Bridging the Binaries of Skilled and Unskilled Migration from India[1]

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Abstract

The Indian diaspora, comprising the NRIs and the PIOs, is characterized by a dichotomy between the skilled and the unskilled migrants. This dichotomy could be attributed to the two distinct types of flows, viz., the 'brawn drain' and the 'brain drain' from the Indian sub-continent in the last two centuries. However, despite the fact that the two groups are quite dissimilar in terms of their human capital components and their migration experiences in the last few decades both groups have evoked almost similar expectations - as contributors to Indian development either through transfer of technological know-how and circulatory return or remittances. This disjoint poses a serious problem to public policy on diaspora's role in national development and international relations. The dichotomy itself is further accentuated by several binaries of skilled and unskilled migration, viz., the binary of loss types: investment loss vs. skill loss; the binary of compensation: remittances vs. return migration; the binary of stay: permanent vs. temporary migration; and the binary of civil rights: dual-citizenship vs. voting rights Apart from providing detailed discussion on these binaries, the paper suggests ways for bridging them by designing an exhaustive generic classification of the occupations and framing of a long-term holistic policy aimed at establishing India's links with its diaspora as a distinct constituency that could be tapped for contributing to sustainable socio-economic development in the country.

Keywords: Skilled migration, Un-skilled migration, Diaspora, Binaries, Migration policy.

1. Introduction: Prelude to Deconstructing the Binaries

India has attracted world attention as a major source country in global migrations in the twenty-first century.[2] Figure 1 presents the percentage distribution of Indians abroad across world regions at the close of the twentieth century - an approximate 20 million Indian migrants comprising roughly half non-resident Indian (NRI) citizens, and half foreign persons of Indian origin (PIO) - the two together now being referred to as the 'Indian Diaspora'[3] (Figure 1). This has been a function of the *flows* of migration of unskilled, semi-skilled and highly skilled workers and their families from India over the past, at least one and three quarters of a century. However, by and large, a dichotomy still prevails, separating two sub

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[2] India has also been an attractive destination country for migrants from the neighbouring countries in the sub-continent, both irregular and illegal, primarily from Bangladesh and Nepal, and to some extent Bhutan. Tibet is also sometimes mentioned, but that has been a disputed region for long.

[3] At present, Indian Diaspora is estimated to have increased to 25 million in 2006. According to a 1979 Indian Ministry of External Affairs estimate the number of persons of Indian extraction residing abroad was 10.7 million (Weiner 1982, p. 32, cited in Kosinski and Elahi, 1985, p. 4). This number was impressive but represented merely 1.6 % of the national population at that time (rising to 2% of an estimated 1 billion population of India in Census 2001). No qualitative group-wise classification of the global distribution of 'Indian Diaspora' is available beyond broad country-wise quantitative distribution of numbers. These one-time stock estimates are not complemented by flow data, which are of limited availability from select destination country sources of the US, UK, Australia etc. Most UK data are aggregated data for 'Indian subcontinent'. Even European data are gross population data only.

groups in the Indian diaspora – the skilled diaspora in the West, being wooed for their skills and their 'riches'; and the unskilled diaspora in the Middle-East, pitied and 'helped' for their labour and 'rags', giving rise to what may be called 'binaries'. There are tendencies that deviate from this categorization of destinations, but the binaries still prevail.

It is common knowledge that the early migrants who laid the foundation of the so-called Indian diaspora formation mainly involved 'cheap' manual workers. They had left India in large numbers to meet the enormous quantitative demand for indentured labour that arose in the nineteenth century plantations and mines in the colonies, immediately after the British abolished slavery in 1834. They went to far away places in the Caribbean (Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad), the Pacific (Fiji), the Indian Ocean (Mauritius, South Africa, and East Africa), and south-east Asia (Malaysia, Singapore), as well as to neighbouring South Asian countries (Sri Lanka and Burma) – leading to what has sometimes been also called the 'brawn drain'.[4] The 'brain drain', an exodus of talent and skill, India's cream of highly skilled professionals, to the developed countries comprising doctors, engineers, scientists, teachers, architects, and entrepreneurs, appeared in independent India, a century-and-a-quarter later in the twentieth century (Khadria, 1999: 62-64). Beginning as a trickle in the 1950s, the migration of skilled persons to the developed countries picked up momentum in the post-mid-1960s, became prominent with the more recent migration of IT workers and nurses that has continued in the twenty-first century, contributing *inter alia* to the concentration of skilled Indian migrants in the US and Canada, the UK, other European countries in the West, and Australia and New Zealand in the Antipodes in the east. Side by side with skilled migration to the developed countries, the twentieth century also witnessed large-scale migration of unskilled and semi-skilled Indian labour to the Gulf countries in West Asia, which began in the wake of the oil-boom of the 1970s, a trend which still continues at present including a small but growing numbers of skilled and professional migrants as well.

The emotive reaction in India, about the highly-educated and skilled knowledge workers supposedly 'deserting' India, as well as the indifference to the large scale labour migration to the Gulf region (with the genesis of indifference going back to the formative periods of Indian diaspora in other destinations like the Caribbean, and South- and East-Africa), have both seemingly undergone radical transformation of perception by the beginning of the twenty-first century. Whereas professional Indian immigrants have come to be seen as 'angels' with a perfected image of transnational "global Indian citizens" capable of bringing not only investment and technology to India but themselves returning in a circulatory mode of migration, the large number of low-, semi- and un-skilled labour migrants to the Gulf have come to be viewed as the main source of remittances to India which have contributed to the fattening of its foreign exchange reserve. Despite this commonality of a positive stance, however, the two groups have remained distinctly different and separate.

A new international context has emerged posing a 'double challenge' for public policy in India as the sending country: First, to rethink of a well-defined national development strategy with a two-way transnational participation of the diaspora that includes both the skilled and the unskilled; and secondly, to invent and convince the two distinctly different sub-diasporas, of the strategic importance of an inter-diasporic complementarity and cooperation (with India as the hub). This novel context derives its genesis from a new roadmap for action, drawn by the recently submitted Report of the Global Commission on International Migration, titled,

[4] See Tinker (1974, 1976, 1977) for these colonial migrations from India.

