the community which otherwise was/is not possible. In sum the VBV has given a unique virtual space which has helped them to

² Interview with the Committee members for constituting Ambedkar Chair at Columbia University.

assert their religious identity on the one hand. And on the other hand it creates solidarity among Dalits who have never even met with each other. The VBV has started acting as a platform of collective education and information for both Dalits in US and in India.

6.9 Dalit Family, Woman and Education in Diaspora

Most of the emigrated Dalits, both old and young, live in nuclear families i.e. mother, father and unmarried children. The population which migrated in 1960s -1970s is left only with aged husband and wife. Their sons and daughters are married and gone. Sons and daughters maintain strong ties and visit regularly to their old parents and sometimes parents also visit them. When asked, the senior citizens revealed painfully that, “In spite of all their achievements and success old age is really lonely”. The members of Dalit families who migrated after 1990s are very young in their early forties and late forties and maintain two children or one child norm. Most of their children are school going at the most to tenth class. On the other hand the semiliterate and blue collar workers mostly live in joint families. This is precisely because they have to spend less on their accommodation and secondly it is cost effective to run and own joint business. Marriage of Dalits in Diaspora in US is very mixed. The children of the 1960s-1970s generation have mostly married in US. They have married Indians cutting across the caste, regional and linguistic boundaries. They also married to Afro-Americans, White- Americans, and Mexicans, etc. However the semiliterate and economically not so well off Dalits try to marry within their region and caste back home.

6.10 Dalit women in US

Dalit women in US Indian Diaspora present an altogether different image in comparison to Dalit women in India. Most of them are literate and of course employed in different professions. They are electrical engineers, software engineers, doctors, University and School teachers, and part time sales woman. Dalit girls who do not have much education mostly end up working as sales woman in different stores. Some joint-families bring some work at home where woman work in the day time when the husbands and kids have gone to work and school respectively. Educated women have been helping their husbands in their businesses and also work at home. Most of them know driving. They help their husbands in dropping and picking them from bus stops in the families where husbands prefer to commute by bus for their jobs. They often go to pick their kids from schools also. The Dalit woman in US Diaspora has adopted dual policy of dress codes. She is comfortable with western clothes like pants, shirts, coats and middies, etc. and Indian clothes-Salwar suits and *Sarees* both. So for community functions they will prefer their traditional dress and for outside day to day they wear western dresses.

Houses and Cars will tell you the economic differentiations among the Dalit in US. Those who have attained little permanency in their job they are very particular to buy their own houses and move as early as they can. This is because of two reasons. One, the loan policy is very smooth. If a person bears good credit rating he can easily get loans. Second, one ends up paying same amount of money if a person rents a house or he pays monthly installment of the house he has bought. I met Dalits who owned different types of houses. The range of the houses was really diverse. Dalits lived in Studio apartments, with one bed-room apartments, to big bungalows with swimming pool and lawn. Car is not a luxury but a necessity in US or for that in any European country, Dalits in US argue; but what is unique about cars is that

most of them had more than one and they kept on changing the cars in short intervals. Many of them bought second hand cars as well. A good number of Dalits in US use two modes of transport –personal and the public transport. Public transport is used because it is much cheaper, easily available, faster, to avoid heavy toll taxes and parking problem although the gas is much cheaper in US. However, if you are living in a sub-urban area, which most of the Dalits live, then you need a car for everything, even to reach public transport.

6.11 Education among the Second Generation

Most of the parents are not worried about the primary education of their young children. However they are really worried about their higher education. They are worried about the higher education because it is very costly and lots of competition exists. They have not only to compete with Indians but with Asians and Americans both. Secondly, even if you get admission you may not get scholarship and without scholarship it is impossible to complete higher education. Further, most of the Dalit parents like any other Indian parent have preference for science education. There are few reasons for the same. One, most of the parents migrants are themselves science graduates and it is science stream of education which has helped them to get a job. Hence they are convinced about the positive co-relation between science education and jobs. Moreover, they are also aware that in US a science graduate can get many jobs as compared to graduate of social sciences. So education, especially higher education in science, is really very crucial matter which keeps the Dalit parents on their toes and they are not tired planning and talking about the same with their relatives, neighbors or colleagues.

6.12 Innovating Financial Assistance

The poor Dalits who arrived in US without any capital have brought their traditional system of financial banking called ‘Committee’ in US also. They know very well that official finance or Bank loan is out of their bound because in US banks are very strict in giving loan to anyone. One’s credit standing is needed to be sound before one can get loans from banks, which any emigrant Dalit does not have. Under these circumstances the traditional financing system has worked efficiently for the Dalits. The modus operandi is simple. A small group of ten to fifteen Dalits came together and started pooling their agreed upon sum of money every month. Each month the collected amount was borrowed by the highest bidder in the group. In this way the Dalits emigrants generate capital for themselves. The group functioned till each one of the member got his or her money. Many Dalits made successful ventures out of this money; number of members solved their domestic problem. However, Ashok Ram (named changed) is the most successful man who benefitted from this ‘Committee’ system of traditional system of micro-financing. Not even graduate, he was an ordinary staff at a gas station. Later with difficulty he passed driving exam and became a taxi driver. But soon he started participating in the ‘Committee’ and borrowed two hundred thousand dollars and purchased two gas stations. Now he has repaid the loan and has bought a motel in which seventy-four members are employed.³ There are many other successes stories like this but we cannot discuss them here all. However, one thing is sure that this process of micro-financing has really worked in favor of Dalits in an alien land.

³ Interview with Ashok Ram, in New York.

6.13 Caste Discrimination in US

Presence of caste and caste discrimination cuts across religions in the Indian Diaspora. In fact caste based discrimination have been reported among Indian Dalits considered as Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs and Christians in Diaspora. Various Ravidasi Gurudwaras in UK are testimony of the extension of existing caste divide among Sikhs back in India (Juergensmeyer, 1982; Judge, 2010). We have already analyzed the presence of caste and caste discrimination against Dalit Sikhs in *Gurudwaras* in UK and Canada, let us see the case of Dalit Christians in US. McDermott (2009) while doing her study on Indian Dalit Christians in the Diaspora in New York and New Jersey wrote,

Whether they want to admit it or not, however, the overwhelming impression I gained through nine months of research was that Dalit Christians continue to experience caste discrimination in the United States...the majority of advertised matrimonial demonstrate that Indian still practice caste preferences...Even in mixed congregations, people will not participate in social interactions if Dalits are known to be hosts...One of the younger Dalit Christian...was vocal, ironic, and critical of the ways in which university students express caste prejudice... 'Prejudice? I experience it every day! They know their caste identity more than their Tamil (McDermott, 2009, pp. 235-236).

Under these circumstances the Christian Dalits in United States, recognized that the problem of caste discrimination in US is extension of Indian society hence it should be fought at the root. Therefore, they have created an organization in US to fight the caste oppression back home. According to the president of the group created in 2002 in the United States, the Dalit Freedom Network's (DFN), mission is to empower Dalits in their quest for socio-spiritual freedom and human dignity by networking human, financial, and information resources...This international movement exists to give India's Dalits a voice to be heard socially, politically and spiritually (D' Souza, 2004, p. 259).

Apart from the above, Dalits from Gujarat have also suffered the ridicule because of their caste titles, but because of solidarity and protests by Dalits has kept the situation under tight leash. Uttar Pradesh Dalits tell how Indian temples restrict their entries in the absence of their *Gotra* (A sage as a mythical ancestor). Dalits do not have *Gotra*. In the same vein the so-called upper castes still do not hesitate to enquire about the caste title.