"Migration in an Interconnected World: New Directions for Action" (GCIM, 2005). On the one hand, the report concludes that "*the international community has failed* to capitalize on the opportunities and meet the challenges associated with international migration, and therefore *new approaches are required* to correct the situation" (emphasis added). On the other hand, a first-ever emphasis that the report has made is to state that "*the traditional distinction between skilled and unskilled workers is in certain respects an unhelpful one, as it fails to do justice to the complexity of international migration.* This paper derives its rationale from this necessity of bridging the skilled-unskilled divide in international migration, with special reference to India.

Figure 1: Percentage Distribution of NRIs and PIOs by Region



Source: ICWA, Report of the High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora, New Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs, 2001.

The dichotomies between skilled and unskilled migration could be deconstructed as a number of binaries underlying the differences between the skilled 'knowledge workers' and unskilled 'service workers' have been predicted to crystallize in the twenty-first century. For example, while the mobility of the highly skilled knowledge workers has become largely demand-driven, the migration of unskilled/semi-skilled service workers for employment abroad has still remained largely supply-driven. This has led to a binary in the international labour market, of a "worker-seeking mode" by the prospective employers looking for the availability of skilled migrants, and a "work-seeking mode" by the unskilled migrants.

2. 'Worker-seeking' Mode for Highly-skilled Indians in Developed Countries

In the developed countries today, the worker-seeking mode for Indian skilled migrants prevails predominantly in the United States, at present the country with the largest stock as well as the largest flow of educated and professionally qualified personnel from India.[5] This might sound ironical in a historical sense because even in the face of vehement opposition and two defeated vetoes from President Woodrow Wilson, a 'literacy test' was promulgated

[5] Up to 80 per cent of Indian migration to the developed countries is to the US.

for restricting the entry of Indians as non-English speaking immigrants in early 20th century, of persons working in the lumber mills, docks, railroad construction, etc. in the Pacific Coast, the illiterate labourers at the lowest rung of the category of *service workers.*[6] These early immigrants to the U.S. went mostly from the Punjab state, and to a lesser extent, from Bengal, Gujarat and Uttar Pradesh had settled in the West Coast of the United States.

Over time, when the system was rationalized with the landmark 1965 amendments to the Immigration Act, Indian immigrants' right to enter the United States came at par with that of citizens of other countries. This was in fact the beginning of the end of the first phase of Indian immigration to the U.S. that had incorporated mainly the unskilled 'service workers'. The 1965 Amendments opened the floodgates for entry of highly skilled 'knowledge workers' of India into the U.S. It was in the 1970s, therefore, that the US overtook both the UK and Canada as the prime developed country destination for Indian skilled migrants. Indian immigration in the US, which constituted a minuscule of less than 1 percent of global immigration from all countries during the 1950s and the 1960s, registered a rapid increase during the 1970s, touching almost 5 per cent in 1999 and 2000, and crossed 7 per cent in 2004 (Table 1). In the two top categories of skilled immigrants in 2001, viz., "professional and technical", and "executive, administrative and managerial occupations", Indians occupied very high proportions of 24 per cent and 11 per cent, respectively. Even in the post 9/11 tight immigration regime in 2003 and 2004, one in every four global immigrants "with an occupation" has been an Indian (25 per cent in column C for 2003, and 24.7 per cent in column C for 2004), with the overall Indian share amongst global immigrants on the increase (from 6.7 per cent in 2002 to 7.1 per cent in 2003).[7]

Table 1: Inflow of Indian* Immigrants Admitted in the US: Numbers (A), Percentages (B), and Percentage Shares Amongst Global Immigrants (C)

Pre 9/11 Years*	1999 (INS data regime)	2000 (INS data regime)	2001 (INS data regime)
	A B C	A B C	A B C
All Immigrants	30237 100.0 4.7	42046 100.0 4.9	70290 100.0 6.6
With Occupations	8016 26.5 5.7	3724 32.7 7.2	27073 38.5 11.3
Ecec/Adm/Mngrl	1112 3.7 7.1	1644 3.9 7.9	3062 4.3 11.1
Profssnl/Techncl	3492 11.6 9.4	8632 20.6 14.7	19935 28.4 23.8
Post 9/11 Years**	**2002 (DHS data regime)**	**2003(DHS data regime)**	**2004(DHS data regime)**
	A B C	A B C	A B C
All Immigrants	71105 100.0 6.7	50372 100.0 7.1	70116 100.0 7.4
With Occupations	42885 60.3 34.5	20560 40.8 25.0	38443 54.8 24.7
Ecec/Adm/Mngrl	Global number: 29277	Global number: 22295	Global number: 31689
Profssnl/Techncl	Global number: 79370	Global number: 46495	Global number: 73862

Source: The author, using US INS and US DHS Statistical Yearbooks, various years.
*Notes: * By country of birth. **County-wise occupational break-up of immigrant data not available in DHS regime.*

Thus, the modern phase of Indian immigration to the United States distinctly marked a category from that of the earlier phase that had comprised mainly unskilled workers and labourers. Urban, educated, and *ironically* 'English-speaking', masses of Indian population

[6] As per the classification given by Peter Drucker (1993).

[7] Data in column B for all years show percentage shares of Indian immigrants, taking the total number Indian immigrants as 100. Data in column C are percentage shares of Indian immigrants amongst global immigrants admitted into the US from all countries of the world. However, as no country-wise break up of occupational groups is available from 2002 (i.e., in the post 9/11 regime) onwards, Indian shares are unknown. For this period, the publication of U.S. immigration statistics was taken over by the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) from Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), perhaps due to a policy of curtailment in data availability caused by growing security concerns.

became distinctly visible in the US, carrying a large share of India's human capital to the U.S., and causing 'brain drain' for India. Jensen (1988, 280) reported thus: 'Almost a hundred thousand engineers, physicians, scientists, professors, teachers, and their dependents had entered the U.S. by 1975' and settled *permanently*.[8]

After 1992, it was the relatively less noticeable route of *temporary* migration that tended to became predominant, thus giving rise to a binary of permanent and temporary migrants. The 1990 Amendments, brought into effect in 1992, explicitly favoured the building up of human capital capabilities of America by fulfilling its current and future requirements. In 1998, 42 per cent of H-1B visas (or two out of every five of these temporary visas) were issued to Indian IT software professionals. After 2001, the number of H-1B visas issued to Indians went down (Table 2) because the American immigration scenario came to be determined more by the post-9/11 security concern in the U.S. and the subsequent recession that burst the IT bubble than by its actual labour market needs. The U.S. government has been under continuous pressure of different lobby groups, including the American industry and business, to raise the H1-B visa limit once again. Thus, of the three major issues of the US immigration policy, viz., (a) ethnic balance in the population, (b) illegal immigration and (c) labour force needs, Indian immigration has mainly catered to the last one.

Table 2: Indian Citizens Admitted as Non-immigrant Workers in the US, by Visa Type (Numbers)

Country of Citizenship	Registered Nurses (HIA)	Workers with Speciality Occupations (HIB)	Industrial Trainees (H3)	Exchange Visitors (JI)	Intra-Company Transferees (LI)	Workers with Extraordinary Ability (OI)
India (2001)	166	104,543	62	5,374	15,531	666
India (2002)	228	81,091	96	4,866	20,413	523
India (2003)	9	75,964	136	4,732	21,748	9

Source: U.S. DHS, Office of Immigration Statistic, 2003, 2002, 2001 Yearbooks of Immigration Statistics. No disaggregated data are given for 2004 in the latest available Yearbook, 2004.

The socio-economic profile of the skilled Indian diaspora in the developed countries reflects how the 'worker-seeking' demand for skilled Indians has become a determining factor in migration. Within the European Union (EU) - the largest economic entity in the world today - two-thirds of the entire Indian migrant community still resides in the UK. The Indian community is one of the highest-earning and best-educated groups, achieving eminence in business, information technology, the health sector, media, cuisine, and entertainment industries. During the decade 1991-2001, immigration alone is supposed to have contributed half the British population growth. The new immigrants were, on an average, younger with higher fertility rates.[9] A British Government report, released in January 2001, stressed that "migrants were not a drag on welfare, but contribute to its economy and culture."[10] The UK 2001 Census estimated the population of South-Asian nationality in Britain at 2.5 million,

[8] 'Ironically', in 1917 the US Congress had, against the opposition of two unsuccessful vetoes from President Woodrow Wilson, introduced the 'literacy test' in English effectively to stop Indian immigrants from entering the territory of the United States.

[9] This could as well be a blessing in disguise for the UK (and the EU countries as well) where older people dominate the population structure, thereby creating an acute demand for medical professionals to look after the aged (Khadria, 2002).

[10] *The Economist*, March 31 - April 6, 2001. The point about culture is so important that India may follow a cultural route to forge alliances with its Diaspora.

with 1 million Indians, of which close to half, i.e. 466,416 counted as India-born.[11] This constituted 0.82 per cent of the British population, the highest share of a single 'born-abroad' ethnic category, except the Irish.

A number of shifts in political positions reflect the growth of demand for the developing-country skills in the UK since the end of the twentieth century. For example, in 2000, immigrants were given the 'green light' by the British Home Office Minister Barbara Roche. By positing a 'market-led' loosening up of immigrant legislation, Roche wished to attract skilled professionals: nurses, doctors, IT experts, customer service and financial personnel.[12] In 2006, the Home Office website (UK Home Office, 2006) cited the statement of Home Office Minister Tony McNulty that the government was committed to ensuring that persons entering the UK would benefit the UK economy.[13] He pointed out that the government's recently announced points-based immigration system would "allow only those people with the skills the UK needs to come to this country, while preventing those without skills from applying." Only high-skilled migrants among Indians apparently seem to be fit these slots squarely.

The British Home Office publication, *Control of Immigration: Statistics United Kingdom 2005*, presented to the Parliament in August 2006, provides selected immigration data for Indians (under a regional category of the 'Indian sub-continent', covering two other countries also, viz., Pakistan and Bangladesh) for the year 2005, the latest available (UK Home Office, 2006). Extracts of some of the information and data are provided below:

Of a total of 11,800,000 non-EEA nationals entering the UK in 2005, after the US, Canada, and Australia, the fourth largest admissions were from India, comprising 687,000 persons (Table 3), registering a 12 per cent increase over 2004. A total of 137,000 migrants were admitted as non-EEA work-permit holders and their dependents (EEA nationals requiring no such work permit), of which 38,200 or 28 per cent were Indian nationals; 19,500 Indians with work permits were granted extension of stay. Extension for "permit-free employment" was the largest for Indians at 8,255, followed by Filipinos at 2,155. Indian trainees granted extension of stay numbered 6,005; and 11,315 Indian students, second only to Chinese (25,555) were granted extension to stay in the UK in 2005. Among persons granted settlement on completion of four years' employment (with work permit for 4,540), Indians (18 percent) were the second highest, the first being 6,300 (25 per cent) Filipinos; they were followed by 2,635 (10 per cent) South Africans. In contrast, the number of applications in 2005 for asylum in the UK submitted by Indian nationals, excluding dependents, was only 940 (out of 25,710 received from all nationalities), *but no single Indian was granted asylum; of the 935 cases handled for 'initial decision' 915 were refused, and the remaining 20 were given discretionary leave without recognition as 'refugee';* 16,720 Indian nationals were issued grant of settlement in 2005 compared to an average number of 9,345 per year in the four preceding years, an increase of close to 80 per cent.

[11] BBC: Born Abroad: An Immigration Map of Britain, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/uk/05/born_abroad/countries/html/india.stm

[12] *The Hindustan Times*, Sept/Oct 2000.

[13] These were not the kind of claims that one would have expected to hear from a UK government minister under the Thatcher or Major administrations of the 1980s or the early 1990s.They marked a turning-point into a new phase of managed migration aimed at encouraging significant increases in labour immigration to the UK (Findlay and Stam, 2006).

Table 3: Indian Nationals given Leave to enter the UK, by Purpose; Comparison with other Nationalities, 2005

Geographical region and nationality	Passengers admitted by purpose of journey							
	Total admitted	Visitors		Students [1]	Au pairs	Work permit holders		Dependants of work permit holders
		ordinary	business			Employment for 12 months or more	Employment for less than 12 months	
All nationalities (excluding EEA)	11,800,000	5,330,000	1,560,000	294,000	2,360	51,200	40,300	45,500
Asia	3,230,000	1,320,000	404,000	125,000	*	29,100	10,900	29,700
Indian sub-continent	970,000	356,000	100,000	29,400	*	18,800	7,550	18,400
India	687,000	239,000	84,500	17,600	*	15,000	6,360	16,800
Pakistan	229,000	100,000	13,000	8,920	*	1,530	700	1,290
Bangladesh	54,800	16,800	2,760	2,910	*	2,290	490	335

Source: The author, using UK Home Office, 2006, Control of Immigration: Statistics United Kingdom 2005, TSO, London.