7. Conclusions

In conclusion we can argue that the presence of Dalits in Indian Diaspora proves the point that caste like structure exists in Indian Diaspora. The presence of caste restricts the patterns of interaction within the Indian Diasporas. Restrictions lead to discrimination, latent and manifest forms of exclusion and alienation. The presence of caste, caste based interaction, discrimination against Dalits amply proves that Indian Diaspora is internally differentiated on caste lines. The presence of Dalits with their caste, religious symbols and icons in Diaspora give them a separate and independent identity within Indian Diaspora. The presence of Buddha Viharas, Ravidasi and Valmiki Temples, and Ambedkar House on the one hand and celebrations in their names on the other have further strengthen their separate identity. Further the presence of different religious and social organizations has helped them to inculcate social solidarity among themselves. Through this Dalits have also developed self – esteem which they were deprived in the home land. That means the establishment of

symbols, independent associations, religious and secular organizations, relationship with Universities, and High Commissions, and political parties of the host nations have proved very useful for the Dalits in Diaspora.

It is also a fact that for long Dalit Diaspora has been invisible, however with information revolution Dalits have been able to utilize the new technology and have carved out a new virtual space for them by establishing web-sites, Blogs and e-magazines and have increased connectivity among themselves via e-mail, Facebook, twitter, mobile phone, etc (Kumar, 2004). By this modern technology of Internet and Computers they have also developed transnational relations within their own groups. Dalit Diaspora has also helped the Dalits in the country of their origin by opening up schools, coaching centers, libraries, distributing scholarships, funding buildings of religious places like- Buddha Viharas and Ravidasi temples. By establishing Ambedkar Memorial lectures and busts of Babasaheb Ambedkar in different universities of the world the Diaspora has given much required international exposure to the issues of Dalit Human Rights. Today United Human Right Commission, different Social Forums-World Social Forum, Asian Social Forums or European Social Forums have been made aware about the issues human right violations of Dalits in India. This has helped the Dalits in India to relate themselves with the movements of other excluded groups in different parts of the world. The idiom and language in which Dalits raise their issues at the international forums has totally changed in contemporary times so that the professional functionaries manning these supra institutions of justice can appreciate their problems better and take speedy and appropriate actions. However, Dalits are really happy in Diaspora and doing very well without any protective discrimination. Their performance is second to non-Dalits which in a way deconstructs the myth that Dalits do not have merit. They proved the point that if opportunity is given to them they can also perform like anyone else. Therefore one can argue that in coming days the 'New Dalit Diaspora' can act as catalyst for change in the lives of Dalits Diaspora and Dalits in India both. It is, indeed, important for the development of world's largest democracy.

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Widening income gap and economic disparity among South Asians in Canada^{1,2}

Sandeep Agrawal
Ryerson University, Canada

Abstract

This paper outlines the economic experiences of four South Asian ethno-cultural sub-groups – Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, and Sri Lankans – which, together, form the largest visible minority group in Canada. The economic performance of South Asian sub-groups is compared using customized tables from Statistics Canada's Longitudinal Administrative Database. The paper argues that all four sub-groups, Bangladeshis and Pakistanis in particular, fared worse than the Canadian-born and another contemporaneous, but non-South Asian group – Filipinos – demonstrating a failure of human capital model. The findings contribute to a better and more nuanced understanding of economic outcomes of South Asians with implications for Canadian immigration policies and settlement programs.

Keywords: South Asians; Immigrants; Longitudinal Administrative Database; Filipinos; economic performance

1. Introduction

South Asians are now the single largest visible minority group in Canada, having surpassed the Chinese in 2006. Between 1996 and 2001, while the overall Canadian population grew by only 4 percent, the number of people who reported South Asian origin rose by 33 percent. By 2006, this number had risen from 1 million to 1.3 million, another increase of 30 percent, while the overall Canadian population grew by only 5.4 percent. At this rate, according to Statistics Canada (2010), the South Asian population could more than double during the next two decades, reaching between 3.2 million and 4.1 million by 2031. Today in Canada, one in four persons belonging to a visible minority group (25 percent) is South Asian; by 2031, that proportion could rise to approximately 28 percent.

Currently, a conclusive definition of “South Asian” does not exist. According to Tran *et al.* (2005), a South Asian may be defined as any person who reports an “ethnicity”³ associated with the southern part of Asia or who self-identifies as part of the South Asian “visible minority”⁴ group. According to this definition, the person may have been born in Canada, on the Indian sub-continent, in the Caribbean, in Africa, in Great Britain, or elsewhere. This

¹ Because of publication delay, this Working Paper, although dealing with 2012 data, appears in a 2011 issue.

² This is a version of paper presented at the National Metropolis Conference, Toronto, Canada Feb 29-March 3rd 2012.

³ Ethnicity is a socially constructed attribute of individuals and groups based on their culture, language, nationality, and/or customs (Abercrombie *et al.*, 2000). It can change over time and context and applies to immigrants as well as to the Canadian-born. Statistics Canada defined ethnic origin as a respondent's cultural inheritance from ancestors derived from her or his roots and not nationality, language, or citizenship (Statistics Canada, 2006).

⁴ According to Statistics Canada, “visible minority” refers to a person who belongs to a visible minority group as defined by the *Employment Equity Act*, which defines visible minorities as “persons, other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour.” The visible minority population consists mainly of the following groups: Chinese, South Asian, Black, Arab, West Asian, Filipino, Southeast Asian, Latin American, Japanese, and Korean.

definition encompasses people with a mix of nationalities, religions, and linguistic and regional differences including those with Bangladeshi, Bengali, Sikh, Gujarati, Hindu, Ismaili, Kashmiri, Nepali, Pakistani, Punjabi, Goan, Sinhalese, Sri Lankan, and Tamil ancestry.

Much of the variability arises from the vastness of the Indian sub-continent and the size of its population. This region was never exposed to centralized political or military control long enough to reduce the social and cultural differences between various groups as in China, where centuries of centralized rule widely disseminated Han culture (Buchignani *et al.*, 1985). After the end of British imperial rule of India and Sri Lanka in 1947 and 1948, respectively, the area was politically subdivided into the Muslim nation states of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh, predominantly Hindu India and Buddhist Sri Lanka.

In this study, South Asians are identified by their places of birth, irrespective of their religion, ethnicity, culture, language, or nationality. Within the limits of the data collected by Statistics Canada and the requirements of Canada's *Privacy Act* (1985), the scope of the study is limited to immigrants born in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. Immigrants from the other countries are few, except for Afghans. In 2006, about 48,000 self-identified Afghans resided in Canada, many of whom arrived in the country as government-assisted or privately sponsored refugees.

This paper explores the economic outcomes of four South Asian ethno-cultural groups in Canada. It compares and contrasts their performances with those of Canadian-born individuals as well as other immigrant groups, such as the Filipinos and Chinese. It places these findings in the context of the characteristics of immigrants, including human capital endowments (education, qualifications, and knowledge of Canada's official languages), age, place of birth, and gender. Since the characteristics of immigrants are largely determined by immigration policy, immigration class is included as one of the contributing factors. The Canadian labour market, including the industrial sector in which an immigrant finds employment, also affects earnings.

Many immigrants acquire additional knowledge and skills after arriving in Canada by pursuing Canadian education to increase their job prospects and perhaps offset negative attitudes towards foreign-acquired education. Education pursued in Canada can be tracked for immigrants through the tax deduction claimed for tuition fees paid for full-time education. However, the length and nature of education (discipline, university degree or college diploma) is unknown, nor is it known whether the person completed his or her studies.

The study does not take into account the access of immigrants to the labour market and their treatment within it, including discrimination, credential recognition, and assessment of foreign qualifications, access to specific occupations, and labour market niches, union representation, other means of employment advancement, and "glass ceiling" effects regarding promotions. Social and cultural capital and institutional factors are also outside the scope of this study.

Economic analyses thus far have been limited to comparisons between the native-born group and various immigrant or ethno-racial groups. The assumption is that immigrants belonging to any specific ethno-racial group are homogeneous and their economic performances are similar. Increasingly, researchers (Ghosh, 2007; Lo and Wang, 2004; Qadeer *et al.*, 2010) find nomenclature such as "South Asians," "Hispanics," and "Asian-Americans" meaningless, because diversity within an immigrant group is not recognized as a factor in

different economic performances. “When Chinese from China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, or South Asians from India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka are lumped together as an investigation group, averaging takes place and this masks important differences” (Lo and Wang, 2004). This grouping together limits our general understanding of a group, our nuanced understanding of sub-groups, and the appropriateness and effectiveness of policy to address the needs of these groups.

This paper provides a literature review, followed by a discussion of methodology. It then analyzes South Asian immigrants’ economic performance through a discussion of their place of birth, immigrant class, age and education level on arrival, prior knowledge of an official language, education pursued in Canada, and employment in various industrial sectors. Finally, some policy options are explored.

2. Background

A vast amount of Canadian and international research identifies the primary factors in the employment success of immigrants. According to Picot (2008), Statistics Canada has produced 32 research articles on economic integration issues. Statistics Canada research in the late 1980s suggested that the traditional pattern of immigrant earnings growth was changing. During their first few years in Canada, immigrants traditionally earned significantly less than their Canadian-born counterparts, but over time their earnings caught up with and sometimes surpassed those of their Canadian-born colleagues. By the early 1990s, research indicated that the earnings gap at entry between immigrants and the native-born was increasing. Even in the early 1990s, when many highly educated immigrants entered Canada, earnings among adult immigrants worsened. This decline continued in the 2000s, despite a relatively favourable Canadian economic climate.

Consistent with the government reports, the dominant theme in academic literature is that most immigrants are subject to some economic penalties upon entry, and earn less income than the Canadian-born. The earliest study is Borjas’s (1990) discussion of 1981 census data. Baker and Benjamin (1994) and Bloom *et al.* (1995) analyzed the 1986 census, and Grant (1999) noted that the 1991 census showed further declines in immigrants’ earnings vis-à-vis the Canadian-born. The release of 2001 data increased concern about the trends, and the search for explanations led to further studies by Aydemir and Skuterud (2005), Chui and Zeitsma (2003), Frenette and Morissette (2003), Green and Worswick (2004; 2006), Picot and Hou (2003), and Picot *et al.* (2008). Although most of the studies are based on census data, a few have used the Immigration Database (IMDB) or the Survey of Consumer Finances. Methods of analysis vary, and include complex analytic techniques.

During the 1990s, mounting evidence indicated that university education among immigrants did not lead to high earnings in the Canadian labour market. Picot and Sweetman (2005) attribute this finding to three factors: the changing composition of source countries, mother tongue or language used at home, and visible minority status; age at immigration; and a general decline in labour market outcomes for all new entrants to the labour market. Immigrants, regardless of their age at arrival, appear to be treated by the labour market as if they were new entrants.

Factors such as age, knowledge of an official language, and prior work experience have received particular attention. Immigrants who arrive in Canada between the ages of 21 and 30 years and who list English as their mother tongue earn much more compared to other

immigrants (Schaafsma and Sweetman, 2001). Aydemir and Skuterud (2004) argue that the knowledge of a Canadian official language, to a large extent governs earnings. Work experiences before arrival in Canada has been explored in detail. More recent immigrant cohorts receive a much lower rate of return in the labour market from work experiences gained in their home countries (Green and Worswick, 2002; Schaafsma and Sweetman, 2001).

Visible minority status also appears to affect income. Palameta (2004) found that recent immigrants who had been in Canada for less than seven years – most of whom were visible minority individuals – were significantly more likely to be low-income than the rest of the population. Visible minority immigrants, irrespective of time spent in Canada, experienced lower incomes.

Picot *et al.* (2009) looked at trends from 1980 to 2005, and found that 22 percent of immigrants in 2005 had low incomes. Picot (2008) also identifies different factors responsible for the earnings decline between 2000 and 2005, including the disproportionate number of immigrants in information technology and engineering occupations, which coincided with a downturn in these two sectors of Canadian economy.

Education attained in Canada has an impact on immigrants' income. Gilmore and Le Petit (2008) found that recent and established immigrants who received their highest university degree in Canada or Europe had comparable employment rates in 2007 to the Canadian-born population. In contrast, many of those who obtained credentials in Latin America, Asia, or Africa had lower employment rates. One exception to the latter group was immigrants who received a university degree from Southeast Asian (mainly Filipino) educational institutions. Anisef *et al.* (2010) found that those who pursued postsecondary education in Canada saw their employment rate rise more rapidly than those who did not in the first six months after arrival. However, the employment rate after four years remained lower for immigrants who pursued postsecondary education in Canada than for those who did not.

Rollin (2011), using the Longitudinal Administrative Database (LAD), found that pursuing postsecondary education in Canada seems to be correlated with stronger growth of employment income for both women and men, but with a larger nominal increase for women.

How well did immigrants from specific regions or countries of birth fare in the Canadian labour market? Gilmore (2008), using the Labour Force Survey, found that immigrants born in Southeast Asia, particularly those from the Philippines, had the strongest labour market performance of all immigrants to Canada in 2006, regardless of when they landed. He found that in 2006, many very recent immigrants in the core working-age group, 25 to 54, had experienced more difficulties in the labour market than the Canadian-born, regardless of their region of birth. The only exceptions to this finding are those born in Southeast Asia, particularly Filipinos. Those born elsewhere in Asia (including the Middle East) as well as individuals born in Latin America, Europe, and Africa all had higher unemployment rates and lower employment rates in 2006 than their Canadian-born counterparts.

Several papers focus on the economic integration of specific immigrant groups, particularly the Chinese (Liu, 1997; Lo and Wang, 2004; Ma, 2003; Wang and Lo, 2000). Lo and Wang (2004) note that heterogeneity and sub-ethnicity, coupled with immigration status and time of immigration, explain diverse economic experiences among Chinese immigrants. Economic studies on South Asians are rare. Walton-Roberts's (2003; 2011) research explores connections between Indo-Canadian transnational networks, immigration, and trade between

the two countries. Agrawal and Lovell (2010) have developed a socio-economic profile of Indians and examined the determinants of success for high-income earners.

This paper therefore, stands out in three ways. First, it focuses on the subgroups of South Asians. Second, it uses LAD, which consists of 27 years of immigrant data including human capital at the time of arrival, human capital acquired after arrival, and Canadian labour market attributes. Third, it compares South Asians with other immigrant groups, including Filipinos and Chinese. In 2009, with nearly 30,000 coming to Canada, Filipinos emerged as the largest group of immigrants to Canada, surpassing Chinese and Indians.

3. Method

The study uses both descriptive and inferential statistics to forecast the upward mobility of South Asian immigrant groups. Employing cross-tabulations and ordinal logistic regression, the paper analyzes the custom tabulations of the Longitudinal Administrative Databank (LAD) of Statistics Canada. This administrative file contains longitudinal income information on other Canadians as well as immigrants, allowing for comparisons among groups.

Few studies have used this database for immigration-related research and analysis, perhaps because it is expensive. The little work that exists is by federal and provincial governments, mainly on return migration (Dryburgh and Hamel, 2004), interprovincial mobility and earnings (Bernard, 2008; Government of Alberta, 2009), immigrants' income correlated to Canadian educational attainment (Rollin, 2011), and economic integration of immigrants living outside large urban areas (Bernard, 2008). Other government economic studies focus on retirement income replacement (Laroche-Côté *et al.*, 2010), the slowdown of output growth relative to employment growth (Cross, 2007), and the repayment of student loans and how well loans are targeted to low-income youth (Kapsalis, 2006).

The LAD is a longitudinal and cross-sectional sample composed of 20 percent of Canadian tax filers. The data are drawn from the T1 income tax returns of individuals and their families and the Longitudinal Immigration Data Base. The LAD contains demographic variables about the individuals represented and annual income information reported to Canadian Revenue Agency for both the individual and his or her census family⁵ in that year. The file also contains certain characteristics at landing such as language proficiency, education, age, and immigration class.