As part of such a paradigm shift, not only in the UK, but in other developed countries like Germany, France and Japan, closely followed by Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore too, the governments opened up their labour markets to India's highly skilled human capital. In North America, they had just 3 per cent share in a population of 30 million. In Canada, Indo-Canadians have recorded high achievements in the fields of medicine, academia, management, and engineering. The Indian immigrants' average annual income in Canada is nearly 20 per cent higher than the national average, and their educational levels too are higher. In the East, there are 30,000 Indian citizens in Australia; and New Zealand has also witnessed an increase in the number of Indian professional immigrants engaged in domestic retail trade, and in medical, hospitality, engineering, and Information Technology sectors; countries like Japan, Korea, and Singapore are also trying to attract Indian talent.

The strong profile of Indian immigrants in the US supports a proposition that the human capital content of Indian immigrants has been a major determinant of the high-skill Indian diaspora formation there. This is testified by the geo-economic significance of Indians in the US economy, indexed by their age-profile, education, occupation, and income rankings, all being at the top all through the 1970s till the present. These high rankings for Indians in the US hold good not only among Asian nationals, but also in comparison with the U.S. population of Census 2000.

2.1 Age

The younger an immigrant is the more capable he or she would be to undertake rigorous work on a sustainable basis. Figure 2 presents the distribution of average age of the Asian diaspora in the U.S by the country of origin. Asians in the US had a median age of 33 years in 2000, i.e., 2 years younger than the national median of 35 years. The Indian diaspora, with 72 per cent of them in the working-age and an even lower median age of 30 years, has an edge over others in this respect.

Figure 2: Selected Age Groups and Median Age, 2000

(Percent distribution. Data based on sample. For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see *www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/doc/sf4.pdf*)



Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 special tabulation

2.2 Education

Roughly 80 percent of all Asians, and all persons in the United States of 25 years and above had at least a high school education (Figure 3) in the year 2000. A higher proportion of Asians (44 percent) than the total population (24 percent) had at least a bachelor's degree, but within Asians, Indians had the highest proportion of bachelor's degree holders, about 64 percent.

Figure 3: Educational Attainment, 2000

(Percent distribution of population 25 and older. Data based on sample. For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see *www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/doc/sf4.pdf*)



Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 special tabulation

2.3 Occupation

Labour force participation rate is an important indicator of diaspora empowerment and capability. Indian male participation rates have been above the average for all Asians. The proportion of persons employed in high-end jobs like management, professional positions and related occupations stood at 60 percent for Indians (Figure 4). Only less than 15 percent of Indians were employed in service sector jobs.

Figure 4: Occupation, 2000

(Percent distribution of employed civilian population 16 and older. Data based on sample. For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see *www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/doc/sf4.pdf*)



Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 special tabulation

2.4 Income

Earnings and income are indicators of purchasing power and investible capacities of individuals and families. Fully employed Asian men and women had higher median earnings than all men and women, but Indian men had the highest year-round, full-time median earnings ($51,900), and Indian women too earned higher median earnings than all Asian women (Figure 5). Indian women earned between $4,000 and $9,000 more annually than all other women.

The profiles of the Indian diaspora given in Figure 5 show that Indian immigrants have occupied high economic positions in the twentieth-century US economy, and that this trend has existed from 1970s onwards. In addition to becoming a great professional force through diaspora associations, Indians have also become a strong voting force in the United States as well as Canada. To form a formidable voting force in the U.S., for example, the U.S. born second-generation Indian-Americans, who are already U.S. citizens, is added to the number of India-born naturalized American citizens that comprise no less than one-third of all Indian immigrants. This has led Indian-Americans to become increasingly involved in the political system of the United States. Indian-Americans have traditionally exercised great political

influence through their campaign contributions, and are actively involved in fund-raising efforts for political candidates at the federal, state and local level elections. In recent years, they have begun taking a more direct role in politics as well as continuing to help through their financial contributions. The same is the trend in Canada, though in a smaller and more obscure manner. The Association of Parliamentarians of Indian origin has several hundred members from developed countries like Canada, Germany, France, Britain and the United States, apart from developing countries like Malaysia, Trinidad, South Africa, Fiji, Surinam and Guyana where Indian communities have existed for more than a hundred years. It is the second-generation of overseas Indians who have started taking keen interest in local politics

Figure 5: Median Earnings by Sex, 1999



Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 special tabulation

in the developed countries they live in. There are about forty mayors of Indian origin in Britain where Indians have a longer experience of active politics (*Overseas Indian,* April 2006, 10-11). Certainly, the proportion of naturalization amongst the immigrants in North America

would increase in the twenty-first century now that the dual citizenship (OCI or the Overseas Citizen of India) granted by India has become fully operational, and more and more NRIs amongst the diaspora would choose to take up citizenship of the country they live in without having to give up their Indian passports, thus acquiring increasing voting power for the Indian diaspora as a whole in the destination countries.

3. 'Work-seeking' Mode for Low-skilled Indians in the Gulf Countries

Although Indians had manned the clerical and technical positions of the oil companies in the Gulf countries after oil was discovered in the region during the 1930s, the overall numbers had remained small. When large scale development activities started following the 1973 spurt in oil prices, an upsurge in the flow of workers and labourers began from India to the Gulf region. During the early 1970s, large scale human resource requirements in development activities in agriculture, industry, transport, communication and infrastructure in the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries of (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE) were being met primarily by immigrant labour from neighbouring Arab states like Egypt, Jordan, Palestine and Yemen. Gradually, however, India (and Pakistan) supplied most of the unskilled labour, registering almost 200 percent growth between 1970 and 1975. In 1975, Indian expatriates constituted 39.1 percent, (next to Pakistanis constituting 58.1 percent), when other Asians constituted only 2.8 percent of the total non-Arab expatriates in the Gulf region. Since then, Indian migration has overtaken even that of Pakistan, and since the Kuwait war of 1990-91, Indians have replaced even the non-national Arabs in the Gulf, viz., the Jordanians, Yemenis, Palestinians and Egyptians. From less than 258,000 in 1975, work-seeking voluntary migrant Indian population in the Gulf went up to 3.318 million in 2001 (Table 4), which is now estimated to have crossed 3.5 million and spread across the entire range of activities, from professionals like doctors and nurses, engineers, architects, accountants and managers, to semi-skilled workers like craftsmen, drivers, artisans, and other technical workers, to unskilled labourers in construction sites, farmlands, livestock ranches, shops and stores, and households (Rajan and Nair, 2006). Indian migrant workers in the GCC countries cater to all the three categories of labour.