The large number of observations in LAD makes it possible to produce reliable estimates. The 20 percent sample increased from 3,227,485 people in 1982 to 4,962,151 in 2006 (an increase of almost 54 percent). The LAD's coverage of the adult population is adequate, because according to Finnie (2006), the rate of tax filing in Canada is very high: higher-income Canadians are required to do so, while lower-income individuals may file in order to recover payroll deductions made throughout the year and receive various tax credits. The full set of annual tax files from which the LAD is constructed are estimated to cover more than 91 percent of the target adult population (official population estimates), comparing favourably with other survey-based databases, and rivalling the census.

LAD also covers a wide range of income sources like employment and self-employment earnings, investments, and other income, facilitating the study of changes in income

⁵Census family as defined by Statistics Canada constitutes a married couple and the children, if any, of either or both spouses; or a couple living common-law and the children, if any, of either or both partners. All members of a particular census family live in the same dwelling.

composition over time. It includes industry sector variables, using the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS⁶), produced by matching LAD with the Business Register. Population numbers in the database are the weighted estimates of the number of tax filers in Canada. In the LAD, the population we are talking about are tax filers, and the average weight of the tax filer is 5, which is equal to the inverse of the probability of selection (1/20 percent).

Special tabulations of LAD from Statistics Canada for this study consist of immigrants who arrived between 1980 and 2007 and filed taxes⁷. It also includes Canadian-born workers as well as immigrants who arrived in Canada before 1980 for comparison purposes. The customized tables with 5,107,529 observations in 2008 contain 12 variables: landing year (6 cohorts between 1980 and 2007, plus Canadian-born or immigrated before 1980), country of birth (7 sources, plus Canadian-born or immigrated before 1980), annual family income expressed in 2008 constant dollars (7 categories), age at landing (7 categories), gender (male/female), immigrant category (6 categories), level of education at landing (high school or less, some university/college diploma, university degree), official language ability (yes or no), industry derived from NAICS (13 categories), full-time education deduction (claimed/not claimed), immigrant/emigrant code (no migration, entry or exit), and last place lived (16 places). The variables are described in Appendix 1. Each table contained country of birth, landing year, income and counts in each year from 1982 till 2008 in which tax returns were filed with one additional variable added from the remaining 9 variables.

Table 1: Profile of tax filers in 2008

tax filers in 2008	India	Pakistan	Bangladesh	Sri Lanka	China	The Philippines	other immigrants
knowledge of an official language	49.92%	66.31%	70.42%	65.10%	32.17%	83.23%	63.36%
education pursued in Canada	4.83%	7.82%	9.66%	7.23%	7.90%	5.50%	7.77%
entered with university degree	34.37%	44.55%	45.40%	7.16%	37.38%	35.04%	21.86%
immigration class							
Family class	61.32%	29.73%	31.01%	31.54%	30.63%	36.90%	29.72%
Business PA	1.50%	4.27%	3.13%	0.25%	10.33%	1.18%	6.93%
skilled worker	32.01%	50.92%	42.48%	12.85%	50.32%	32.79%	36.16%
prov nominee	0.60%	0.35%	0.31%	0.11%	0.81%	2.97%	0.88%
refugee	2.53%	12.38%	14.80%	37.51%	3.68%	0.19%	20%

The paper involves logistic regression model to compare the likelihood of impacts that different levels of explanatory variables (predictors) have on the level variations within the dependent variable. The model includes the 'Income', measured by 7 levels from low to high, treated as the dependent variable against 10 (out of 11) explanatory variables, but only three at a time – country of birth, landing year and another variable from the remaining 8. In addition to this basic model, several interaction effects are also estimated. Specifically, country of birth is interacted with age at landing, landing year, gender, immigrant category, level of education at landing, official language ability, industry sector, education pursued after arrival and last place lived. Any variables or interaction effects that are found to be non-significant are

⁶The North American Industry Classification System is a system that groups together production units that use similar production processes.

⁷ Table 1 outlines a profile of immigrant tax filers in 2008.

removed from the final models. The “emigration” variable was found to have insignificant effects, hence, was removed from the model. This is perhaps because a very small percentage of immigrants emigrate, 0.1 percent in a given year (Finnie, 2006; Dryburgh and Hymel, 2004).

The basic logistic model that shows what function of probabilities results in a linear combination of parameters is

$$\ln(Y') = \ln\left(\frac{\pi(x_j)}{1 - \pi(x_j)}\right) = \alpha + (\beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_n X_n) + \xi$$

Where $\pi(x_j)$ is the probability of being at or below category j in Income.

The quantity to the left of the equal sign, called a logit, is the log of the odds that an event occurs. The X_n is an explanatory variable. α , β_n and ξ represent the intercept, coefficients of the explanatory variables, and error term respectively. X_1 is Landing Year and β_1 is coefficient of Landing Year; X_2 is country of birth and β_2 is coefficient of country of birth.

In addition to the above basic model, several interaction effects were also estimated with the help of the following model. The purpose of this was to account for the interactive effects of explanatory variables, but most importantly, focus on the interactions of country of birth and the rest of the variables.

$$\ln(Y') = \ln\left(\frac{\pi(x_j)}{1 - \pi(x_j)}\right) = \alpha + (\beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \dots \beta_n X_n) + (\gamma_{2n} X_2 X_n) + \xi$$

Where γ_{2n} is the coefficient of the interactive effect $X_2 X_n$

In the SPSS output, the coefficients of all levels of every explanatory variable are interpreted in the following way: with one unit increase in the predictor (i.e., a category within an explanatory variable), the response variable level (i.e., a category in the dependent variable) is expected to change by its respective regression coefficient in ordered log-odds scale while the other variables in the model are held constant.

As an example, a regression coefficient of 0.313 for Education Claimed means that if an individual received education in Canada, his or her odds of being in a higher income category would increase by 0.313 with other variables held constant. The odds ratios of the predictors are calculated by exponentiating the estimate. So the odds ratio of the individual who received education in Canada is $e^{.313}=1.37$, which represents the difference in the likelihood of impact on income levels between educated immigrants and non-educated immigrants. Simply put, this individual is 1.37 times more likely to be in the higher income group. Furthermore, using the interactive predictor, a Bangladeshi, for example, who pursued education in Canada, has log-odds of being in a higher income group of -1.363 (Figure 4) or an odds ratio of 0.256. In other words, this individual is only 0.256 times more likely to fall in the higher income levels, that is, a very low likelihood of moving to higher income levels.

4. South Asians in Canada

The diversity among South Asian Canadians cannot be understood without some knowledge of the history of South Asians in Canada, shaped by the colonial past of South Asian peoples, post-colonial geo-political conflicts, the independence of India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and

Bangladesh, and changes in the Canadian immigration policy. The following summary is based in part on Buchignani *et al.* (1985).

Early South Asian immigrants came from India, mostly Sikhs from the Punjab province, seeking economic opportunities abroad. A group landed in British Columbia when their ship stopped en route from Britain to India in 1897. In 1903, South Asians population numbered about 300, but they grew to 5,000 between 1904 and 1908. The increase coincided with a shortage of manual labour in Canada caused by an intermission in Chinese immigration when the government raised the head-tax on Chinese immigrants.

In 1908, the Canadian government restricted Indian immigration through the “continuous journey” rule. The rule required immigrants to arrive on ship that came in Canada directly from its home port, but any ship from India was compelled to stop at a foreign port to refuel, which effectively made South Asian immigration impossible. The infamous *Komagata Maru* incident of 1914 was a result of this exclusionary law.

Between 1914 and 1957, very few South Asians arrived in Canada, and many who had arrived earlier returned to their homeland so that in 1951, there were only 2,148 South Asians in the country. On January 1, 1951, the Canadian government initiated a quota system for South Asian immigrants, set at 150, 100, and 50 people per year, from India, Pakistan, and Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), respectively.

The Canada-India Immigration Agreement of 1957 raised the Indian quota to 300. In 1958 the government allowed South Asian Canadians to sponsor relatives, and between 1962 and 1967, regulations were further liberalized. The categories for entry were expanded to include the skilled class and the family class, which allowed more women and children, as well as more ethnically diverse groups, to enter Canada.

Meanwhile, the diversity of South Asian immigrants was increasing. Before 1957, most Indian and Pakistani immigrants were Sikhs. In the 1960s, however, South Asian immigrants included Sinhalese and Tamils from Ceylon and Muslims and Anglo-Indians from India and Pakistan.

In 1967, with the introduction of quotas based on a points system rather than on ethnicity, the number of South Asian migrants also began to increase. Between 1962 and 1971, South Asian immigration rose to more than 12 times the level it had been in the previous decade. Rates of immigration remained high through the 1970s and early 1980s. During this time, at least 200,000 South Asians came to Canada, so that by 1982, about 310,000 people of South Asian origin lived in Canada, representing 1.2 percent of the Canadian population.

A greater emphasis on the Sponsored class (now called the Family class) by the Canadian government in the 1970s contributed to a shift in the occupational background of South Asian immigrants, and an increase in the number of skilled, as well as unskilled, workers coming to Canada. Most found work in the agricultural, manufacturing, and clerical sectors.

Since 1985, increasing numbers of South Asian immigrants have come to Canada. Between 2000 and 2005, the average yearly immigration figures have included about 30,350 Indians; 14,000 Pakistanis; 3,100 Bangladeshis; and 5,200 Sri Lankans. At the time of the 2006 census, 443,690 Indians, 105,670 Sri Lankans, 133,280 Pakistanis, and 33,230 Bangladeshis lived in Canada, mostly in Toronto.

5. Sri Lankans in Canada

Because of the early Canadian quota system, immigration from Sri Lanka dates only from the early 1950s. Most early immigrants were Burghers.⁸ The population of Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon) comprised a majority of Buddhist Sinhalese and a minority of Hindu Tamils. In the 1970s, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the separatist militant Tamil group, started a campaign of violence against the state to oppose laws that they deemed discriminatory towards the Tamil minority. Sinhalese and Tamil professionals who were dissatisfied with ethnic or political relations in their country began to emigrate so that by 1983, their numbers in Canada rose to 5,000.

With the outbreak of civil war in Sri Lanka in 1983, the number of Tamil immigrants and refugees to Canada increased. Since then, refugee claimants and immigrants through the Family class have outnumbered those in the Skilled Worker category and these immigrants have a high school education at most. In 2006, there were 105,670 Sri Lankans in Canada, of which 80 percent lived in the Toronto area.

6. Bangladeshis in Canada

The creation of the state of Pakistan in 1947 created East and West Pakistan, separated by a thousand miles of India (Guha, 2007). Political control centred in the West. Repression of the people of East Pakistan resulted in a violent civil war leading to the independence of East Pakistan and the birth of Bangladesh in 1971. A few immigrants had come from East Pakistan between 1960 and 1965 as a part of overall Pakistani immigration. Since the early 1990s, Bangladeshi immigrants have increasingly come through the Skilled Worker category, with a brief spike in refugee claimants between 1989 and 1991. Relative to Indians (35,965 in 2005), few Bangladeshis (4,156 in 2005) come to Canada. Most are skilled professionals with university degrees. At the time of the 2006 census, about 33,230 Bangladeshis lived in Canada, 57 percent of them in the Toronto area.

7. Pakistanis in Canada

Few people emigrated from independent Pakistan during the 1950s, and, of those, most were Sikh. In the late 1950s and 1960s, however, professional Pakistanis, primarily Muslims, emigrated because of a huge surplus of skilled and educated people in Pakistan.

While fewer than 1,000 Pakistanis came to Canada before 1960, in the next 10 years, the number rose to 6,000 and by 1983, it stood at about 25,000. Between 1990–1992 and 2000–2004, Canada also received refugees from Pakistan. Since the early 1990s, many highly educated Pakistani immigrants have arrived through the Skilled Worker category, repeating the 1960s pattern. Today, Pakistanis are the second largest group among South Asians. At the time of the 2006 census, 133,280 Pakistanis lived in Canada, 64.25 percent of them in the Toronto area. Against this backdrop of migration history, we now turn to the economic outcomes of these four groups.

8. Results

In this study, sub-cultural groups are defined by place of birth: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, or Sri Lanka. Canadian-born and other contemporary immigrant groups – Chinese and Filipinos

⁸Intermarriages between Portuguese and Sinhalese and Dutch and Sinhalese resulted into a new ethnic group called the Burghers.

– are used for comparisons. Economic performance is measured by total annual family income,⁹ reported to Canada Revenue Agency in 2008 in the 2008 constant dollars. As Hiebert and Ley (2003) argue, the household income better captures the economic achievements of immigrants, especially non-Europeans. The literature suggests that immigrants' economic performance are affected by landing year, country of birth, age at the time of landing, immigrant category, gender, level of education at the time of landing, official language ability at landing, and education pursued in Canada. This study adds last place of residence other than the place of birth and industrial sector of employment as factors that may contribute to earnings.

Although most South Asians arrive in Canada directly from their place of birth, more than 12 percent of Indian-born immigrants enter Canada from another country. In 2005, for example, 3,426 Indian-born newcomers arrived in Canada after residing in a country other than India. Before the mid-1990s, many arrived from England. Since the 1990s, an increasing number has entered through the Middle East. In the past decade, the step-migration of Pakistanis has been primarily through Saudi Arabia, followed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and India. Bangladeshis come via the UAE, followed by Saudi Arabia. The most typical last place of residence for Sri Lankans has been India, the UAE, England, and Germany, in that order.

Immigration policy has affected the characteristics of South Asians entering into the country. New immigrants tends to be younger, more educated, highly skilled and in the skilled worker category. Most are fluent in one of Canada's official languages. Religious and linguistic traits are also changing. South Asian immigration in Canada was once dominated by Sikhs, but in 2001, only 30 percent of South Asians in Canada identified themselves as Sikhs. Other groups include Hindus (28 percent), Muslims (23 percent), Catholics (8 percent), another religion (7 percent), and no religion (3 percent).

According to the 2001 census, members of the South Asian community reported more than 75 different mother tongues. Among those with just one mother tongue, Punjabi was the most common at 29 percent, followed by English (27 percent), Tamil (10 percent), Urdu (8 percent), Gujarati (6 percent), Hindi (6 percent), and Bengali (3 percent). Punjabi remains the most widely spoken mother tongue of new arrivals (41 percent of all South Asian immigrants between 2001 and 2003). In the two recent cohorts, 1996-2000 and 2001-2003, however, the proportion of people identifying Punjabi as their native language has declined by roughly 20 percent. There is a corresponding increase in Gujarati and Bengali as well as Southern Indian languages – Telugu, Tamil, and Malayalam (Agrawal and Lovell, 2010).

Almost one-third of Indians are engaged in manufacturing (14.2 percent), wholesale industries (10.3 percent), and transportation (4.7 percent). Slightly more than 2 percent of Indian immigrants work in agriculture, the highest proportion among all South Asian groups as well as Chinese and Filipinos. Over one-third of Sri Lankans and Bangladeshis are engaged in the manufacturing, accommodation and wholesale/retail trade sectors. Pakistanis seem to gravitate towards wholesale (11.7 percent), and administrative support and waste management (8.1 percent) sectors. Although 28.8 percent of Filipinos are in the manufacturing and wholesale trade sectors, 13.5 percent of them work in the health sector, the highest proportion among all immigrant groups (see Table 2 for further details).

⁹Total income is the aggregate of all incomes before tax reported to the Canada Revenue Agency by all members of an individual's census family. The income is the sum of various sources of income including employment earnings from T4 slips, self-employment, rental income, universal child care benefit, pension, CPP, investments, or other income.