Table 4: Stocks of Indian Migrant Population in the Gulf Countries, Selected years: 1975-2001

Country	1975	1979	1983	1987	1991	2001
S Arabia	34,500	100,00	270,000	380,000	600,000	1500,000
UAE	107,500	152,000	250,000	225,000	400,00	950,000
Oman	38,5000	60,000	100,000	184,000	220,000	312,000
Kuwait	32,105	65,000	115,000	100,000	88,000	295,000
Qatar	27,800	30,000	40,000	50,000	75,000	131,000
Bahrain	17,250	26,000	30,000	77,000	100,000	130,000
Total	257,655	433,000	805,000	1,016,000	1,483,000	3,318,000

Sources: Rahman (1999), and Rajan (2004).

Indian white-collar workers and professionals comprise only about 30 percent of the total Indian workers in these countries. The highly skilled and technically trained professionals remain in great demand in the government departments and the public sector enterprises, and they also earn high salaries. They are also allowed to bring in their families, and children are allowed to stay with parents till their school education is completed. Life in general is comfortable for the professionals and white-collar workers in the Gulf countries. They are able to keep contacts with compatriots and nationals, form associations and participate in

socio-cultural activities. The professionals and the white-collar Indians have also established a large number of schools in the region which follow Indian curricula and are affiliated to Indian examination and certification bodies like the Central Board of Secondary Education. Despite all this, the majority of Indian migrants to the Gulf region are unskilled or semi-skilled workers and the majority of skilled professionals and managers are in the western developed countries only.

About 70 per cent of the Indian migrants in the Gulf region comprises the semi-skilled and unskilled workers, mostly employed persons seeking jobs and therefore, supply determined. Table 5 presents their occupational distribution till after the outbreak of the Gulf War in August 1990. The fall in numbers in 1991-92 is directly related to the restrictions imposed by the Government of India in issuing emigration clearance in the years immediately following the Gulf War in 1990-91 when large numbers of Indians were evacuated from the Gulf region by the Government of India. However, the classification more or less resumed to become typical of pre-Gulf War period soon after, although as already referred to, some changes have taken place due to the demand in receiving countries tilting more towards skilled professionals as infrastructure development has progressed in the Gulf.

Table 5: Emigration Clearances granted by Government of India till after the Gulf War of 1990-91: Unskilled and Semi-skilled Labour by Occupation, 1988-1992

Category	1987-88	1988-89	1989-90	1990-91	1991-92
Labourer/Helper	91,196	40,657	58,779	45,028	17,345
Housemaid/House-boy	891	2,965	0	1,400	1,938
Mason	8,550	8,731	8,913	6,323	246
Cook	3,550	3,051	2,070	2,386	239
Tailor	5,115	4,361	3,722	3,231	163
Salesman	1,580	4,199	4,121	3,818	147
Carpenter	6,361	12,900	6,939	5,132	145
Technician	3,539	1,450	3,389	2,642	136
Driver	6,562	6,334	6,724	5,123	131
Electrician	3,494	3,689	4,496	2,832	112
Mechanic/Air Conditioner	3,562	4,476	3,263	2,467	111
Agriculturer	0	0		452	108
Painter	2,273	2,501	1,867	1,866	65
Office Staff	3,916	2,211	1,385	1,087	56
Welder	1,497	1,222	3,272	1,291	55
Operator	1,309	1,855	1,342	1,001	39
Plumber	1,971	1,624	2,047	1,831	33
Foreman	927	906	983	764	30
Fixer/Fabricator	1,904	2,008	2,827	1,052	29
Supervisor	1,021	813	1,069	444	21
Paramedical staff	1,349	736	434	437	18
Engineering overseer	354	268	248	173	13
Surveyor	461	264	218	234	12
Fitter	0	1,690	0	0	0
Other	18,284	17,778	2,565	19,302	3,074
Total	169,666	126,689	120,673	110,316	24,266

Source: Various Annual Reports of the Ministry of Labour, Government of India, cited in Rajan (2003).

3.1 Government Clearance

On the supply side, it is the Indian government's monitoring and controlling that has been the prime determinant of the increase of unskilled and semi-skilled labour migration to the Gulf region, increasingly during the past couple of years. The demand for low category of workers like housemaids, cooks, bearers, gardeners, etc. has been large, but systematic all-India data are not easily available, except for the state of Kerala where an exclusive state-level Ministry for Overseas Keralite Affairs has existed over a decade.[14] Some data are now in the process of being collected and compiled by the newly formed Union Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs.

3.2 No Legal Protection

An important aspect that distinguishes the unskilled from the skilled migrants is that workers in unskilled and semi-skilled categories do not enjoy protection of local labour laws. Women, working as housemaids or governesses, face ill-treatment in some Gulf countries, sometimes being subjected even to sexual abuse (MOIA 2006). Unskilled and semiskilled workers employed in infrastructural and development projects live, in general, in miserable conditions and are accommodated in small cramped rooms in labour camps. Often toilet and kitchen facilities are inadequate, and working conditions are harsh. Thus, adverse working conditions, unfriendly weather, inability to participate in social and cultural activities, and long periods of separation from families and relatives leading to emotional deprivation, are known to have wrecked the lives of low-skilled Indian workers in the Gulf (Zachariah, Prakash and Rajan, 2002; MOIA *Annual Report 2005-6*, 17; MOIA 2006).

3.3 Temporary Residence

Indian workers in the Gulf are allowed only temporary stay and circulatory immigration. The unskilled and semi-skilled workers have a high rate of turnover as their contracts are for short periods of employment and work, usually not more than two years at a time. Those completing their contracts must return home, although a large proportion of them manage to come back with new contracts which are not made available to them before a gap of one year ends. This policy has facilitated the proliferation of recruitment and placement agencies, sometimes colluding with the prospective employers, and in many cases with fake ones duping illiterate and vulnerable job-seekers. The employee is required to deposit the travel documents and passports with the prospective employer, who is thus empowered to exercise all kinds of control over the employee, including violation of the terms of contract of employment. There exist even cases of fraudulent employers based in Gulf countries who import labour for hawking or "body-shopping" them to others at attractive margins of commission.[15]

The forms of exploitation of uneducated and unskilled Indian expatriate workers in the Gulf at the hands of the recruiting agents and prospective employers range from refusal to give promised employment, non-payment of promised wages, non-payment of over-time wages, undue deduction of permit fee and other fees from wages, unsuitable transport arrangements, inadequate medical facilities, denial of legal rights for redressal of complaints,

[14] For this paper, I carried out a search for data for the personnel beyond 1991-92, but could not find any.