Table 2: Country of Birth and industry sectors

51

country of origin * industry Crosstabulation																	
Count																	
		1. Agriculture	10. Administrative support, Waste management	11. Educational Services	12. Health Care and Social Assistance	13. Accommodation and Food Services	14. Unknown	15. All Others	2. Construction	3. Manufacturing	4. Wholesale/Retail Trade	5. Transportation and Warehousing	6. Finance and Insurance	7. Real Estate and Rental/Lease	8. Professional, Scientific and Technical services	9. Management of Companies and Enterprises	Total
country of c	1. India	2.3%	7.6%	2.0%	3.1%	4.8%	35.6%	5.2%	2.0%	14.2%	10.3%	4.7%	2.9%	0.7%	4.1%	0.4%	100.0%
	2. China	0.2%	2.9%	2.5%	2.5%	7.6%	46.6%	5.8%	1.3%	10.3%	9.4%	1.0%	2.4%	0.7%	6.5%	0.3%	100.0%
	3. Philippines	0.1%	5.5%	1.7%	13.5%	6.8%	17.8%	10.9%	1.3%	16.8%	12.0%	2.5%	4.1%	1.8%	4.4%	0.8%	100.0%
	4. Pakistan	0.1%	8.1%	2.1%	2.3%	4.5%	48.5%	5.3%	0.8%	6.5%	11.7%	2.3%	2.8%	0.3%	4.5%	0.1%	100.0%
	5. Sri Lanka	0.0%	7.6%	1.7%	2.8%	10.1%	34.7%	5.5%	0.6%	16.2%	10.3%	2.2%	3.9%	0.9%	3.3%	0.2%	100.0%
	6. Bangladesh	0.0%	6.5%	2.9%	2.2%	16.1%	40.9%	4.7%	0.0%	9.2%	10.7%	0.4%	2.1%	0.2%	4.1%	0.0%	100.0%
	7. Immigrant f	0.5%	5.2%	3.9%	6.0%	4.4%	36.0%	8.5%	2.7%	10.5%	10.5%	2.3%	3.1%	1.2%	4.8%	0.5%	100.0%
	8. Canadian b	1.1%	3.2%	4.8%	5.7%	4.0%	36.4%	12.6%	4.1%	7.1%	10.6%	2.7%	2.6%	1.1%	3.4%	0.5%	100.0%
Total		1.1%	3.5%	4.7%	5.6%	4.2%	36.4%	12.0%	3.9%	7.6%	10.6%	2.6%	2.7%	1.1%	3.5%	0.5%	100.0%

Of the tax filers in 2008, the 87.6 percent were Canadian-born or immigrated to Canada before 1980. The rest were immigrants. Of those immigrants, 83.23 percent of Filipinos and 70.42 percent of Bangladeshis claimed to have the ability to speak in an official language. 9.66 percent Bangladeshis pursued education in Canada, highest among South Asian, Chinese and Filipinos immigrants as well as among the rest of the immigrant population. Among the 2008 tax filers, the highest proportion of Bangladeshis (45.4 percent), closely followed by Pakistanis (44.55 percent), entered into Canada with university degrees. Parsing the immigrant population along the immigration class, Indians topped the Family class with 61.32 percent; Chinese the Business class with 10.33 percent, Pakistanis the Skilled category with 51 percent; and Sri Lankan the refugee class at 37.51 percent.

The ordinal nature of custom LAD tables does not let us calculate the average incomes. So, the Public Use Micro data File (PUMF) of Census 2006 was used, but it yields only individual, not family, average incomes. It tells us that the average annual income of Canadian-born was \$42,000, closely followed by immigrants at \$41,430.00. Among immigrants, Indians' incomes averaged at \$36,000 while Pakistanis settled at \$32,017 and Chinese at \$29,986. Filipinos' average income was \$32,393, slightly higher than Pakistanis'. Bangladeshis' income could not be calculated because they are not identified as a separate group in the PUMF.

The regression results show that each of the 10 factors included in the analysis was statistically significant. However, six accounted for significant differences in the income levels of immigrants: country of birth; age at the time of landing in Canada; education level at the time of arrival; ability to speak an official language; immigration category; and employment sector. Year of landing, education attained in Canada after arrival, last place of residence, and gender has less impact on earnings. Table 3 summarizes the coefficients.

Table 3: Logistic regression Coefficients table

X_3													
Education Deduction		Language		Age		Education Level		Immigration Category		Sex		Industry	
Claimed	0.313	English and/or French	0.348	0-14 years	2.264	High School or less	-0.881	Provincial Nominee	1.062	Female	-0.232	Agriculture	-0.954
Not Claimed	0	Neither	0	15-24 years	2.04	Some University/College Diploma	-0.453	Family Class	0.211	Male	0	Administrative support, Waste management and Remediation Services	-0.959
				25-34 years	2.332	University Degree	0	Business P.A.	0.103			Educational Services	0.117
				35-44 years	2.194			Skilled Worker	1.014			Health Care and Social Assistance	-0.248
				45-54 years	1.428			Other	0			Accommodation and Food Services	-1.267
				55-64 years	0.525							Unknown	-1.786
				65 and over	0							All Others	-0.063
												Construction	-0.31
												Manufacturing	-0.27
												Wholesale/Retail Trade	-0.585
												Transportation and Warehousing	-0.369
												Finance and Insurance	0.216
												Real Estate and Rental/Leasing	-0.459
												Professional, Scientific and Technical Services	0.11
												Management of Companies and Enterprises	0

Model: $Y = \alpha_j + (\beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3)$; Dependent variable: Y = Income Level ; Independent variables:

X_1 = Landing Cohort; X_2 = Country of Origin


Consistent with Gilmore's (2008) findings, Filipinos generally do better than South Asians and Chinese. The Provincial Nominee program also does better than other economic classes, including skilled worker and business classes, as also noted by Carter (2010), who studied Manitoba's provincial nominee program. The finding that education attained in Canada does not result in higher earnings (barring Filipinos) contradicts Gilmore *et al.* (2008), Rollin (2011), and Anisef *et al.*'s (2010) findings. Higher education at the time of arrival in Canada generally leads to higher earnings, especially for Filipinos, but does not seem to benefit immigrants from South Asia. This outcome is consistent with the findings of Gilmore and Le Petit (2008). Bangladeshis and Pakistanis fare especially badly on this score. The association between Indian immigrants with a university degree and income is not statistically significant; that is, while some Indians with a university degree progress to higher income levels, others do not.

Bangladeshis, despite acquiring education in Canada, do not attain high income levels. Neither do they benefit from their language abilities, like Pakistanis. Even arriving at an early age does not benefit them to the same extent as it benefits other groups. Furthermore, entering Canada with high education does not yield positive returns to Bangladeshis or Pakistanis. While every element of human capital yielded negative returns for Bangladeshis and Pakistanis, Filipinos benefited immensely from each of those factors. Irrespective of the landing cohort in which they arrived, Filipinos tend to be in higher income levels. Arriving at an early age benefitted every immigrant, no matter which country of birth.

8.1 Ability to speak an official language

Facility in an official language, country of birth, and landing cohort together explain differences in income levels. Regression analysis confirmed that those who have facility in English or French are 1.416 times more likely to move to higher income levels than those who do not. Filipinos ($e^{.630} = 1.878$) with proficiency in one of Canada's official languages, followed by Indians ($e^{.441} = 1.554$) are most likely to fall in higher income levels (see Figure 1). The odds of Bangladeshis ($e^{-.410} = .664$) having low incomes are much higher, despite language proficiency. Even the inability to speak an official language does not prevent Filipinos from doing well ($e^{.380} = 1.462$).

Figure 1: Graph showing the coefficient regressions of interaction predictors between knowledge of English or French and country of birth.




8.2 Age

Age, country of birth, and landing cohorts explain high level of variations in income levels. Age groups 15-24, 25-34 and 35-44 are more likely to fall in higher income levels. Among the three age groups, the 25-34 age groups across all immigrants are more likely

to earn higher incomes. Filipinos, once again, do better than any of the South Asian and Chinese immigrants for all three cohorts (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: Graph showing the coefficient regressions of interaction predictors between age on arrival and country of birth.



8.3 Education on arrival

Three variables – education level at the time of arrival, country of birth, and landing cohort – together explain significant variations in income. Immigrants who come with higher levels of education are more likely to attain a higher income category as opposed to those with some university or college diplomas ($e^{-.453=.636}$) or high school or less ($e^{-.881=.414}$).