[15] MOIA and the Protectorate of Emigrants, Government of India have started compiling the number of complaints received on these counts, and taking action on them. See MOIA, *Annual Reports, 2004-05, and 2005-06.*

use of migrants as carriers of smuggled goods, victimisation and harassment of women recruits in household jobs like maids, cooks, governesses etc (*Overseas Indian,* 2006, various issues).

3.4 Family Separation

Characteristically, families are not allowed to accompany unskilled contract workers to the countries of their immigration. As a result, Indian migrant communities in the Gulf region maintain in general, close contacts with their kith and kin in India, and making frequent home visits. They also keep track of the political developments and socio-economic changes taking place in India through communication channels of newspapers, radio and television. At times of natural disasters like earthquakes in India, the Indian community in the Gulf region comes forward with donations, and deposits in India Development Bonds. Most of the remittances have come from unskilled workers whose consumption expenses in the Gulf are kept minimal because their families are not living with them and are heavily dependent on them for sustenance (Zachariah and Rajan, 2004; 2005).

4. The Paradoxes of Binaries

Many Indian immigrants who sustained the Silicon Valley's success were persons educated in the US at the post-graduate level after securing their first engineering degrees from the Indian Institutes of Technology (Table 6). Similarly, many medical doctors who earned laurels in their respective fields in the US had emigrated with their first MBBS degree from the All-India Institute of Medical Sciences. Engineers from the Regional Engineering Colleges, Banaras Hindu University and other institutions of excellence had also followed suit. Similarly, scientists with M.Sc/M.Tech degrees obtained from prestigious universities like the Jawaharlal Nehru University, or the University of Delhi, and engineer-managers with degrees in engineering, followed by Post-Graduate Diplomas in Business Management taken from the Indian Institutes of Management (IIMs), had emigrated to pursue higher studies abroad, and then enter the world labour market for professionals in the US. These have been the causes of brain drain from India.

Table 6: The 20th Century Brain Drain of Graduates of Top Institutions of S&E Education in India

Indicators	Indian Institute of Technology Bombay, Mumbai	Indian Institute of Technology Madras, Chennai	Indian Institute of Technology Delhi, New Delhi	All India Institute of Medical Sciences, New Delhi
Batches of Graduates	1973-77	1964-87	1980-90	1956-80
Year of Survey	1987	1989	1992	1997
Magnitude of Brain Drain	31%	27%	23%	56%

Source: The author, using various institution-based surveys sponsored by Department of Science and Technology, Government of India, cited in Khadria (1999).

In the middle of 1991, India faced a serious balance of payments crisis. Foreign exchange reserves had fallen to a level hardly adequate to meet essential imports for only a few weeks. The Indian migrants in the developed countries withdrew their dollar deposits from Indian banks abruptly. These problems warranted immediate action for India to avoid defaulting on its international obligations or a collapse of its economy for want of critical imports (Kelegana and Parikh, 2003, 111). It was the slowly but steadily growing remittances from the Indian

unskilled workers in the Gulf region which saved the situation for India. Today India is at the top of the list of countries receiving remittances from its migrants abroad. Close to ten per cent of the worldwide remittances sent home by 191 million migrants come to India.[16] Kerala's share in attracting remittances from overseas Indian workers has been significant. Zachariah, Mathew and Irudaya Rajan (2003, p.214-22) estimated the total remittances to Kerala households in 1998 at Rs.35,304 million, representing an average remittance of Rs. 25,000 per emigrant, and a per capita receipt of Rs. 1,105. As a rough proportion of Kerala's State Domestic product, this was close to 10 percent. They also constituted about 10 percent of the country's aggregate remittances of US$12,000 million in 1998 at an exchange rate of approximately Rs. 33 to a dollar.

The above two examples, of loss and gain respectively, conceal a number of paradoxes of binaries arising from the stereotype dichotomy of skilled and unskilled migration.

4.1 The Binary of Loss Types: Investment Loss *vs* Skill Loss

Traditionally branded as the 'brain drain', the costs of high-skill emigration have been termed as the 'investment loss' of financial subsidies in higher education (Sen, 1973). However, these costs of brain drain did not seem to have been much of a cause for concern for the politicians or the bureaucracy, although there have been attempts to compensate them through 'brain drain tax' (Bhagwati and Partington, 1976). When the government agencies were asked by the United Nations (1982), questions included in the periodic surveys of 1981, the response for international migration was that "levels of international migration (are) not significant and (therefore) satisfactory" for skilled emigration (Kosinski and Elahi, 1985, 9-12). It was the emigration of the unskilled and the semi-skilled to the Gulf region, which involved exodus in large numbers. There were also persons with vocational skills among them but that did not cause concern about loss of skills.

The binary of loss types has not created much of a chasm between the two types of migration in policy discourses.

4.2 The Binary of Compensation: Remittances *vs* Return Migration

A second important binary distinguishing Indian labour migration to the Gulf region from the high-skill migration to the West has been the fact that the lion's share of the homeward remittances has been from unskilled workers. What is forgotten is that one of the major positive impacts of migration of skilled persons has been the remittance of foreign exchange to India. Beginning in the mid-1970s, there was rapid increase in remittances coming from the US, Canada, the UK, the present EU countries in Western Europe, and Australia.[17] As migrants to these countries were gradually joined by their kith and kin to whom remittances used to be sent, they were gradually overtaken by larger amounts coming from West Asia, destinations to which most unskilled and the semi-skilled Indian labour migrated.[18]

Whereas the volume of remittances from Indian labour migrants *in the Gulf* have drawn a lot more attention than those from the West, in two other areas, viz., transfer of technology

[16] *Population Headlines*, No.310, March April 2005, ESCAP, Bangkok, 2006.

[17] Remittances are officially known as Private Transfer Payments in India's Balance of Payments Accounts.