The association of Indian immigrants with university degrees and income is not statistically significant. Some Indians with university degrees progress to high income levels while others do not. Filipinos with university degrees ($e^{.342=1.408}$), on the other hand, are most likely to achieve higher income levels. Educated Sri Lankans ($e^{.188=1.207}$) also do well. Highly-educated Pakistanis ($e^{-.785=.456}$) and Bangladeshis ($e^{-.831=.436}$), however, are likely to end up in low income levels. University-educated Chinese ($e^{-.314=.730}$) performs a little better than Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, but cannot match Filipinos and Sri Lankans. Not surprisingly, those with only high school or less education, especially Chinese and Pakistanis, tend to remain with low incomes. Figure 3 shows the regression coefficients of interactive predictors of country of birth and education.


8.4 Education in Canada

Pursuing full-time education in Canada, country of birth and landing cohort explain some differences in income levels. Compared with those who did not pursue education, those who did are 1.37 times more likely to be in a higher income category. Filipinos ($e^{.363=1.438}$) who pursued education in Canada are most likely to fall in higher income levels, very much like the Canadian-born ($e^{.354=1.425}$), when all other variables are held constant. The likelihood of Bangladeshis ($e^{-1.363=.256}$) attaining higher income levels is very low, even for those educated in Canada. The situation of Pakistanis ($e^{-.872=.418}$) and the Chinese ($e^{-.866=.420}$) are not much better (see Figure 4).

8.5 Immigration class

Immigration categories, country of birth, and landing cohort also explain significant changes in income levels. Pakistanis in the Provincial category, Indians in the Family class, and Business Principal Applicants (PAs) from other countries are not statistically likely to have higher incomes. Business PAs from Sri Lankans were so few that they have been suppressed to zero. Among those who have positive association with earnings, provincial nominees ($e^{1.062=2.892}$) followed by Skilled workers ($e^{1.014=2.757}$) are most likely to do well in Canada. Within the skilled worker category, Filipinos, Sri Lankans and Indians are most likely to do well. Among Provincial nominees, Bangladeshis ($e^{.782=2.186}$) and Sri Lankans ($e^{.782=2.186}$) fare well, closely followed by Filipinos ($e^{.747=2.110}$). Skilled Chinese ($e^{.476=1.610}$) seem to thrive in the Canadian economy while family ($e^{-.682=.505}$) and Business PA ($e^{-.626=.535}$) class Chinese tend to be in low-income categories. Figure 5 shows regression coefficients for interactive predictors of country of birth and immigration categories.

Figure 3: Graph showing the coefficient regressions of interaction predictors between education on arrival and country of birth. * $p < .05$



8.6 Gender

Gender, country of birth, and landing cohort explain some variations in income levels. Compared with men, women ($e^{-.232}=.793$) are less likely to attain higher income levels. Compared with Canadian-born, only Filipino men ($e^{.097}=1.102$) do equally well. Other immigrant men and women are likely to remain in low income levels. Bangladeshi and Pakistani men and Bangladeshi, Pakistani, and Chinese women tend to remain at low income levels.

Figure 4: Graph showing the coefficient regressions of interaction predictors between education pursued in Canada and country of birth.





Figure 5: Graph showing the coefficient regressions of interaction predictors between immigration categories and country of birth. * $p > .05$



8.7 Industry Sector

Industry sector, in combination with landing cohort and country of birth, explain the greatest income variations. Finance and insurance ($e^{.216}=1.241$), followed by education services ($e^{.117}=1.124$); and professional and scientific and technical services ($e^{.110}=1.116$), are the three industrial sectors that seem to lead to higher income levels. In contrast, accommodation and food services, agriculture and administrative support, waste management and remediation services are the three that tend to be associated with low incomes; 40 percent of Chinese, 38.6 percent of Pakistanis, and 41 percent of Bangladeshis in accommodation and food services are earning less than \$30,000 a year. Administrative support and waste management employ 35.5 percent of Pakistanis, 28.8 percent of Bangladeshis, and 31.7 percent of Chinese in low income categories. Fewer Bangladeshis attain high incomes, even in sectors like health, education, professional and technical services and finance and insurance. Figure 6 explains all the coefficients.

8.8 Last Place of Residence

Last place of residence, landing cohorts and country of birth together accounted for some income variation. Immigrants whose last place of residence were the UK, the US, or Germany is more likely to attain a higher income level. Pakistan carries a negative value as a last place of residence, meaning that immigrants, who were not born in Pakistan but lived in the country at the time of application, are least likely to fall into a higher income level. As Figure 6 shows, Indians coming via other countries (except Pakistan) do better than their counterparts coming straight from India. Pakistanis who entered Canada via the United States ($e^{-.548}=.578$) did not perform well. Filipinos, on the other hand, irrespective of their last place of residence, do very well, performing better than those originating from their own country. Filipinos emigrating from the UK ($e^{2.377}=10.773$) were propelled much further, while Indians from Pakistan ($e^{-1.637}=.195$) performed the worst. Pakistanis, Sri Lankans, and Bangladeshis emigrating from India are also among the worst performers in the Canadian labour market. Coefficients are represented graphically in Figure 7.

9. Conclusion

Among South Asians, Bangladeshis and Pakistanis are penalized heavily in the Canadian labour market. None of their human capital assets (such as high education on arrival, pursuing education in Canada, or knowledge of an official language) helped them move up the economic ladder. Contrary to earlier scholarly findings, pursuing education in Canada does not help them. This finding exposes the inability of human capital model to account for immigrants' disadvantage in the labour market.

Although Indians fared far better than the other groups in the Canadian labour market, they did not do as well as Filipino immigrants. Filipinos consistently demonstrated a stronger labour market outcome with the same human capital assets. Irrespective of their landing year, age, gender, or immigration class, they out performed every other South Asian and Chinese immigrant group. Chinese immigrants did better than Bangladeshis, Pakistanis and Sri Lankans, but lagged behind Indians and Filipinos.

There are clearly large variations among South Asian immigrant groups. Government policies and settlement programs have not been effective in assisting all immigrant groups, especially South Asian sub-groups. However, immigrants entering Canada through the Provincial Nominee program have consistently performed better than members of any other immigrant class across all the countries of origin under observation. Perhaps this program should be expanded further and renewed in the provinces where it has expired or is about to expire, and should be coupled with increased provincial authority in designing and delivering immigrant services.

One characteristic – early age at arrival – has consistently proven beneficial. It points to the fact that immigration policy should emphasize recruitment of younger immigrants, preferably through Canadian Experience or Provincial Nominee class. Expanding the Canadian Experience class will require partnering with Canadian universities and community colleges. Canadian educational institutions need a better presence outside Canada, especially in the South Asian countries, and should engage in recruiting good students.

Barring Filipinos, all other Business class immigrants, including South Asians performed poorly in the Canadian labour market. Ley (2000; 2003) argues that Canada's Business class for immigration has outlived its usefulness. His research demonstrates that those in the Business class¹ have not done better than those in the Provincial nominee, skilled, or even family classes. Perhaps it is time the federal government replaced this program by a new, renewed program for transnational entrepreneurs and professionals that emphasizes the development of business ventures to create jobs in Canada by applying immigrants' transnational ties.

The underperformance of skilled immigrants, especially Bangladeshis and Pakistanis, who are Muslims, may point to racial – and perhaps religious – discrimination in the Canadian labour market. Racial and other cultural discrimination in Canadian labour market is dealt with elsewhere in the literature (Li, 2001; Pendakur and Pendakur, 1998, 2002; Reitz, 2001a; Reitz and Banerjee, 2007; Swidinsky and Swidinsky, 2002). While overt racial discrimination is limited, Model and Lin (2002) demonstrate the earnings penalty and higher unemployment

¹The objective of the Business Immigration Program is to promote, encourage, and facilitate the immigration of experienced business persons from abroad who will make a positive contribution to the country's economic development by applying their risk capital and know-how to Canadian business ventures which create jobs for Canadians (Ley, 2003).

among Muslims, especially those from Pakistan and Bangladesh, in Canadian and British labour markets.

Foreign credentials and experience are discounted in the labour market. According to Houle and Yssaad (2010), the recognition of education and experience from the Philippines and India is higher than that for education and experience in Pakistan and China. The labour market appears to prefer immigrants who came from countries in which the language of instruction is English and the education system is similar to Canada's (Zeitsma, 2010). The negative effects of foreign credential and work experience, however, can be smoothed by investing in civic education and language training, coupled with bridging and mentorship programs for new immigrants.

Entering Canada with high levels of education or acquiring education in Canada has very little positive effect on earnings. This is partly because the Canadian labour market cannot absorb such a large scale increase in the supply of highly educated workers when it struggles simply to accommodate Canadian-born people with Canadian educations (Picot, 2008). Reitz (2001) argues that the relative advantage in educational levels of immigrants has declined as a result of rapidly rising levels of education among the Canadian-born. Thus immigrants have not benefited from increases in education to the same extent as the Canadian-born.

Enclave economies, self-employment, social and cultural capital, social network and labour market niches, although not addressed here, may have an effect on income disparities, especially between Bangladeshis and Pakistanis on the one hand and Filipinos on the other. The concentration of immigrant employment in particular occupations, sectors of the economy, enclaves, and work settings does happen. In some cases, such as the concentration of Filipinos in the health sector and in jobs like nurses, health technicians, and health support services, the outcomes are positive, but there is little benefit to concentrations of Bangladeshis and Pakistanis doing manual labour, janitorial work, service jobs, or shift work in manufacturing and administrative support and waste management sectors. Lacking social assets such as access to the "right" social networks or lack of cultural conformity may be detrimental as well.

More can be done to further research in this area. Detailed qualitative observations could be made to examine and explain the plight of Bangladeshis and Pakistanis as well as to understand the barriers in economic mobility of these two groups. Further, research on Filipinos is also warranted to learn what contributes to their economic success. This work may lead to changes to immigration selection policies and programs in order to help ease the entry and promote the upward mobility of immigrant groups who are struggling in the Canadian labour market.

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Appendix 1

Classification Variable	LAD Variable	Notes
Landing Year	LNDYRI	Landing Year
Before 1980 or Canadian born		This is derived from variable LNDYRI. See LAD dictionary for more details.
1980 - 1984		
1985 - 1990		
1991 - 1995		
1996 - 2000		
2001 - 2005		
2006 - 2007		
Country of Birth	PAYSNI	Country of Birth
Sri Lanka		This is derived from variable PAYSNI. See LAD dictionary for more details.
China		
India		
Pakistan		
Bangladesh		
Philippines		
Canadian born or immigrated before 1980		
Immigrant from other countries		
Annual Family Income	XTIRCF	Annual family income
Under \$5,000		This is derived using variable XTIRCF, total income of the family. All values are expressed in 2008 constant dollars.
5,000 - 14,999		
15,000 - 29,999		
30,000 - 49,999		
50,000 - 79,999		
80,000 - 99,999		
100,000 & above		
Age at landing (Derived)	AGEI(Derived)	Age at Landing
0-14 years		This is derived from subtracting the landing year (LNDYRI) from the year of birth (YOB_I). This information is unavailable for Canadians and immigrants who landed before 1980
15-24		
25-34		
35-44		
45-54		
55-64		
65 and over		
Gender	SXCOI	Gender
Male		This is derived from variable SXCOI. See LAD dictionary for more details.
Female		
Immigrant Category	IMCAT	Immigrant category
Family Class		This is derived from variable IMCATI. It only applies to immigrants.
Business P.A.		Recode:
Skilled Worker		01 = Family Class
Other Economic		02-06 = Business P.A.
Refugee		07-09 = Skilled Worker
Provincial Nominee		10,11 = Provincial Nominee
		12-15 = Refugee
		16-20 = Other Economic
		21 = Other immigrants
Other		
Level of education at landing	IEDCD	Level of education at landing
High School or less		This is derived from variable IEDCDI. It only applies to immigrants after 1980.
Some University/College Diploma		Canadian born and immigrant before 1980 are coded as "Unknown".
University Degree		Recode:
		1-2 = High School or less
		3-5 = Some University/College Diploma
		6-8 = University Degree
Unknown		other = Unknown;
Official language ability at landing	LNGOF	Official language ability at landing
Unknown		This is derived from variable LNGOFI. It only applies to immigrants after 1980.
English or French		Canadian born and immigrant before 1980 are coded as "Unknown".
		Recode:
		1-3 = English and/or French
		4 = Neither
Neither		" " = Unknown

Industry	NAIC11	Industry
agriculture 11		This is derived from variable NAIC11.
Construction 23		Recode:
manufacturing 31-33		11 = Agriculture
wholesale/retail trade 41-45		23 = Construction
transportation and warehousing 48-49		31-33 = Manufacturing
finance and insurance 52		41-45 = Wholesale/Retail Trade
real estate and rental/leasing 53		48,49 = Transportation and Warehousing
professional, scientific and technical services 54		52 = Finance and Insurance
management of companies and enterprises 55		53 = Real Estate and Rental/Leasing
administrative support, waste management and remediation services 56		54 = Professional, Scientific and Technical Services
educational services 61		55 = Management of Companies and Enterprises
health care and social assistance 62		56 = Administrative support, Waste management and Remediation Services
accommodation and food services 72		61 = Educational Services
		62 = Health Care and Social Assistance
		72 = Accommodation and Food Services
		NN,00 = Unknown
		other = All Others
all others		
Immigrant/emigrant code	IEMCOI	Immigrant/emigrant code
No migration		This is derived from variable IEMCOI. It describes the migratory status of the taxfiler during the taxation year, with respect to movement in and out of Canada. These movements bear no relation to formal immigration status; they are only recorded to apply taxation laws.
Entry		
Exit		
Both		
Education deduction full time	EDUDNI	Education deduction full time
		This variable indicates whether or not the persons claimed deductions as a full time student. This is derived from variable EDUDNI, where the person is supposed to have claimed if the amount in the variable EDUDNI is greater than zero. Variable EDUDNI is present from 1983 to the present. Note that prior to 1988, education deductions can include amounts transferred from a dependant (children, spouse, etc.). This is the most probable cause of the diminution in claims that happens between 1987 and 1988.
Claimed		
Not Claimed		
Last place lived	PAYSRI (Derived)	Last place lived
1. Same as country of origin		This is derived from variable PAYSRI (Immigrant's country of last permanent residence). This selection of the countries in the list was established from the most popular countries were the immigrants last lived. Most immigrants "last lived" in their country of origin (variable PAYSNI). Canadian born or immigrants before 1980 are set to "Same as country of origin".
2. Germany, Federal Republic of		
3. Hong Kong		
4. India		
5. Kuwait		
6. Macao		
7. Pakistan		
8. Saudi Arabia		
9. Taiwan		
10. United Arab Emirates		
11. United Kingdom and Colonies		
12. United States of America		
13. Vietnam, Socialist Republic of		
14. Poland		
15. Iran		
16. Other countries		

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An Exploratory Study on Circular Migration from India to European Union

Binod Khadria

International Migration and Diaspora Studies (IMDS)

Project is a research facility at the Zakir Husain Centre for Educational Studies (ZHCES), School of Social Sciences (SSS) Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU). The project also hosts the *Research Programme in International Migration* instituted at the Centre by an agreement between Jawaharlal Nehru University and the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA), Government of India. The project aims to conduct and facilitate research on major migration themes of significance in Indian as well as global contexts. The focus is to undertake research on various economic, social, political, cultural, and educational aspects of globalisation and migration; and to initiate collaborative interactions with other academic institutions and international organisations on major migration issues. The emphasis of these initiatives is on creating an interface between academia and policy making through workshops, conferences, teaching modules, publications, hosting of visiting scholars and other interactive pursuits.