[18] From all countries of the world, remittances reached a level of US $2,083 million in 1990-91, further rising to US $8,112 million in 1994-95, to US $11,875 million in 1997-98, to US $ 12,290 million in 1999-2000, and eventually to US $ 21,700 million in 2004 (Figure 4). In terms of the share of GDP at market prices, these constituted 0.7 per cent in 1990-91, 2.5 per cent in 1994-95, 3.1 per cent in 1996-97, and 3.0 per cent in 1999-2000 (Reserve Bank of India, ***Report on Currency and Finance***, various years).

and return migration, positive outcome of skilled migration to the developed countries has been talked about. However, most studies have not gone beyond talking about the need to assess the quantitative outcomes in terms of volumes of flows of technology collaborations. In sharp contrast, return migration has become topical in the context of 'outsourcing' of business processes to India, a process which picked up after the burst of the IT bubble in the US, although in this case also, no systematic assessment of the numbers and quality of the returnees exists, although some studies have emphasised that the return to India has been unsustainable because the returnees tend to go back after short stay in India (Saxenian, 2005).

What has been overlooked as a result of this binary is that the high-skill migrants to developed countries have rather effected, what I have called, 'a silent backwash flow' of remittances from India to countries of destination like the UK, Australia, and the US in the form of 'overseas student' fees that the students and their parents pay (Khadria, 2004c, 2006a). The amounts involved have remained un-estimated and un-analysed so far. Similarly, return migration of the unskilled and the semi-skilled has not drawn adequate attention. The binary has kept remittances and return as two separate domains, of the unskilled and the highly-skilled Indian migrants, completely in isolation from each other.

4.3 The Binary of Stay: Permanent *vs* Temporary Migration

Whereas highly skilled migrants have mostly settled permanently in their host countries, low-skilled migrants go on temporary migration, although as mentioned earlier, they also re-migrate, thus maintaining a process of permanent circulation. With respect to emigration of the unskilled and the semi-skilled to the Gulf region, or to south-east Asia or anywhere else, the government's role has been perceived as that of a *facilitator in finding gainful employment to the maximum number of persons,* now increasingly under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) of the WTO negotiations. In contrast, high-skill migration is still associated with permanent migration whereas the reality is that there too the primacy of temporary and circulatory migration policies has led to splitting of families.

4.4 The Binary of Civil Rights: Dual-citizenship *vs* Voting Rights

For some time, the dual citizenship policy of India had been driven by a dichotomy of civil rights, as only PIOs in 16 select developed countries were given the eligibility to apply for it. It was only later, in 2006, that its purview was expanded and the privilege was offered in all countries, excepting Bangladesh and Pakistan.

Of the government measures and programmes in India, the Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI) – the dual citizenship - is an important landmark in redefining the contours of a *migration policy* in the new millennium, not merely for India but for a transnationally 'interconnected' world that is perceived to be emerging. This measure seems to be beneficial mainly to the highly skilled migrants in the developed countries though, as those in the developing countries apprehend a backlash from the local regimes, for suspecting their loyalties. Under the second measure, in contrast, the Indian citizens abroad would have the right to exercise their votes from abroad; it is primarily meant for the Indian unskilled workers in the Gulf region, to those who can never hope to become naturalized citizens of those countries because of the restrictive regimes there.

This binary of dual citizenship for PIOs and voting rights for NRIs, however, overlooks the question as to what would happen when NRIs start becoming PIOs *en masse* and are eventually granted voting rights?

5. Conclusion: Bridging the Binaries

In terms of the impact on migrant workers themselves in the destination countries (and therefore on their families back in India), there are commonalities and similarities of exploitation which have emerged between unskilled migration to the Gulf and skilled migration to South-east Asia (Khadria and Leclerc, 2006). Of course, there has been concern followed by diplomatic action at the plight of the migrant workers of Indian origin employed abroad whenever a crisis erupted, be it the Gulf war, or the Iraq war, or the random abductions of Indian truck drivers, or the beheading of an Indian engineer by the terrorists in Afghanistan, or the sudden arrests of Indian IT professionals in Malaysia or the Netherlands (*Hindustan Times, Times of India, Strait Times,* April-May, 2006). However, binaries are such that whereas India virtually exerts no control over migration flows of highly skilled categories, unskilled migration flows are controlled only to the extent they fall under the purview of the Emigration Clearance Required (ECR) category of passports. As a result, what has not been looked into is the possibility that migration itself has created a sense of desperation amongst the low-income Indian populace who emigrate for the sake of upward socio-economic mobility of their families left behind in India, even braving the risks that accompany migration overseas. Similarly, in the case of high-skill migration, there have been no studies on its impact on career and educational choices in India, a country in which a lot of choice distortion and inter-generational or even inter-community conflicts over educational choices have taken place but remained un-analysed if not un-noticed[19] (Khadria, 2004b; NCAER 2005)

In fact, it was the Gulf war of 1990-91 that had woken up the Indian policy makers about the vulnerability of its workers in the Gulf region, and the importance of their remittances to the economy. The increase in petroleum prices, associated with fall in remittances of Indian workers in Kuwait and Iraq and the expenditure of airlifting Indian citizens from the Gulf region,[20] all stressed the Indian economy so much that they precipitated a reforms process in the early 1990s. However, with shifts in the paradigm of migration, it was the perception of high-skill emigration to developed countries which had changed much more dramatically than that on labour migration to the Gulf countries. Thus, in the mid-1980s, the political perception of "brain drain" had suddenly given way to the perception of "brain bank" abroad. Through the 1990s, the gradual success and achievements of the Indian migrants in the US - particularly led by "bodyshopping" of the software professionals to the US from Bangalore, India's Silicon Valley, and working towards averting the looming global crisis of Y2K, drew real attention of the developed countries in the West and the East alike (Van der Veer, 2005: 279). What followed was a change of attitude in India too, towards its migrants abroad, now being given a singular identity called the "Indian diaspora" or even "Indiaspora" as was once proposed.[21] The paradigm shift in the perception about professional migrants leaving India, thus took place in phases: from the 'brain drain' of the 1960s and the 1970s to the 'brain bank' of the 1980s and 1990s, and subsequently to 'brain gain' in the twenty-first century (Khadria, 2006).

What is required to bridge the binaries is to design an exhaustive generic classification for occupations – ranging from 'manual/unskilled', to 'semi-skilled' and 'skilled', and professional

[19] The present agitation over reservation of seats in higher education is a case in point.

[20] A feat that had got Air India entry into the Guinness Book of Records!

[21] There is enough evidence of diaspora-India interaction that has been documented in the media lately. It was around this time that the Indian government appointed the High-Level Committee on Indian Diaspora.

talents, (by levels of education and occupation/experience), which would have international recognition as services under the GATS (Khadria, 2004b). Secondly, the various stakeholders needed to be distinctly identified: the migrant workers themselves, their spouses and their families, the training/certifying institutions, the accrediting agencies, the manufacturers using the talents, the service consumers, and the state itself. Thirdly, the interests inherent in the receiving-country stakes for streamlining the migrant flows needed to be spelt out, specifically and explicitly for overseas employment of various types – temporary, revolving, and permanent. Fourthly, schemes and processes of job-search, job-certification, hedging against uncertainties, compensation mechanism, return passage – preventive as well as curative (like overseas job insurance scheme), education/training of children left behind; their health guarantee, channelization of designated minimum amounts and maximum proportions of remittances to be spent on human-capital building activities, with matching grants from the state and so on needed to be explored. Finally, the apparent tension that has arisen in recent years between the interests of the state and the interest of the corporate sector in relation to international migration from India has to be taken into account. Private multinational enterprises that wish to boost their global competitiveness and expand their markets feel that they must be able to recruit their employees and import them much more freely from India. When they were unable to do so because of their own countries' restrictive immigration policies, they moved in part or all of their enterprises to India where they were able to find the workers they needed, both skilled and unskilled.

In this emerging scenario, if the "average productivity" of the unskilled migrant-to-be workers in India can be raised from its present low level, then poorly skilled Indian migrants from poorer regions of the country would also have the option of either migrating to the rest of the world unhindered, or attracting enterprises from abroad, or choosing an optimum mix of both. The problem would lie with the divisive policies of the developed receiving countries who find the binaries between the skilled and the unskilled migration very handy in serving their objectives – both short-term and long-term. What appears to be a useful policy tool is an "adversary analysis" whereby the contribution to social and economic development in countries of origin would be assessed from the point of view of the stakeholders in countries of destination and vice versa. To do this in a multilateral international-relations framework at fora like the GATS under WTO, binaries have to be deconstructed first. The advantages derived by the developed countries of the North, primarily through higher migrant turnover in-built in the binaries, are inherent in their objectives of (a) bringing in younger migrants to correct the age-composition bias in their ageing population, (b) keeping the wage and pension commitments low by replacing older and long-term permanent migrants with younger and short-term temporary migrants, and (c) stockpiling the latest vintage of knowledge embodied in younger cohorts of skilled workers respectively, what I stylistically call the 'trinity' of Age, Wage, and Vintage (Khadria, 2006a:194). It remains to be explored and judged what the counterpart costs are of these to the origin countries like India.

The destination countries, in which the Indian professional migrants have settled to form a diaspora, are expected to play a catalyst's role in the exercise of bridging the binaries. The change of values could be brought about by the Indian diaspora itself that has defied doomsday predictions by their spectacular economic success in the destination countries, leading to a paradigm shift in societies and regions where Indians have settled.[22] The

[22] Today, Britain a fabulous repository of success stories of the Indian professional diaspora, ranging from Lord Swraj Paul, to steel magnate Laxmi Mittal, to icons like Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen.

opportunity lies partly in the realization of the host countries that, given the appropriate help, resources, and local support, one type of migrants, the suspected 'social parasite', would transform themselves into the other, the social boon, or as someone has phrased it, the white West's 'great *off-white* hope'! (Albinia, 2000).

After bridging the binaries, what is the required, however, would be a long-term holistic policy (rather than one fragmented into binaries) that is aimed at establishing India's links with the Indian diaspora, as a constituency that could be tapped for sustainable socio-economic development in the country. To arrive at a 'win-win' situation in international relations for the trinity of stakeholders – India as a country of origin, the Indian migrants as part of its diaspora, and the destination countries of the skilled and unskilled migrants - a set of two specific conditions must be met: A 'necessary condition' of significant global geo-economic presence of the "Indian workers", whether skilled or unskilled; and a 'sufficient condition' of India deriving *sustainable* benefits from that global geo-economic presence. In terms of the large stocks and flows of Indian skilled as well as unskilled workers abroad, and the migrants establishing excellent records of accomplishment in the labour markets of the destination countries, the first condition is automatically fulfilled. To satisfy the second, sufficient condition of India deriving significant gains from the global geo-economic presence of the Indian migrants, their 'participation' must be directed not primarily towards trade and business but towards the removal of two kinds of poverty in India - the 'poverty of education' and the 'poverty of health' – areas in which migration has so far failed to change society. Large masses of the illiterate/uneducated population, incapacitated by their poor health status are the root causes of India having one of the lowest levels of average productivity of labour, and therefore the lowest average wages in the world - a binary of paradox when Indian diaspora members, on the average, form one amongst the largest contributing ethnic communities in their countries of destination. For example, it is indeed paradoxical that the average per-hour contribution of each employed worker within India to the production of India's gross domestic product (GDP) has been amongst the lowest in the world, a mere 37 cents as compared to that of the United States' 37 dollars, i.e., one-hundredth of the latter. This is naturally ironical, because the same average Indian employed abroad contributes to a very high average share to the GDP of the country where one settles and works, as cited earlier (Khadria, 2002).

This sets a 'double challenge' of public policy for a sending country like India: first, to convince its own diaspora community to rethink the development process in India as a 'bottom up' creation and enhancement of sustainable productivities of labour through development of education and health rather than a 'top down' development through participation in business and industry - one comprehensive, the other dispersed; one long-term, the other immediate. It is not just a matter of willingness; in many instances, it would entail long periods of struggle in creating the decision-making and priority-setting discerning abilities, or *capabilities*, amongst leaders of the migrant communities. Secondly, India must be able to convince the countries of destination (and the other countries of origin as well) as to where the binary of distinction between the most 'painful' and the most 'gainful' socio-economic impacts of migration of its workers – both skilled and unskilled lies. The 'adversary analysis' would help a country like India in multilateral fora to press for international norms in the Mode 4 negotiations of the GATS around the issue of movement of natural persons as service providers under trade, which is just another description for promoting the temporary entry of migrants. At multilateral dialogues, the so-called "vulnerability of the unskilled

migrants" and the "instability of 'skill-points' in immigrant quotas" underlying the 'open-and-shut policy' of the destination countries, creates a binary that must be bridged for making a correct beginning.

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